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Abstract 
Finance is considered as “the lifeblood of the economy” and it is integral to a country’s 
economic growth and stability. However, this perception has been called into question, 
particularly following the global financial crisis, giving rise to new research questions. For 
example, does too much finance harm economic growth? And does the financial sector serve 
society’s economic and social needs? 
 
 
This thesis aims to provide cross-sectional and time-series evidence on the macroeconomic 
consequences of financialisation in an international context. Financialisation is defined as the 
increase in the size and importance of a country’s financial sector relative to the overall 
economy. The primary objective of this research is to examine the robustness of the relationship 
between financialisation, on the one hand, and economic growth and income inequality, on the 
other. The technique of extreme bounds analysis (EBA)—proposed by Leamer (1983, 1985) 
and its modified variant suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997)—is used to address the model 
uncertainty problem inherent in econometric analysis. EBA is extended to examine the 
robustness of other potential determinants of economic growth and income inequality. Another 
main objective is to investigate potential nonlinearity in the relationship between 
financialisation, economic growth and income inequality, which amounts to finding out if the 
financial Kuznets curve exists.  
 
The initial analysis, based on Leamer’s EBA, reveals that “nothing is robust” of the 
determinants of economic growth and income inequality. The analysis proceeds by using the 
Sala-i-Martin EBA, producing results suggesting that the effects of financialisation on 
economic growth are not robust with respect to changes in model specification (the choice of 
XVII 
 
explanatory variables). However, the results reveal that trade openness, unemployment, 
economic freedom, school years, the agriculture sector share of GDP, the manufacturing sector 
share of GDP, population growth, urban population growth, government size, and labour force 
are robust determinants of economic growth. Moreover, the results of Sala-i-Martin EBA for 
income inequality suggest that financialisation is a leading driver of income inequality and that 
the effects are larger when transmitted through financial markets channels. The positive sign 
of the coefficients on the financialisation variables is in line with the inequality widening 
hypothesis and the recent evidence found in the financialisation literature. Furthermore, higher 
levels of financialisation boost the top 10% income share, which is consistent with the famous 
findings of Piketty (2014). In addition, the results show that law and order, labour union 
density, population, globalization, remittances, education, and agriculture sector share are 
considered as robust determinants of income inequality. 
 
Supporting evidence is found for nonlinearity in the relationships between financialisation, 
economic growth and income inequality—based on annual data for 20 developed and 
developing countries—which may suggest the existence of the financial Kuznets curve (FKC). 
The FKC is represented by an inverted U-shaped curve for the finance-growth and finance-
inequality relationships. The growth and inequality FKCs are estimated using the Phillips and 
Hansen (1990) fully modified ordinary least square (FMOLS) and the unobserved components 
model (UCM) developed by Andrew Harvey (1989). The empirical results lend support to 
previous findings of the growth-FKC nexus in all countries except for Mexico and Turkey. The 
results of estimating the inequality version of the financial Kuznets curve provide support for 
the existence of a U-shaped curve as well as an inverted U-shaped curve in more than half of 
the sample countries. The estimated turning points of the growth and inequality financial 
Kuznets curves fall in the range 100% to 130%, depending on the measure of financialisation 
XVIII 
 
used. Overall, the findings of this research demonstrate that excessive growth of the financial 
sector can become a drag on the real economy.  
 
Keywords: Financialisation, Financial Development, Financial Structure, Economic Growth, 
Income Inequality, Extreme Bounds Analysis, Unobserved Components Model 
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Chapter One   
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
During the past three decades, the financial sector has grown enormously in size and 
complexity, which begs the question whether or not the economy benefits from this growth. 
There is no doubt that finance plays a crucial role in the functioning of the modern economy. 
Simply put, the financial sector provides intermediation between savers and investors, as well 
as credit and payment mechanisms, all of which are necessary for a well-functioning economy. 
However, the advent of the global financial crisis has shown that the financial sector 
(particularly an oversized financial sector) can be detrimental to growth and economic stability 
(the crisis led to the great recession).1 In his presidential address to the American Finance 
Association, Luigi Zingales (2015) stated that “at the current state of knowledge there is no 
theoretical reason or empirical evidence to support the notion that all growth in the financial 
sector over the last 40 years has been beneficial to society”. Moreover, He argued that there 
was ample empirical evidence indicating that some financial sector components can degenerate 
to rent-seeking activity.  
 
Accordingly, the financialisation thesis is crucial to the understanding of the role of finance 
within the contemporary economy and provides alternative channels for the effects of the 
financial sector on the real economy. Financialisation (or the financialisation process) is a 
concept that is used to describe the rise of finance, mainly since the 1980s. It is defined as “the 
increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
 
1 For example, it has been found that recessions last 18 months longer when they are associated with financial 
crises (Kannan et al., 2014). 
2 
 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein, 2005). 
According to the Oxford Living Dictionary, it is “the process by which financial institutions, 
markets, etc., increase in size and influence”.2 The concept of financialisation intertwines with 
financial development in many aspects, but it is more often linked to the negative consequences 
of the later stage when the financial sector becomes “too big”.3 
 
The growing literature on financialisation investigates the negative consequences of an 
oversized financial sector, whereby the marginal effect of finance becomes insignificant (or 
negative) when the size of the financial sector exceeds a certain threshold. Moosa (2016) 
stresses the presence of excessive finance or the “finance curse”, which signals the threat of 
overdependence on the financial sector. In this sense, Shaxson (2019) compares the 
financialisation process to the natural resources curse (the Dutch disease). He argues that “in 
the era of financialisation, the corporate bosses and their advisers, and the financial sector, have 
moved away from creating wealth for the economy, and towards extracting wealth from the 
economy using financial techniques”. The finance curse, which symbolizes the ultimate 
manifestation of the financialisation of the economy, produces detrimental effects for 
economies hosting oversized financial sectors and shares many similarities with the “resource 
curse” that affects mineral-rich countries (Christensen et al., 2016). 
 
Moreover, the literature on the effects of finance on economic growth and income inequality 
produces conflicting results. Both theoretical and empirical studies are equivocal about the real 
effects of finance. The recent literature reveals changes in the perceived view of the effects of 
finance on the real economy. Many theoretical and empirical explanations have been 
 
2 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/financialisation 
3 A thorough discussion of the concept of financialisation and its origins can be found in section 2.3 of chapter 2. 
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introduced for this issue, including the financial structure, nonlinearity and model uncertainty. 
Above all, the model uncertainty issue appears on the top of list. Part of the problem is the lack 
of a specific theory that identifies the set of growth or inequality determinants that should 
appear in the true model and the existence of several theories that are not mutually exclusive. 
This problem is intensified in the presence of significant model uncertainties in econometric 
studies, which casts a shadow over the reliability of drawing inferences from empirical results. 
In this sense, Steel (2017) argues that the lack of consensus may reflect the model uncertainty 
problem inherent in economic modelling. 
 
Moreover, the recent evidence suggests that the divergence of results could be attributed to two 
main reasons: (i) a fundamental change of the finance-growth relationship, and (ii) the 
relationship is non-monotonic (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Arcand et al., 2015b). In this 
sense, Gründler (2018) attributes nonlinearity between finance and growth to fundamental 
changes in the transmission mechanisms of finance. The empirical analysis used in this 
research reassesses the current divergence of results in the literature. For this purpose, a 
sensitivity analysis is carried out using extreme bounds analysis (EBA)—introduced by 
Edward Leamer (1983) and its modified variant as suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997)—to 
address model uncertainty arising from the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the set of 
explanatory variables and the underlying measure of financialisation. Moreover, different time 
series methodologies are applied to examine the non-monotonicity of the relationship between 
financialisation, on one hand, economic growth and income inequality, on the other. 
 
1.2 Research Motivation, Aims and Objectives 
Finance is believed to play a decisive role in the process of economic development, but there 
have been competing propositions about the role and contribution of finance throughout the 
4 
 
history of capitalism. However, the growing financial sector share of the economy and 
recurrent financial crises have revived the desire to investigate the contributions of the financial 
sector to the economy. The divergence of empirical evidence on the effects of finance on 
economic growth and income inequality has urged many economists to call for more empirical 
contributions that would push a step further towards understanding the relationships among 
finance, economic growth, and income inequality (for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 
2009).  
 
This research aims for a more rigorous understanding of the impact of the recent rise of finance. 
More specifically, this research aims to provide cross-sectional and time-series evidence on the 
macroeconomic consequences of the financialisation process, with a focus on the post-crisis 
period. Consequently, the first objective of this research is to conduct a sensitivity analysis 
using the extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to investigate the robustness of the relationships 
between financialisation, economic growth and income inequality. Sensitivity analysis is 
extended to investigate the robustness of other potential determinants of economic growth and 
income inequality, as suggested by economic theory and the empirical literature. The second 
objective is to investigate the robustness of the indirect channels whereby financialisation 
influences economic growth and income inequality. The third objective is to provide time series 
evidence on the direct effects of financialisation on economic growth and income inequality 
and how these effects vary with the level of economic development and financial structure. Yet 
another objective is to provide time series evidence on the nonlinearity hypothesis of the 
relationship between financialisation, economic growth and income inequality, ultimately 
revealing evidence for or against the financial Kuznets curve. 
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1.3 Research Contributions 
The contribution of this research to the literature is threefold. First, the macroeconomic 
consequences of financialisation on economic growth and income inequality is examined at 
various levels of economic development and the type of financial structure (bank-based and 
market-based). This study provides cross-sectional and time-series evidence on the effects of 
financialisation on economic growth and income inequality.  
 
Second, this study provides a methodological contribution by applying extreme bounds 
analysis to deal with the model uncertainty arising from the sensitivity of the results to changes 
in model specifications—the sensitivity of the results to the choice of explanatory variables. 
This contribution is of utmost importance considering the present divergence of the empirical 
evidence on finance-growth and finance-inequality relationships. The findings of this research 
will highlight the uncertainty surrounding the relationships among financialisation, economic 
growth and income inequality. Moreover, this research provides a comprehensive examination 
of the set of robust determinants of economic growth and income inequality. The analysis is 
applied to samples of developed and developing countries, which enables a comparison of the 
determinants of economic growth and income inequality between the two country groups. 
 
Third, this research provides time series evidence on nonlinearity in the relationships among 
financialisation, economic growth and income inequality in the the financialisation era. 
Investigation of the nonlinearity hypothesis will reveal whether the financial Kuznets curve 
exists. Accordingly, the obtained thresholds from the estimation results of the financial Kuznets 
curve can be used to advocate an optimal size range for the financial sector. Taken as a whole, 
it is hoped that this research contributes to the debate of on the role of finance in the modern 
economy and enhance the knowledge about the current role of the financial sector. 
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis comprises eight chapters including this introductory chapter. In Chapter 2 the 
theoretical and historical background of the financialisation process is reviewed while 
presenting an exposition of the origins of the financialisation concept from different 
perspectives. The exposition reveals that excessive financial sector growth and financial 
deregulation are the most prominent trends of the financialisation process. The review links the 
growing financialisation literature to the well-established financial development literature.  
 
In Chapter 3 a survey of the significant finance-growth and finance-inequality literature is 
presented, highlighting the contributions that have been made in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. Moreover, a synthesis is provided of the significant theoretical and empirical 
studies that discuss the consequences of the financialisation process. The review suggests that 
several important aspects of the financial sector and the economy should be considered in the 
empirical analysis—most importantly, the level of economic development, type of finance and 
the financial structure. The review draws heavily on the too much finance literature and the 
evidence on the non-monotonicity of the relationships among financialisation, economic 
growth and income inequality, which implies the existence of the financial Kuznets curve.  
 
The methodology used to conduct the empirical analysis is explained in Chapter 4. The focus 
is on addressing model uncertainty by applying extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to cross 
sectional analysis. Subsequently, several time series methodologies are used to investigate 
nonlinearity in the relationships among financialisation, economic growth and income 
inequality. EBA is applied to examine the robustness of the financialisation variables as 
determinants of economic growth and income inequality in chapters 5 and 6. Two variants of 
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EBA are applied—traditional EBA (Leamer’s EBA) and its modified variant by Sala-i-Martin. 
Moreover, the analysis is extended, in both chapters, to investigate the robustness of other 
potential determinants of economic growth and income inequality, as suggested by economic 
theory and the empirical literature. 
 
In Chapter 7 the nonlinearity hypothesis of the relationships among financialisation, economic 
growth and income inequality is investigated with consideration to the level of economic 
development and the type of financial structure. The empirical analysis is based on annual data 
covering 20 developed and developing countries for the period 1980 to 2015. The variable 
addition test and non-nested model selection tests are used initially to examine functional form 
(quadratic vs linear). Subsequently, the financial Kuznets curve (FKC) is estimated using the 
Phillips-Hansen (1990) fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and the unobserved components model 
(UCM) of Andrew Harvey (1989). The use of the UCM is of utmost importance as it accounts 
for missing variables, without the need for them to appear explicitly in the model, by including 
stochastic trend and cyclical components. Last but not least, Chapter 8 summarizes the research 
and recapitulates the main findings. Subsequently, research implications and recommendations 
are outlined, and avenues for future research are provided.  
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Chapter Two 
Financialisation: Historical and Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Financialisation is the latest, and probably the most widely used term, by scholars trying to 
“name” and understand the contemporary rise of finance and its powerful role in the past four 
decades. By and large, financialisation is the neologism assigned to the massive growth in size 
and importance of finance (Seccareccia, 2013; Davis, 2017) 
 
A widely adopted definition is put forward by Epstein (2005) who defines financialisation as 
“the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”. However, 
subsequent research shows that financialisation combines a complex array of interrelated 
processes and that it has been understood in different ways by different authors. Section 2.3 
presents a thorough discussion of the concept of financialisation and its origins. 
 
Economists hold paradoxical views of the role played by finance in the real economy. Bagehot 
(1873) and Schumpeter (1934) were pioneers as they stressed the critical role of finance in 
growth and economic development. This view is supported by Miller (1998) who describes the 
contribution of finance to growth as “too obvious for a serious discussion”. At the other 
extreme, Nobel laureate Robert Lucas (1988) depresses the importance of finance in economic 
development as “very badly over-stressed”.  
 
Notwithstanding the contradictory views of the role played by finance, by the last decade of 
the twentieth century, an extensive literature established a consensus amongst academics and 
9 
 
policy makers of the role of finance in promoting economic growth and development. This was 
followed by waves of financial liberalisation and deregulation across advanced economies and 
worldwide, resulting in unceasing growth of financial sector (Hudson, 2010; Kus, 2012; 
Sawyer, 2013).  By the end of the twentieth century, finance was considered as the “lifeblood 
of the economy” where a well-functioning financial system is integral to the growth and 
stability of the real economy (Levine, 2005).  
 
The global financial crisis led to widespread doubt of the contribution of finance to growth and 
the promised contributions of finance in general. Zingales (2015) argues that ample empirical 
evidence indicates that some financial sector components can degenerate to rent seeking 
activity. Thriving literature finds not only a weakening effect in the positive impact of financial 
development on economic growth but also a negative effect of excessive finance on growth 
(Panizza, 2012; Allen et al., 2014). For instance, the 2009 World of Work Report, published by 
International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS), states that the financial sector has massive 
growth beyond the reasonable boundaries and that its practices have spread to the real economy 
(IILS, 2009). Similar policy reports share the same concerns—for example, a recent report 
published by the OECD shows that adverse effects of credit on economic growth increase 
disproportionately to the rise of household credit relative to business credit (OECD, 2015). 
 
The adverse effects of the growth of the financial sector have been studied in the 
financialisation literature. Financialisation is primarily linked to the increasing indebtedness of 
the non-productive sectors of the economy as well as the disproportionate increase of financial 
activity to real activity as critical features of the modern economy (Krippner, 2005; Orhangazi, 
2011; Moosa, 2016; Davis, 2017; Karwowski et al., 2017). According to Sawyer (2016) and 
Van der Zwan (2014), the literature on the consequences of financialisation centred mainly on 
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three different levels. The first is the autonomous growth of the financial sector and its 
subcomponents, with focus on the role of financial markets in capitalist advanced economies. 
The second is the financialisation of non-financial corporations. The third is the financialisation 
of households. Hence, financialisation has taken a broader perspective, but less optimistic, on 
the macroeconomic consequences of the financial sector (Sawyer, 2016). 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews briefly the envisaged role 
of finance in the modern economy. Section 2.3 discusses the concept of financialisation and its 
origins. Section 2.4 explores the link between financial deregulation and financialisation. 
Section 2.5 introduces the excessive finance literature. The macroeconomic consequences of 
financialisation are described in section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes this chapter.  
 
2.2 The Role of Finance  
Finance is considered as an indispensable prerequisite to the process of economic development. 
The idea that financial intermediation plays a vital role in supporting the process of economic 
development is directly linked to the works of Bagehot (1873) and Schumpeter (1934) 
(Fernández and Tamayo, 2017; Beck and Levine, 2018). Schumpeter (1934) argued that 
finance fosters growth by extending “entrepreneurial finance” opportunities. In their famous 
article “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right”, King and Levine (1993a) were 
among the first to validate empirically the views of Schumpeter, where they find support for a 
positive contribution of finance to capital accumulation and growth. 
 
The Nobel laureate Robert C. Merton identifies the main functions of the financial system by 
suggesting that “the core function of the financial system is to facilitate the allocation and 
deployment of economic resources, both spatially and across time, in an uncertain 
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environment” (Merton, 1990). According to Levine (2005), finance fosters economic growth 
by carrying out and improving the following broad functions: (i) collecting production of ex 
ante information about possible investments; (ii) monitoring of investments and execution of 
corporate governance; (iii) assisting trading, diversification, and risk management; (iv) pooling 
of savings; and (v) easing the exchange of goods and services. In addition, the growth literature 
shows that the financial sector promotes economic growth by supporting the main sources of 
growth: physical capital accumulation and human capital accumulation. These two factors are 
present in all growth theories and the famous Cobb–Douglas production function.4 Generally, 
financial development boosts the rate of physical capital accumulation and total factor 
productivity growth (Beck et al., 2000; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Rioja and Valev, 2004b). 
 
2.3 The Concept of Financialisation  
 
2.3.1 Neologism Origins 
The financialisation literature suggests that the financialisation neologism first appeared in the 
last decade of the twentieth century (Sawyer, 2013). Similarly, Foster (2007) asserts that the 
term origins are obscure, although he gives credit to Kevin Phillips for employing the notion 
in his writings in the early 1990s.5 However, an earlier attempt to utilise the concept of 
financialisation can be found. In particular, Bhatia and Khatkhate (1975) refer to 
financialisation as the ratio of financial assets to GNP, which they use to examine the impact 
of financial intermediation on economic growth in selected African countries. 
 
4 The Cobb–Douglas production function depicts the relationship between factors of production (labour and 
capital) and output (Cobb and Douglas, 1928). The standard form is represented by the equation 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡1−𝛼𝛼, 
where Y is total production, L is the labour input, K is the capital input, A is total factor productivity and α and 1-
α are the output elasticities of capital and labour, respectively.   
5  Foster (2007) states that “the current usage of the term ‘financialisation’ owes much to the work of Kevin 
Phillips, who employed it in his Boiling Point (New York: Random House, 1993) and a year later devoted a key 
chapter of his Arrogant Capital to the ‘Financialisation of America,’ defining financialisation as ‘a prolonged 
split between the divergent real and financial economies’ (New York: Little, Brown, and Co., 1994).” 
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The use of the term grew rapidly in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, as it has been 
mentioned regularly in the academic literature and press since 2008, as a reflection on the 
global financial crisis. Christophers (2015) contends that the global financial crisis has revived 
interest in the financialisation process and helped to bring the topic from “the periphery to the 
mainstream of scholarly inquiry across several social–scientific disciplines”.6 
 
Financialisation is a concept that gives a sense of variant aspects of the set of phenomena across 
many disciplines (Van der Zwan, 2014; Godechot, 2016). As a result, the macroeconomic 
consequences of the financial sector have been perceived in different ways by different schools 
of thought (Hein, 2010; Stockhammer, 2013a). Epstein (2015) divides the literature into two 
groups. The first is the Marxist and regulation school approaches that focus on financialisation 
as a new stage of capitalism and therefore a new regime of accumulation. The second comprises 
scholars (primarily post-Keynesian scholars) who attempt to analyse theoretically and 
empirically the effect of financialisation on growth, investment, distribution, consumption, 
productivity and financial crises.  
 
2.3.2 Definition of Financialisation  
Although there is a far-reaching consensus of the general theme of the financialisation process 
as the growing size and importance of the financial sector and its subcomponents, the available 
definitions lack coherence in terms of operationalization for the purpose of empirical research. 
For instance, Epstein’s definition of financialisation has been criticised for the “lack the 
analytical precision” (Hein, 2010). Similarly, Stockhammer (2010) and Zezza (2018) stress the 
 
6 According to Investopedia, mainstream economics is a term used to describe schools of economic thought 
considered to be orthodox. Many of the underlying categories within and concepts central to mainstream 
economics are readily taught at universities. It is used to describe theories often considered part of the neoclassical 
economics tradition.  
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lack of precision in wide definitions similar to that of Epstein (2005). However, they 
acknowledge the sense of the pervasiveness of financialisation it delivers.   
 
The term “financialisation” has been used to refer to different but interconnected phenomena 
such as the ascendancy of the shareholders’ value orientation and changing corporate 
governance regime (Lazonick and O’sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2011), financial globalization 
(Levy-Orlik, 2013), the rise of financial activity of the non-financial corporations (Duménil 
and Lévy, 2004; Stockhammer, 2004; Crotty, 2005; Krippner, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008; 
Stockhammer, 2008), increasing household indebtedness, and the autonomy of the financial 
system (Lapavitsas, 2009b; Toporowski, 2010; Bezemer and Hudson, 2016). Hence, Fine 
(2013) suggests that financialisation should be understood from the scope of its logical, 
theoretical and historical contexts. Generally, the term has been used to describe changes in the 
structure of the financial sector and its interactions with the real economy (van Treeck, 2009; 
Hein, 2010; Palley, 2013). In this sense, Aalbers (2016) defines financialisation as the 
“increasing dominance of financial actors, markets, practices, measurements, and narratives at 
various scales, resulting in a structural transformation of economies, firms (including financial 
institutions), states, and households”. 
 
Krippner (2005) argues that financialisation is “a pattern of accumulation in which profits 
accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity 
production”. Krippner’s definition is closely associated with the view of financialisation as 
“the ascendancy of shareholder value as a mode of corporate governance” (Clarke, 2014). The 
literature suggests that financialisation is associated with the rise of the shareholder value 
orientation as a new corporate governance regime, as well as increasing financial investment 
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and financial payments of non-financial corporations (Lazonick and O’sullivan, 2000; 
Stockhammer, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008). 
 
Financialisation as a new stage of capitalism or “monopoly-finance capital” is viewed as a 
structural change of different economic agents arising from financial sector dominance (Foster, 
2007, 2010a). Stated differently, it is a “systemic transformation of mature capitalist 
economies” (Lapavitsas, 2011). In addition, the financialisation of capitalist economies has 
been closely linked to other processes in place—namely, neoliberalisation and globalization 
(Sawyer, 2018). Komlik (2015) describes financialisation as “the ascendancy of finance”, as 
well as “a key feature of Neoliberalism”. Overall, financialisation is viewed as a process that 
captures the changing structure of interaction between financial and real sectors, both from 
macro and micro perspectives (Stockhammer, 2010, 2013a). 
 
2.3.3 Financialisation and  Financial Development 
Financialisation refers to the massive expansion of the financial system mostly in developed 
capitalist economies. However, the term has been used in different ways at the macro level. 
First, financialisation is used interchangeably with financial development, where both refer to 
the size of intermediation in the financial system (financial depth).7 In this sense, 
financialisation refers to the size of the financial sector at any level (Bhatia and Khatkhate, 
1975; Tridico and Pariboni, 2018). Moosa (2018a) suggests that financial development is an 
early stage of financialisation where contribution of finance to the real economy is still positive 
whereas excessive financialisation is a late stage where an oversized large financial sector 
exerts adverse effects of the real economy. 
 
7 It is noteworthy that financial development in this sense refers to the size of financial sector or financial depth. 
Generally, financial development is a wider concept that comprises financial sector depth, access and efficiency. 
For example, broadly used measures of financial depth in the literature are the ratio of private credit to GDP and 
stock market capitalisation to GDP.  
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Second, the concept of financialisation is contrary to that of financial development. Financial 
development indicates a favourable growth of financial sector and its positive impact on 
economic development, whereas financialisation is often used to refer to the downside of 
excessive growth of financial sector, where an oversized sector adversely affects the process 
of economic development (Sawyer, 2013; Van der Zwan, 2014; Davis and Kim, 2015; Epstein, 
2015; Barradas and Lagoa, 2017a; Whalen, 2017).  
 
Third, financialisation is considered to be an advanced stage of excessive financial 
development as well as a part of a new stage of capitalism or “finance-led capitalism” 
(Lapavitsas, 2013a; Plys, 2014). This suggests that financial sector developed along with the 
rise of neoliberalisation and globalization, implying that the financialisation process is linked 
to the evolution of the financial system within capitalist economies. Barradas (2015) identifies 
three stages of financial development: (i) the financial repression stage, when the financial 
sector is subject to many regulations and restrictions; (ii) the financial development stage, 
which started after the financial liberalisation activity in the 1980s when the financial sector 
experienced exponential growth and witnessed the emergence of financial derivatives, 
securitization and shadow banking; and (iii) the financialisation stage, which refers to the 
aggressive increase in the size and power of the financial sector that might exert negative 
effects on the economy.  
 
From a historical perspective, the financialisation process is not a phenomenon of the 1980s—
rather, it is a part of the transitory phase of the role of finance in economic development. For 
instance, Fasianos et al. (2018) argue that financialisation is a recurring process in economic 
history. They suggest that the 20th century can be divided into four phases, in which the first 
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phase (1900-1933) and the current phase represents the “neoliberal phase of capitalism”, where 
both phases have the same aspects upon which they can be described as financialisation epochs 
despite some institutional and formal differences. The other two phases include the transitory 
phase (1933-1940) and the “de-financialisation” phase (1940-1973). This classification is 
based on distinct factors such as the relative size of the financial sector, regulatory regimes, the 
presence of the shareholders value ideology and the level of financial innovation. 
 
Vercelli (2013) notes the presence of a “secular tendency toward financialisation that is 
intrinsic in the development of market relations”. He interprets financialisation as a phase of 
acceleration in the secular trend and de-financialisation as a phase of deceleration. 
Furthermore, he identifies two financialisation episodes in the twentieth century, the first of 
which appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century and continued until the beginning 
of the Great Depression. The second episode of financialisation, according to Vercelli (2013), 
surged after the collapse of the Bretton-Wood System and continues until now despite the 
global financial crisis.  
 
2.3.4 The Importance of the Financialisation Thesis 
The use of the concept of financialisation was limited to the non-mainstream literature. It was 
only after the global financial crisis that the term was adopted by the mainstream literature, 
such that reference to the concept has been growing since then. Figure 2.1 shows that 
publications on financialisation started to appear by the end of the last decade of the twentieth 
century at a rate of three to six publications per year. After the global financial crisis, there has 
been a strong acceleration of the publication growth from an average of 50 to 250 publications 
per year in 2018. 
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Moreover, there is a heated debate over the causes, consequences and the nature of 
financialisation, as evidenced by the financialisation, economy, society and sustainable 
development (FESSUD) project (Fontana, 2016). The project recognises that economic growth 
around the world has been heavily dependent on aspects of the financialisation process.8 The 
project seeks to understand how the financialisation process impacts the achievement of 
economic objectives among others. In other words, the objective is to understand the nature of 
the nexus between financialisation, economic development and financial system sustainability. 
The project came to an end in 2016, having produced numerous research publications that deal 
with many topics related to the financialisation process.9 
 
2.3.5 Critiques of the Financialisation Thesis 
The core of the financialisation hypothesis is the empirical and statistical observation of the 
symptoms, primarily the increasing dominance of finance, measured by the growth of the 
financial sector and growing financial activity. The main critiques of the financialisation 
neologism come from Jan Toporowski and Jo Michell, where Toporowski (2015) suggests that 
financialisation is an example of “spurious theoretical innovation (neologism) in economics”. 
 
 
8 The FESSUD project is made up of a team of economists and other social scientists from across Europe and 
South Africa, working at 14 leading universities and one European non-government organisation. http://fessud.eu/  
9 For a synthesis and overview of the project research outcomes, see Sawyer (2017a). 
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Figure 2.1: Research Activity on Financialisation, 2000-2018 
 
source: www.wizdom.ai 
 
Michell and Toporowski (2013) note the lack of coherence in the main veins of the 
financialisation literature that only provides evidence on the existence of the process. They 
suggest that more people have become active in financial markets in an unproductive way 
according to the classical political economy. However, this does not mean that finance becomes 
dominant over the real economy. Accordingly, they stress the need for a comprehensive theory 
that explains the reality behind the rise of finance. 
 
Furthermore, Michell and Toporowski (2013) claim that finance is still functioning in the same 
ways it is supposed to be as a follower of the real economy, not a driver as argued by those 
arguing for the presence of financialisation. According to them, the high turnover observed in 
financial markets is caused by a combination of four factors: (i) market finance, (i) financial 
innovation, (iii) active monetary policy, and (iv) hedging. These factors are specific processes 
that take place exclusively in economies with complex financial systems and they are 
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independent of the general process of financialisation. They believe that the conflict of 
multifaceted approaches to financialisation is due to the inability of scholars from different 
disciplines to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous changes in a more fundamental 
element of the economy. In particular, they note that the proponents of financialisation 
overlook the possibility that increasing activity of the banking sector and financial markets are 
endogenous themselves or a result of routine or fundamental changes in the economy. 10  
  
Nevertheless, Ioannou and Wójcik (2019) show that financialisation can be viewed as “a focal 
point for cross-disciplinary dialogue and collaboration”, and argue that the differences shaping 
the financialisation debate should be appreciated as potential avenues for future outcomes or a 
possible convergence of cross-disciplinary scholarly perceptions of financialisation. Moreover, 
a growing literature suggests that financialisation hypotheses provide an alternative 
explanation for several observed changes beyond the scope of current economic theories (for 
example, Van der Zwan, 2014; Epstein, 2015; Sawyer, 2017b; Tori and Onaran, 2018).   
 
2.4 Financial Deregulation and Financialisation 
The big waves of financial liberalisation and deregulation during the last two decades of the 
twentieth century resulted in the emergence of new markets for complex financial instruments 
that are (or at least were) believed to enhance the liquidity and efficiency of financial 
intermediation. Financial liberalisation was promoted by academics and practitioners who 
postulate that a deregulated financial system boosts economic development, as it generates 
more savings to finance real investments (Lavoie, 2012; Sawyer, 2013). Some economists 
argue that financial deregulation enhances welfare (Palley, 2013).  
 
 
10 For a detailed argument, see Michell and Toporowski (2013) 
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The literature on financial liberalisation advocates the proposition that financial market 
liberalisation is the path to higher growth and egalitarian economy, ignoring the potential 
downside consequences of financial activities (Fuller, 2016). However, recent research shows 
that excessive financial deregulation is identified as one of the main drivers of slow growth and 
rising inequality in advanced economies (Cournède and Denk, 2015b; Denk and Cournède, 
2015; OECD, 2015).  
 
 Krippner (2005) and Philippon and Reshef (2013) suggest that financial liberalisation and 
deregulation fuelled the great rise of the financial sector in the 1980s. Consequently, financial 
deregulation allowed for the rise of new investment vehicles, unregulated financial instruments, 
and shadow banking, which are used as speculation means that aggravate the instability of 
financial markets (Orhangazi, 2009; Lavoie, 2012; Sinapi, 2013).  
 
According to Crotty (2005), the main changes established by the neoliberal globalization are 
the decline in non-financial corporations profit rate concomitant with the rise of impatient 
finance (financial markets) and the rise of real interest rates. He refers to this observation as 
the “neoliberal paradox”, where non-financial corporations are under pressure to achieve high 
profit rates and increase their payout ratios in highly competitive product markets. Otherwise, 
they (the corporations) will be prone to stock price collapses and take-over threats in the market 
for corporate control. 
 
The effect of financial liberalisation is manifested in the increasing availability of speculation 
and leverage opportunities for non-financial firms as well as households. On one hand, 
financial deregulation prompted an expansion of financial sector activities, paving the way for 
financial innovation to create new sorts of profitable financial instruments. The new financial 
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instruments enabled speculation and higher levels of profit without being subject to the law of 
diminishing returns as in the real sector (Crotty, 2008). Therefore, the managers of the non-
financial corporations are increasingly turning to financial investment to satisfy their 
shareholder's appetite for value maximisation as measured by stock prices (Krippner, 2005).  
 
Shift in the financial practice of non-financial corporations was supported by the rise of the 
shareholders’ value orientation. Agency theory forced managers to maximise their 
shareholders’ value by increasing the payout to financial markets in the form of interest to 
creditors and dividends and stock buybacks to shareholders (Aglietta and Breton, 2001; 
Duménil and Lévy, 2004; Stockhammer, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008; Seo et al., 2016). Otherwise, 
managers would face the threats of being removed by hostile take-overs in the market for 
corporate control (Crotty, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008). 
 
On the other hand, the financialisation era has been characterised by the accumulation of debt.11 
The global financial crisis was preceded by a period of massive credit expansion and financial 
innovation, which led to the “great leverage” and eventually the crisis.12 According to the IMF 
(2009), this period shares the same features with the period prior to the Great Depression. 
Moreover, financial deregulation is a shock that leads to credit supply expansion and capital 
inflows that further lead to a boom-bust cycle in household debt and real economic activity 
(Mian and Sufi, 2018). 
 
Freeman (2010) argues that financiers “animal spirit” for excessive risk-taking had come at 
large consequences for the financial sector and the real economy culminated in the financial 
 
11 Financialisation era refers to the period starting in 1980, which experienced excessive financial deregulation 
and expansion of financial sector. 
12 The term “great leverage” has been coined by Taylor (2012) in reference to growing leverage and vulnerability 
in modern financialised economies. 
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turmoil of 2008.13 The deregulation of financial markets exacerbates the deleterious effects of 
recessions in the real economy. The IMF finds that recessions last 18 months longer when 
associated with financial crises (Kannan et al., 2014). In this sense, Kindleberger and Aliber 
(2005) argue that “deregulation has led to monetary expansion, foreign borrowing, and 
speculative investment”. Moreover, the effects of financialisation have been transmitted to 
commodity markets in the era of financial liberalisation (Dragotă, 2012). In the past, no 
evidence was available to link equity and commodity markets, but it has become very popular 
to have commodity futures in diversified portfolios (Cheng and Xiong, 2014).  Subsequently, 
an increasing number of studies have emerged to link the growth and volatility of commodity 
spot markets to the investments behaviour in corresponding futures markets as a result of the 
financialisation of these markets (Fattouh et al., 2013; Singleton, 2013). 
  
Finally, we should note that there are two main perspectives of the role of financial deregulation 
(liberalisation) with respect to the financialisation process. According to the first perspective, 
financial deregulation is considered as a component of the financialisation process that led to 
the proliferation of financial instruments and increasing capital inflows as well as volatility in 
foreign exchange markets (Stockhammer, 2008). According to the second perspective,  
financial deregulation and financial market liberalisation represent a prerequisite for the 
financialisation process following the neoliberal phase of capitalism (Dünhaupt, 2012; 
Fasianos et al., 2018).  
 
 
13 “Animal spirit” is a well-known term coined by Keynes (1936) to describe the human nature of speculation 
based on “spontaneous optimism” rather than mathematical expectation. The term is used regularly to refer to 
fierce investor behaviour in financial markets. 
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2.5 The Excessive Finance Hypothesis (The Finance Curse)14 
The favourable view of finance and the long expansion of the economy, starting from the 1980s 
in most advanced economies, have been put to an end by the global financial crisis. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, there has been a far-reaching recognition of the adverse consequences 
of excessive finance growth. A recent policy report by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) states that “finance is a vital ingredient of economic 
growth, but there can be too much of it” (OECD, 2015). In this sense, De Gregorio and Guidotti 
(1995) were the first to note that the effect on investment efficiency, rather than size, is the 
main transmission channel of financial development to economic growth. 
 
Following the global financial crisis, mainstream economists accepted and adopted the concept 
of financialisation, which is opposed to previously mainstream cherished terms such as “secular 
stagnation” and the “great moderation” that have been on the top of the research agenda for the 
first decade of the twentieth century.15 Over the same period, most advanced economies 
experienced an increase in the flow of credit to the finance and real estate sectors relative to 
other sectors, along with rising inequality and excessive credit and debt to firms and households 
(Aalbers, 2016).16 Aalbers argues that this period should be called the “great excess” or the 
“great financialisation” rather than the great moderation. 
 
Accordingly, the need for a more realistic view of the role played by finance in the economy 
has generated a series of studies that predict the negative consequences of an over-sized 
 
14 Two extensions of the excessive finance hypothesis are the “too much finance” and the financial Kuznets curve. 
The relevant literature is discussed in chapter 3.  
15 The great moderation is a term coined by Stock and Watson (2002) to describe the long expansion and decline 
in output volatility during the period after 1980s in most advanced economies, particularly, the US economy. 
Secular stagnation is defined as a “condition of negligible or no economic growth in a market-based economy”. 
16 Assa (2016) argues that the inclusion of the FIRE sector in GDP has smoothed volatility and secular stagnation. 
He provides a full discussion of a modified national accounts calculation, suggesting the great moderation as a 
statistical mirage. 
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financial system after a certain threshold. For example, the threshold is reached when the ratio 
of credit to the private sector to GDP exceeds about 100 percent  (Beck et al., 2014a; Law and 
Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015b; Cournède and Denk, 2015b).17 In addition, recent research 
suggests that financialisation has been the missing link in understanding the nexus among 
growth, investment, productivity and inequality (Tori and Onaran, 2018). 
 
Moosa (2016) describes the presence of excessive finance as the “finance curse”, which is 
represented by an inverted U-shaped relationship that gives rise to the financial Kuznets curve, 
signaling a threat of over-dependence on the financial sector. The finance curse, which 
symbolises the ultimate manifestation of the financialisation of the economy, produces 
detrimental effects for economies hosting oversized financial sectors and shares many 
similarities with the “resource curse” that affects mineral-rich countries (Christensen et al., 
2016). Panizza (2018) surveys the “too much finance” related literature and suggests that five 
channels drive the nonlinearity resulting from excessive finance. These channels, which he 
considered as possible avenues for future research, are financial crises, misallocation of talents, 
different types of finance, the structure of the financial system, and political capture.18 Figure 
2.2 presents an overview of theses channels and a comprehensive review of the related 
literature provided in section 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
17 Titles of recent research express this trend. For instance, “Finance: Economic Lifeblood or Toxin?” (Pagano, 
2014), “Finance and Growth: Too Much of a Good Thing?” (Beck, 2014), “Does too Much Finance Harm 
Economic Growth?” (Law et al., 2014), and “Too Much Finance?” (Arcand et al., 2015). 
18 The transmission channels of financialisation may be defined as the channels through which the financialisation 
process affects the real economy.  It is noteworthy that channels are not mutually exclusive. 
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Figure 2.2: Financialisation Transmission Channels 
 
 
2.6 The Macroeconomic Consequences of Financialisation 
This section briefly reviews the macroeconomic consequences reported in the financialisation 
literature and their associated transmission channels. In chapter 3, a full review is presented of 
the empirical work on the macroeconomic consequences of the financialisation process. 
Epstein (2015) stresses that the macroeconomic consequences of the financialisation process 
are still less obvious and understudied. In addition, the nature of financialisation remains 
unclear as a result of the divergence of the approaches used to study the wide range of 
phenomena attributed to the financialisation process (Foster, 2007; Lapavitsas, 2013b; Van der 
Zwan, 2014).  
According to Skott and Ryoo (2008), several economic developments have been linked to the 
financialisation process. The main developments include waves of financial deregulation and 
the proliferation of financial instruments, a shift towards market-based financial system, the 
rise of the market for corporate control and shareholder value orientation, increasing instability 
of financial markets and the growth of credit to the household sector (Stockhammer, 2008). 
Most of these developments are specifically associated with advanced capitalist economies and 
only affected the peripheral financialised economies to a lesser extent (Bonizzi, 2013; Barradas 
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et al., 2018). In this vein, Lapavitsas and Powell (2013) suggest that the financialisation effect 
could spill over to the periphery economies through different mechanisms. For instance, Levy-
Orlik (2013) shows that effect of financialisation is transmitted to the Mexican economy by the 
external capital mobility channel rather than the power of financial markets.19  
 
Palley (2013) summarises the main effects of financialisation as (i) elevating the significance 
of the financial sector relative to the real sector, (ii) transferring income from the real to the 
financial sector, and (iii) aggravating income inequality and contributing to wage stagnation. 
In addition, financialisation has led to heightened macroeconomic volatility and financial 
instability, and it is considered to be the indirect cause of the global financial crisis (Orhangazi, 
2009; Sinapi, 2013; Van Treeck, 2014; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). Stockhammer (2013a) 
argues that the evidence indicating that financialisation has led to an increase in the size and 
fragility of the financial sector is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Keynes and 
Minsky that the financial system as inherently unstable. In addition, the liberalisation of the 
financial system has been integral to the increase in the relative power of capital over labour 
and enforced the shareholders’ value doctrine that enabled the finance-led accumulation 
regime.   
 
These financialisation effects materialise through various transmission mechanisms, including 
the crowding out of capital and labour, increasing indebtedness of the different economic 
agents and the shift towards market-based financial systems. Generally, these transmission 
channels represent the main mechanisms whereby financialisation influences the real economy. 
However, many other transmission mechanisms fall under, or intertwined with, the main 
 
19 Bonizzi (2013) provides an extensive survey that covers theoretical and empirical works related to the 
financialisation process in developing and emerging markets. 
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channels, indicating potential complementarity between various financialisation transmission 
mechanisms. For instance, the crowding out channel implies more direct transmission 
mechanisms such as rising financial payments and receipts by non-financial sectors, short-
termism, the brain drain (whereby finance absorbs talents from the productive sectors), 
heightened financial instability and changes in the sectoral composition of the economy.  
 
Before the advent of the global financial crisis, the financialisation process led to a rise in the 
income share of the financial sector, contributed to the decline in real investment, and 
employment, and enhanced the bargaining power of capital owners (Orhangazi, 2008; Hein, 
2010; Stockhammer, 2013a). The crowding out hypothesis comprises two dimensions. First, 
competition of the financial sector for real resources, where the increase in financial investment 
and financial activity extradite real investment opportunities. Second, competition of the 
financial sector for the brightest minds and STEM graduates by offering attractive 
remuneration.20 
 
The first dimension implies that the growth of the financial sector is associated with the decline 
of the real sector and the accumulation of physical capital. Capital crowding out is linked to 
changes in the accumulation regime whereby profits are accumulated through financial 
channels (Krippner, 2005). The finance-led growth regime (finance-dominated accumulation 
regime) represents a salient feature of the financialisation process that is directly related to the 
slowdown of physical capital accumulation (Boyer, 2000; Stockhammer, 2008). Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi (2012) conclude that the financial sector is a drag on productivity growth, as it 
competes for resources with the real sector. Levine (2005) suggests this possibility, albeit in 
different mechanisms.  
 
20 STEM is an acronym for the fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics. 
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Levine (2005) states that, “in a growth model with physical capital externalities, therefore, 
financial development could retard economic growth and lower welfare if the drop in savings 
and the externality combine to produce a sufficiently large effect”. In a recent study, Madsen 
and Ang (2016) argue that financial development influences growth through alternative 
mechanisms rather than the saving/investment channel. They find that finance has permanent 
growth effects transmitted through channels of productivity, ideas production and education. 
 
Moreover, the crowding out of capital is often followed by the crowding out of labour as a 
result of changes in the accumulation regime and the associated effects. Consequently, the 
firm’s management behaviour shifts from “retention of profit to reinvestment” to “downsize 
and distribute” (Lazonick and O'sullivan, 2000). The resulting outcome is a rise in 
unemployment and a decline in the wage share of national income in contrast to rising rentiers 
income (Epstein and Power, 2003; Duménil and Lévy, 2004; Hein, 2010; Dünhaupt, 2013). In 
addition, financialisation creates wealth-based and debt-based consumption, made available by 
booming real-estate and stock markets, which propel the accumulation of enterprise and 
household debt (Hein, 2012b). Hein and Dodig (2014) show that financialisation creates profits 
without real investment in the short and medium run, which is mostly derived from debt-led 
consumption behaviour. 
 
At the firm level, the crowding-out hypothesis suggests two main channels whereby the 
financial sector crowds out the real sector. The first channel is the rising costs associated with 
financial payments to the financial sector, in the form of interest expense and dividend 
payments (financial payments). The second channel is increasing reliance on the financial 
activities as a source of profit rather than the real activity of the firms (financial receipts). Demir 
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(2009) and Orhangazi (2008) were among the first to analyse the crowding-out hypothesis at 
the corporate level. They show that the increase in financial profits leads to a relative increase 
in financial investment over real investment. 
  
The second dimension of the crowding-out hypothesis is the competition of the financial sector 
with the real sectors for talents, which the literature refers to as the “brain drain” effect. Tobin 
(1984) expresses concern about the potential misallocation of talents brought by the excessive 
and rapid growth of the US financial sector. He contends that the large executive remuneration 
offered by the financial sector absorbs talents that are needed for the development of the 
productive sectors. Recently, former US President Barack Obama echoed this sentiment as he 
asserted that “too many potential physicists and engineers spend their careers shifting money 
around in the financial sector, instead of applying their talent to innovating in the real economy” 
(Obama, 2016). Accordingly, the massive growth of the financial sector has drawn more talents 
away from productive economic sectors to work in the financial sector. Talented individuals 
are attracted by financial compensation and higher wages paid for those who work in the 
financial sector. This absorption of talents by the financial sector leads to declining labour 
productivity in the real sectors, particularly those depending heavily on skilled labour (Kneer, 
2013b; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015) 
 
The process of financialisation is associated with a shift towards market-based financial 
systems and enhanced power of financial markets (Stockhammer, 2008; Sawyer, 2015). 
Research suggests that the diversity of the financialisation effects could be attributed to the 
dichotomy between bank-based and market-based financial systems (Barradas, 2017). 
Financialisation changed the traditional role of the financial sector of maintaining the saving-
30 
 
investment link to that of enforcing the trading of financial assets and moving capital out of the 
productive sectors (Sawyer, 2015). 
 
The financial structure literature suggests that the financial structure exerts conflicting effects 
on the finance-growth nexus (Levine, 2005). The first strand of this literature suggests that 
stock markets are more positively associated with economic growth mainly in high-income 
countries (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck, 2012; Cournède and Denk, 2015b). The second 
strand advocates the bank-based financial system and posits that the transition to a market-
based financial system, as the financial system matures, is harmful to the real economy. It 
follows that the impact of bank development on growth is negatively correlated with stock 
market development (Deidda and Fattouh, 2008). 
 
While the finance-growth literature made a clear distinction to the financial structure effect, 
the financialisation literature suggests that both bank-based and market-based financial systems 
contribute to the financialisation effect (Sawyer, 2014, 2015). Nonetheless, more weight is given 
to the power of financial markets, probably as a conduit to the shareholder value orientation, which 
is the main dimension of the financialisation process.    
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the origins of the concept of financialisation from different 
perspectives. Moreover, the various definitions of financialisation are presented and discussed. 
Generally, financialisation is defined as the increasing size and importance of the financial 
sector relative to the real economy. The concept intertwines with financial development in 
many aspects, but it is more often linked to the negative consequences of an over-sized financial 
sector.  
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Excessive financial sector growth and financial deregulation are the most prominent symptoms 
of the financialisation process. The literature suggests that financialisation is a direct result of 
the financial deregulation and liberalisation that occurred in the 1980s. Therefore, financial 
deregulation is considered as a pre-requisite for the financialisation process that has led to the 
proliferation of complex financial instruments, the emergence of shadow banking and the 
frequent occurrence of hostile takeovers.  
 
Consensus on the effects of financialisation process on macroeconomic performance is 
inconspecouous (Sawyer, 2015). Significant theoretical and empirical studies that discuss the 
consequences of the financialisation process at the macro and the micro levels were briefly 
discussed in this chapter. Excessive financial deepening in the past decades has left its marks 
on growth and distribution. Undoubtedly, financialisation has weakened the finance-growth 
nexus and exerted negative effects on growth and income distribution. Nevertheless, the 
literature does not show a clear path to the channels whereby financialisation influences 
macroeconomic performance (mainly growth and distribution). The literature on 
financialisation channels suggests they are not mutually exclusive and intertwined at many 
levels. In chapter 3, the finance-growth and finance-inequality literature is reviewed in detail 
while keeping in mind the related financialisation literature.  
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Chapter Three 
Literature Review: The Macroeconomic Consequences of 
Financialisation 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a literature synthesis on the finance-growth and finance-inequality nexus. 
The focal point of this review is the literature that is directly related to the financialisation 
hypothesis and provides evidence on the macroeconomic consequences of excessive finance. 
This chapter builds on chapter two and explore the empirical literature of finance and 
macroeconomic performance as well as related theoretical considerations.  
 
Numerous literature surveys affirm the need for a great deal of research to establish 
understanding of the financial system’s role in economic growth and development.21 One 
question that stands out in every literature survey is how finance causes growth. Significant 
contributions to the financial development-economic growth literature will be reviewed, 
including the recent contributions demonstrating that this relationship has weakened (or 
reversed). In addition, a synopsis of the recently developed literature on financialisation will 
be provided.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The early literature on finance and growth is 
introduced in section 3.2. Studies on the effect of financial structure on growth are reviewed in 
section 3.3. Nonlinearity of the finance-growth relationship is reviewed in section 3.4. The 
significant contributions of financialisation and growth literature are discussed in section 3.5. 
 
21 See, for example, Levine (2005), Ang (2008), Carré and L’œillet (2018), and Trew (2006). 
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The profit-investment puzzle related literature is reviewed in section 3.6. Literature on the 
finance-inequality nexus, financial structure and nonlinearity are reviewed in sections 3.7 
through 3.9. Section 3.10 concludes this chapter. 
 
3.2 The Early Finance-Growth Literature  
Goldsmith (1969) made the first empirical contribution to the finance-growth literature by 
showing, graphically, positive correlation between financial development (measured by the 
total assets of the financial intermediaries) and GDP per capita (Beck, 2012). Similarly, studies 
conducted by MacKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) were focused on establishing statistical 
correlation, primarily by using cross-country regressions.  
 
The early finance-growth literature produced some scepticism over the importance of finance 
for economic growth and development in general. Two famous critiques of the role of finance 
in economic growth are put forward by Lucas (1988) and Robinson (1952). Lucas depresses 
the importance of finance in economic development as “very badly over-stressed”. His critique 
was preceded by that of Robinson (1952) who contended that finance follows economic 
growth, suggesting that “where enterprise leads, finance follows”. Miller (1998) comments that 
“financial markets contribute to economic growth is a proposition too obvious for a serious 
discussion”. 
 
In the 1990s, empirical evidence on the relationship between financial development and growth 
was spawned by the works of Levine and Renelt (1992) and King and Levine (1993a). Levine 
and Renelt (1992) examined the sensitivity of economic growth determinants, including 
financial development variables, to changes in the information set, using Leamer’s (1985) 
extreme bounds analysis (EBA). They came to a controversial conclusion that “nothing is 
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robust”, which casts a shadow of doubts on the findings of the earlier studies that revealed 
“significant” determinants of economic growth. 
 
The work of King and Levine (1993a), which is based on Goldsmith’s (1969) research, pays 
more attention to the effect of financial development on economic growth. Using a sample of 
80 countries over the period 1960-1989, they examine two channels of growth, physical capital 
accumulation and productivity growth, and find that financial development is a good predictor 
of economic growth in the long run.22 Moreover, they follow the work of Levine and Renelt 
(1992) and apply EBA as a robustness check for their results. In short, they find all four 
financial development indicators as robust determinants of economic growth, contrasting the 
previous results of Levine and Renelt (1992).23 
 
The studies of King and Levine (1993a) and Levine and Renelt (1992) are considered as a 
benchmark for the literature on financial development and growth. They also paved the way 
for a great deal of empirical work in the following decades. Subsequently, economists became 
interested in verifying causality between finance and growth (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck et al., 2000; Levine et al., 2000). 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) support the positive link between finance and growth by examining 
causality running from financial depth to economic growth. They show that industrial sectors 
(more reliant on technology that requires external finance) perform better in countries with 
more developed financial sectors.  However, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) find that 
causality between financial development and growth runs in both directions and provide little 
 
22 King and Levine (1993a) focus on banking variables as a proxy for financial development.  
23 Results of EBA are reported in the working paper version, (King and Levine, 1993b) 
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support for finance as a leader (follower) of economic growth. They find that causality runs 
from financial development to economic growth only in 8 out of 16 countries. In the last decade 
of the twentieth century, strong evidence of the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth was established by the rapidly growing literature. However, recurring 
financial crises have given rise to scepticism about the nature of and the factors affecting the 
finance-growth nexus.  
 
A new line of research has provided new evidence for a non-monotonic relationship between 
finance and growth. For instance, the evidence shows that the financial development and 
economic growth relationship is significant as long as inflation does not exceed the estimated 
threshold between 13 and 25 percent (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002), varies with the level of 
economic development (Rioja and Valev, 2004a), or the level of income (Deidda and Fattouh, 
2002).24  
 
3.3 Financial Structure and Economic Growth   
Economists often make a distinction between bank-based and market-based financial systems, 
the latter being more present in developed countries. The structure of the financial sector is 
believed to determine the effect of financial development on economic growth, as economists 
debate the advantage of one structure over the other (Lin et al., 2009). In this sense, the process 
of financialisation (financial development) is often linked to a transition from a bank-based to 
a market-based financial system (Panizza, 2014). Two main views emerge with respect to this 
issue. On one hand, some economists stress the advantage of bank-based financial systems 
whereas others argue in favour of securities markets (Levine, 2005). On the other hand, the 
 
24 An extended review of research on nonlinearity in finance-growth nexus is provided in section 3.4. 
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distinction between financial structures has been found to be irrelevant to economic growth 
(Huybens and Smith, 1999; Sawyer, 2014).  
 
The proponents of bank-based financial structure argue that banks possess a stronger position 
in risk management such as reviewing and monitoring borrowers and collecting information 
ex ante. Therefore, they have an advantage over financial markets in the allocation of resources, 
in turn promoting economic growth (Levine, 2005; Lin et al., 2009). Rioja and Valev (2012) 
conclude that bank-based financial systems induce faster capital growth. Their study examines 
the impact of financial structures on capital investment, using panel data from 62 industrial and 
developing countries. Beck and Levine (2004) show that both banks and stock markets impact 
economic growth positively. On the contrary, others show that the effect of banks become 
smaller as countries becomes more developed, concomitant with increasing effect of financial 
markets (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Gambacorta et al., 2014). Shen and Lee (2006) find that 
financial development in developed economies contributes to economic growth through stock 
markets. Moreover, they produce evidence for a negative role of banks in economic growth. 
Nevertheless, some economists reject the dichotomy between banks and markets. Luintel et al. 
(2008) suggest that the type of financial structure explains the heterogeneity of output growth 
in most countries. Similarly, Beck et al. (2012) note that financial structures explain the 
heterogeneity of credit composition across countries.  
 
From a law and finance perspective, the quality of the legal system explains international 
differences of financial systems, rather than the distinction between bank-based and market-
based financial systems. Beck et al. (2003) identify two channels through which the legal 
environment affects financial development: the political channel and the adaptability channel. 
They highlight the importance of the latter, which presumes that legal environments differ in 
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their capability to adapt effectively for financial developments. Porta et al. (1998) endorse the 
level of investors’ legal protection as a proxy for the level of financial development. This view 
is based on a study by Levine (1998) that employed the legal origin variable as a measure of 
financial development. Consequently, a well-functioning legal system is a key determinant of 
the development of the financial system (Levine, 2005). To this end, Allen et al. (2018) provide 
a synthesis of the debates and empirical results on the impact of financial structures on 
economic growth and development. 
 
3.4 Nonlinearity of the Finance-Growth Relationship 
 
3.4.1 Background 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) provide a theoretical model that predicts a nonlinear 
relationship between financial development and growth, whereby financial development 
distributional effects are conditioned by the level of economic development. However, the 
nonlinearity hypothesis was largely ignored in the pre-crisis finance-growth literature (Carré 
and L’œillet, 2018). Hence, the pre-crisis literature predominantly depicts the relationship as 
positive and linear, and only a small number of studies examined the potential non-monotonic 
finance-growth nexus before the crash of the financial sector in 2008 (for example, Deidda and 
Fattouh, 2002; Rioja and Valev, 2004a; Aghion et al., 2005).  
 
Accordingly, the global financial crisis has induced a great deal of research that demonstrates 
the nonlinearity of the finance-growth nexus. For instance, the new line of research 
demonstrates the “vanishing effects” of finance on growth (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011), and 
the “too much finance” hypothesis (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Beck, 2014; Law and 
Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015b; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015). Panizza (2018) provides a 
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good argument for the “too much finance” hypothesis and presents five possible explanations 
for the consequences of excessive finance. The explanations that he suggests as possible 
avenues for future research, are financial crises, misallocation of talents, different types of 
finance, structure of the financial system, and political capture.25 
 
3.4.2 The New Literature  
The “new literature” refers to the new line of finance-growth research triggered by the global 
financial crisis to investigate the excessive finance hypothesis (Panizza, 2014). The new 
literature emphasises the complexity of the finance-growth nexus as a “Gordian Knot”—that 
is, the relationship is often variable, nonlinear or insignificant (Carré and L’œillet, 2018).26 
Accordingly, Beck (2014) stresses the importance of nonlinearities for understanding the 
finance-growth relationship.  
 
The relationship between finance and growth started to weaken with the start of the new 
millennium, parallel to the exponential growth of financial sectors in most developed 
economies. Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) find a weakening effect of finance on growth. They 
examined the financial development and economic growth relationship using cross country 
data for the period 1960-2004. Their results show that the classical finding of positive effects 
of finance on growth holds for the period before 1989 and that the link weakened in the 
subsequent period. They attribute this weakening to two possible factors: increasing incident 
of financial crises and the lack of sufficient legal frameworks to cope with invasive financial 
deepening. Moreover, their findings are strongly consistent with those of De Gregorio and 
Guidotti (1995) who contend that financial sectors in high-income countries have reached a 
 
25 A comprehensive review of these explanations related literature is provided in subsection 3.4.2. 
26 Gordian knot is a term used to describe a complex or unsolvable problem.  
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point (in terms of financial depth) at which it no longer contributes to growth. The finance-
growth relationship turns to be insignificant beyond a critical level of financial development 
(Arcand et al., 2015b), subject to diminishing marginal returns as the financial system develops 
(De La Torre et al., 2011). It becomes negative when the financial sector depth (private credit 
to GDP) exceeds a threshold of 100% (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Arcand et al., 2015b). 
The latter result has been confirmed by successive research (for example, Beck et al., 2014a; 
Law and Singh, 2014; Moosa, 2018a).  
 
The effect of finance on growth may vary, depending on different factors such as the country’s 
level of income, type of finance, adequacy of regulatory frameworks, and institutional quality. 
For instance, Rioja and Valev (2014) find that stock markets have an insignificant contribution 
to growth in low-income countries, whereas it has a positive effect in countries with high levels 
of capital accumulation and productivity. Moreover, research has revealed that the type of 
credit matters, represented by the relative proportion of households to business credit (Beck et 
al., 2012; Cournède and Denk, 2015b), intermediation versus non-intermediation activities 
(Beck,Kneer, et al., 2014), and the level of institutional quality (Law and Singh, 2014). Hung 
(2009) develops a model that predicts a conditional effect of financial development on 
economic growth, determined by the relative proportions of investment loans and consumption 
loans. He suggests that investment loans facilitate economic growth while non-productive 
consumption loans hamper economic growth. In addition, Ductor and Grechyna (2015) show 
that the results vary according to the balance of growth between the financial and real sectors. 
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3.4.3 Too Much Finance  
Arcand et al. (2015b) demonstrate the presence of a non-monotonic relationship between 
financial depth and economic growth.27 Their results revealed an inverted U-shaped curve, 
which suggests a threshold after which a marginal increase in the size of the financial sector 
would impact economic growth negatively. They posit two possible explanations for this 
finding: (i) a fundamental change in the finance-growth relationship, and (ii) the relationship 
is non-monotonic. They suggest that nothing fundamentally changed between financial 
development and growth and that previous research methodologies do not allow for non-
linearity between the variables, which is more consistent with the argument put forward by 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2011). Nevertheless, Gründler (2018) attributes nonlinearity between 
finance and growth to fundamental changes in the transmission mechanisms of finance.   
 
Further studies are in favour of the too much finance hypothesis. For instance, Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi (2012) conclude that when the financial sector becomes oversized, it becomes a drag 
on economic growth as it competes with the real sector for scarce resources. They show that 
the relationship between the size of the financial sector and economic growth looks like an 
inverted U-shape curve, which means that the size of the financial sector contributes to 
productivity growth up to a point, after which an increase in the size of the financial sector 
impacts growth adversely. In the same vein, Bezemer et al. (2016) examine data covering 46 
countries over the period 1990-2011. They find that financial deepening boosts investment and 
enhances the economy’s ability to reallocate factors of production. However, they contend that 
a high credit to GDP ratio can retard growth, reduce investment and innovation, and induce 
volatility, financial fragility, and financial crises. 
  
 
27 The article was first published as an IMF working paper in 2012. 
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Several explanations are put forward by Panizza (2018) for the weakening (negative) effects 
of excessive finance. While theses explanations were mentioned briefly in chapter two, the 
related literature is reviewed extensively in this chapter, starting with the misallocation of 
talents (misallocation of resources).28 Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) suggest that financiers 
crowd out the real sector for skilled labour. Their argument is consistent with the findings of 
Kneer (2013a) who shows that financial liberalisation is correlated with the growth of the skill 
intensity in the financial sector, which results in slower growth of the real sectors in the period 
subsequent to liberalisation. In addition, the absorption of talents by the financial sector leads 
to declining labour productivity in the real sectors, particularly those depending heavily on 
skilled labour (Kneer, 2013b; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015). Since the financial sector 
increasingly absorbs funds from the real sectors, the increasing financial activity of the non-
financial firms crowds out real investment (Krippner, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008; Tori and Onaran, 
2018).29 
 
The second explanation is financial fragility and crises whereby excessive financial deepening 
retards economic growth through increasing financial fragility and the consequence spread of 
risk (Rajan, 2006). In this sense, financialisation can lead to crises through different channels, 
such as an increase in financial leverage that fuels asset price bubbles and credit-driven 
consumption. This is evidenced by the hike in the leverage to GDP ratio in eighteen advanced 
economies, from 165% in 1980 to 320% in 2010 (Chan, 2012). Another channel is the increase 
in income inequality, which affects economic growth directly. In addition, inequality has been 
put forward as the root cause of the recent financial crisis (Stockhammer, 2013a).  
 
 
28 The misallocation created by the financial system to resources is generalised, as this is evidenced by the 
financialisation literature. This point will be explored further in section 3.5. 
29 Financial activity refers to the financial payments and financial operations such as dividends, interest, stock 
buyback. 
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The third explanation is aggressive speculation through excessive risk-taking, which is driven 
by high compensation schemes in the financial sector, mainly investment banks (Crotty, 2009). 
Moreover, the surge of financial innovation, following massive financial deregulation, has 
produced increasingly complex financial instruments that set the environment for excessive 
risk-taking and speculation by financial institutions as well as non-financial firms that seek to 
maximise shareholders value in the short run. Crotty (2009) states that “it is rational for top 
financial firm operatives to take excessive risk in the bubble even if they understand that their 
decisions are likely to cause a crash in the intermediate future”. Furthermore, Arnaboldi and 
Rossignoli (2015) argue that some specialised financial innovations, such as the securitisation 
of assets, have exacerbated excessive risk-taking that led to the crash of the financial system in 
2008. Accordingly, financial liberalisation and proliferation of risky financial instruments 
aggravate systemic risk, leading to rising frequency and severity of crises, which impacts 
growth adversely (Ductor and Grechyna, 2015).  
  
A fourth explanation is that different types of finance (household versus business credit) impact 
economic growth disproportionately. A recent report published by the OECD suggests that 
adverse effects of credit on economic growth increase disproportionately to the rise of 
household credit compared to business credit (OECD, 2015). The report builds on a previous 
study by Cournède and Denk (2015b) who show that growth in household credit is a “harmful 
source of financial overextension” in OECD and G20 countries. Similar findings are confirmed 
by Beck et al. (2012) who use a data set covering 45 countries (developed and developing) 
where bank lending is decomposed into two categories: enterprise lending and household 
lending. 
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The Fifth explanation is that there are conflicting effects of financial structure on economic 
growth (Levine, 2005). The first strand suggests that stock markets are more positively 
associated with economic growth mainly in high-income countries (Levine and Zervos, 1998; 
Beck, 2012; Cournède and Denk, 2015b). The second strand, which is used to advocate the 
bank-based financial system, is that transition to a market-based financial system (as the 
financial system matures) is harmful to the real economy and that the impact of bank 
development on growth is negatively correlated with stock market development (Deidda and 
Fattouh, 2008). 
 
3.4.4 Too Much Finance, or Statistical Illusion? 
 “Too Much Finance, or Statistical Illusion” is the title of a paper of Cline (2015b) that initiated 
an interestingly significant debate over the validity of the too much finance hypothesis. This 
debate is of great importance as too much finance constitutes the core argument of this study. 
Hence, an attempt is made to synthesise the main ideas of the debate as portrayed by Cline 
(2015a, 2015b), Arcand et al. (2015a), and Cournède and Denk (2015b). 
 
Cline undermines the validity of the too much finance hypothesis, considering the result as an 
“artefact of spurious attributions of causality”. He criticises the evidence of finance threshold 
(inverted U-shaped relationship), reported by Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012), Arcand et al. 
(2015b), and by Sahay et al. (2015). Cline argues that:  
There is an inherent bias toward a negative quadratic term in a regression that 
incorporates financial depth, or any other variable that tends to rise with per capita 
income, along with the usual convergence variable (logarithm of per capita income) in 
explaining growth. 
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Cline supports his argument by showing how regressing growth—on doctors per capita, R&D 
technicians per capita, or fixed telephone lines per capita—results in a similar inverted U-
shaped relationship (as implied by the negative coefficient on the quadratic term).  
 
Arcand et al. (2015a) refute Cline’s argument. They expose the fragility of his model by 
showing that the coefficient on the quadratic term is not essentially negative but takes a sign 
opposite to the linear term, after which they demonstrate, using Cline’s model to derive a 
standard finance-growth regression equation, how the coefficient on the linear term can become 
negative, which contradicts the essence of the finance-growth literature. In addition, they show 
that the relationship between growth and the factors presented in Cline’s study are not robust 
when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Cline (2015a) admits the validity of the critique raised by Arcand et al. (2015a). He then 
provides a further argument for his previous position and criticises the work of Cournède and 
Denk (2015b), which does not include the quadratic term in model specification. Cline stresses 
his argument by stating that, according to the linear specification used by Cournède and Denk 
(2015b), “growth would be maximized by completely eliminating credit finance”. Moreover, 
he replicates their study using the same data set provided by the authors themselves and 
concludes that their study is unreliable, arguing that 
 
the results of that study are unreliable because first, the tests exclude the most important 
variable, real per capita income at purchasing power parity (PPP) comparable across 
countries; second, the tests apply country fixed effects and thereby throw out important 
information on cross-country variation; and third, incorporation of shift and slope 
dummy variables for lower financial depth removes the significance of the negative 
inﬂuence of higher financial levels on growth while tending to confirm the expected 
positive inﬂuence at low levels. 
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Cournède and Denk (2015a) respond to Cline’s critique, emphasising that “zero-credit” is not 
optimal, and that their research clearly shows a positive effect of finance on growth at low 
ratios of credit to GDP. More importantly, they attribute coefficient bias in Cline’s replication 
to the effects of the omission of a fixed country effects factor. 
 
To that end, the debate provides a critical argument on the new evidence for nonlinearity in the 
finance-growth nexus (the argument could be drawn on similar evidence on the finance-
inequality nexus). However, the critique raised by Cline against works on nonlinearity has been 
invalidated by Arcand et al. (2015a) and by Cournède and Denk (2015a). Nevertheless, the 
economists who participate in the debate share a common conclusion, that it is too early to 
envisage a negative effect of a large finance sector as a stylised fact. 
 
3.4.5 The Financial Kuznets Curve 
The financial Kuznets curve (FKC) is a relatively new concept in the financial development 
literature. It emerged as a counterpart of the environmental Kuznets curve and likewise builds 
on the well-known Kuznets hypothesis (Moosa, 2016). According to Moosa, the FKC is a 
depiction of the finance curse, by which excessive growth of finance, after a certain threshold, 
exerts adverse effects on economic growth. 
 
The original Kuznets curve is an inverted U-shaped curve representing the relationship between 
income per capita and income inequality. Building on the original Kuznets curve, economists 
present two forms of the FKC. The first is a curve that depicts the relationship between the 
level of financial development on the X-axis (measured by financial depth) and either economic 
growth or income inequality on the Y-axis. The second represents interaction between financial 
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development and income per capita, where the turning point is conditioned by the level of 
country’s financial development (for example, Baiardi and Morana, 2016).  
 
Moosa (2016) investigates the FKC variant that represents economic growth as a function of 
financialisation, within an international context. The study utilises the real growth rate of GDP 
as a measure economic growth and the ratio of the market value of publicly traded shares to 
GDP as a measure of financialisation.30 He finds that the turning point is reached when the 
level of financialisation is 46%, 30%, 27% for low, medium and high growth countries, 
respectively. The findings confirm the FKC hypothesis, and the result holds for different 
robustness checks, including model specification (which is often criticised in the comparable 
environmental Kuznets curve literature).  
 
In the same vein, Baiardi and Morana (2016) investigate the effect of financial development 
on the original Kuznets curve using a sample of 19 European countries, over the period 1985-
2013. They conclude that financial development fosters economic growth and reduces income 
inequality by lowering the turning point on the original Kuznets curve. This means that a higher 
level of financial development is associated with a lower turning point on the original Kuznets 
curve. The findings of Baiardi and Morana (2018) are inconsistent with those of Nikoloski 
(2012) and Moosa (2016). 
 
The income inequality variant of FKC is put forward by Nikoloski (2012), who investigates 
the inverted U-shaped relationship between financial development and income inequality based 
on the theoretical propositions put forward by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). The study 
 
30 Market value of publicly traded shares to GDP is a widely employed measure of financial development 
(financial depth). 
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utilises a five-year averaged dynamic panel data from 76 countries over the period 1962-2006, 
using the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP as a measure of financial development and 
the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality. The study reports a clear turning point when 
credit to the private sector reaches approximately 114% of the GDP.31 Likewise, Shahbaz et 
al. (2015) and Kotarski (2015) examine the evidence for FKC in the cases of Iran and China, 
respectively. Strong evidence is found for the inverted U-shaped relationship between finance 
and inequality, which represents the FKC in the Iranian context. However, it is yet to be 
confirmed for the Chinese economy.  
 
3.5 The Effect of Financialisation on Economic Growth 
The financialisation literature investigates the effects of the massive expansion of the financial 
sector on the real economy and aims to provide an alternative view for some unexplained and 
puzzling phenomena observed in the modern economy.32 In particular, the financialisation 
hypothesis focuses on the impact of the rising importance of financial institutions and markets 
on economic growth, investment, productivity, income distribution and financial crises.  
 
Extant studies support the positive effect of finance on economic growth and income 
distribution. However, these studies fail to address the potential negative impact of finance as 
well as the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship uncovered by the recent literature. 
Therefore, the financialisation literature focuses on the deleterious effects of finance on 
macroeconomic performance. Several studies show that the financial sector has decoupled 
 
31 Interestingly, this result is consistent with the finance-growth threshold estimated around 100% by Arcand et 
al. (2015b) 
32 For example, the financialisation literature investigates the profit-investment puzzle as a shift in the 
accumulation regime as well as changes in the market for corporate control, whereas new Keynesian economists 
argue in favour of the secular stagnation and the great moderation hypotheses.  
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from the real sector and that it exerts adverse effects on growth due to excessive financialisation 
(Ductor and Grechyna, 2015; Haiss et al., 2016) 
 
The financialisation-growth literature is divided into macroeconomic and microeconomic 
analysis of the financialisation hypothesis. At the macro level, the literature examines the 
effects of financialisation on output growth, aggregate demand and physical accumulation (for 
example, Stockhammer, 2004; Onaran et al., 2011; Moosa, 2018a). At the micro-level, the 
investment equation is estimated using firm-level data (for example, Orhangazi, 2008; Tori and 
Onaran, 2018). Moreover, the macroeconomic consequences of financialisation are manifested 
at different levels of economic units (Van der Zwan, 2014). Epstein (2015) contends that the 
macroeconomic outcomes of the financialisation process are still less obvious and 
understudied. 
 
The effects of the financialisation process are transmitted into the real economy through 
different channels. The OECD (2015) suggests that the financial sector can exert an adverse 
effect on the real economy and lead to slower growth and rising inequality through the 
following channels: (i) excessive financial deregulation, (ii) a more evident increase in bank 
lending than bond financing, (iii) too-big-to-fail bailout policy, (iv) lower credit quality, (v) a 
disproportionate increase in household credit compared with business credit.  
 
Post-Keynesian economists were the first to reveal the effect of financialisation on the real 
economy (Sinapi, 2013). They focus on the re-emergence of the rentiers class and the 
shareholder value ideology as a plausible explanation for the financialisation process. Their 
analysis depends primarily on the use of post-Keynesian/post-Kaleckian macroeconomic 
models to estimate the effect of the financialisation process on aggregate demand, growth, 
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distribution of income and productivity. For instance, Hein and Vogel (2009) and Hein and 
Tarassow (2009) show that the effects of financialisation on investment, aggregate demand and 
productivity are sensitive to many macro factors when allowing for the distinction between 
wage-led and profit-led regimes. They conclude that, in the wage-led regime, the 
financialisation effect clearly comes at the expense of labour. 
 
Hein (2012a) integrates the effects of financialisation, represented by the shareholder value 
orientation, into a post-Kaleckian model to investigate the effects of the rise of shareholders’ 
power on demand, productivity and overall regimes. He demonstrates that, overall, the 
“contraction regime” is the most viable model of the effect of financialisation associated with 
the increase of the shareholders’ power. Nevertheless, way before the global financial crisis, 
post-Keynesian economists attempted to integrate financialisation into post-Keynesian 
distribution and growth macro-models. A systematic review of these attempts can be found in 
Hein and van Treeck (2008).  
 
The financialisation literature focuses predominantly on the change of accumulation regime 
hypothesis, which represents a salient feature of the financialisation process. The change in the 
accumulation regime suggests that increasing financial activity is directly related to the 
slowdown of capital accumulation and, in turn, real investment and economic growth. The new 
regime is referred to as “the finance-led growth regime” (Boyer, 2000) and the “finance-
dominated accumulation regime” (Stockhammer, 2008). Generally, the finance-led regime has 
been linked to poor growth and increasing fragility associated with the rise of the rentiers class 
(Davis and Kim, 2015). 
 
50 
 
Stockhammer (2004) investigates empirically the effect of financialisation on physical capital 
accumulation in four advanced economies (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany). The findings provide evidence for a negative impact of financialisation on physical 
capital accumulation in every country except Germany. The difference in results can be 
ascribed to the heterogeneity of the financialisation process due to the banks vs markets 
dichotomy (Sawyer, 2015). Onaran et al. (2011) examine the effect of financialisation on both 
real investment and aggregate demand in the US economy, by applying a post-Kaleckian macro 
model. They find a negative impact of financialisation on investment and aggregate demand, 
driven by less consumption, and that the effect is associated with a higher share of rentiers 
income. Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2015) show that increasing financial activity of US non-
financial firms depress economic growth and assert that increased size and power of the 
financial sector “introduced fragility into the world economy”, which exerts extra depressing 
effects on economic growth. 
 
The financial sector increasingly extracts financial payments from non-financial sectors. 
Barradas and Lagoa (2017a) argue that increasing financial payments had a negative impact on 
real investment in Portugal. Similarly, Tori and Onaran (2018) estimate the investment 
equation for the United Kingdom’s non-financial firms and find a negative effect of 
financialisation (financial income and financial payments) on investment. Both studies suggest 
that, in addition to the financial investment crowding out effect, increasing financial payments 
reduce the retention available for investment. Moreover, financialisation creates wealth-based 
and debt-based consumption, made available by booming real-estate and stock markets, which 
propel the accumulation of enterprise and household debt (Hein, 2012b). Hein and Dodig 
(2014) show that financialisation creates profits without real investment in the short and 
medium run, which is mostly derived from debt-led consumption behaviour. 
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At the firm level, financialisation affects the investment behaviour of non-financial firms. This 
is mainly driven by the shareholder value orientation and market for corporate control, boosted 
by neoliberalism, which allowed shareholders to influence the behaviour of non-financial 
firms. Consequently, financial markets are increasingly extracting profits from non-financial 
firms, leading to declining real investments and accumulation (Stockhammer, 2005; Lazonick, 
2011). Moreover, the rise of the profit share is concomitant with the decline in the labour 
income share as a result of new corporate governance schemes (Lazonick and O'sullivan, 2000; 
Stockhammer, 2010; Hein and Dodig, 2014; Van der Zwan, 2014). 
 
Krippner (2005) argues that US non-financial firms change their investment behaviour to 
generate profit through financial rather than real investment channels. In addition, Krippner 
shows that the ratio of financial to non-financial profits grew more than five folds between 
1950 and 2001. Similarly, Orhangazi (2008) shows that growing financial activity in the US 
non-financial sectors crowds out real investment. Moreover, he argues that the financialisation 
of non-financial firms is driven by the shareholder’s value orientation through increasing 
demand for financial payments as well as the short-termism associated with managers’ 
performance-related compensation schemes. The positive difference between financial and real 
investments affects fixed investments adversely (Demir, 2009).  
 
3.6 The Profit-Investment Puzzle  
Economic theories predict that profit and real investment are strongly associated and go 
together hand in hand. However, since the 1980s, real investment continues its slow and steady 
decline, whereas profits have been growing. The weakness of the link between profit and real 
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investment is evident in developed as well as developing economies (Duménil and Lévy, 2004; 
Pauls and Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2016; Gottschalk and Torija-Zane, 2017).  
 
This phenomenon has given rise to the profit-investment puzzle (PIP) (Durand and Gueuder, 
2016; UNCTAD, 2016). The puzzle is also referred to as “profits without accumulation” 
(Stockhammer, 2005; Hein, 2008; van Treeck, 2008b) and “profiting without producing” 
(Lapavitsas, 2013b). PIP is mostly revealed by studies on financialisation effects and 
mechanisms (Davanzati and Pacella, 2013). Moreover, it is most notably observed through the 
behaviour of non-financial firms whereby the decline in real investment is parallel to a rise in 
gross profit. This is due to the shift of the non-financial firms to invest in financial rather than 
real assets. Thus, the neoclassical investment theories suggesting that profit is generated 
through real investment (exchange of goods and services) are contradicted. In this sense, 
physical capital accumulation through real investment has played a vital role in economic 
growth in the industrialisation era. Akyüz and Gore (1996) argue that profits are the main driver 
of real investments, referring to the “dynamic interactions between profits and investment 
which arise because profits are simultaneously an incentive for investment, a source of 
investment and an outcome of investment”. 
 
Durand and Gueuder (2016) identify two main mechanisms related to the rise of the PIP within 
the financialisation literature. The first is the revenge of rentiers, where the capitalists squeeze 
corporate retained profits. The second is the finance-led accumulation regime, which implies a 
trade-off between financial and real investment in the process of accumulation. Both of those 
mechanisms are indicated by the rise of the shareholder value orientation and the change in the 
relative power of capital owners, managers and workers within the firm, which directly impact 
the firm’s investment decisions (Stockhammer, 2005; Dallery, 2009).  
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The rise of the shareholders’ value ideology is linked to the increase in financial activity. 
Krippner (2005) reveals that American non-financial firms are increasingly generating profits 
through financial rather than real channels. The same observations were confirmed by 
Orhangazi (2008) and Van Treeck (2008a) of the United States and OECD countries, 
respectively. 
 
Financial payments have also increased, indicating changes in firms’ management behaviour 
away from “retain and reinvest” towards “downsize and distribute” (Lazonick and O'sullivan, 
2000). This diversion of the firms’ portfolio composition towards financial investment is 
influenced by the maximisation of the firm’s value approach, which is implied by the 
shareholder value orientation (Stockhammer, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008). In addition, managers 
performance-based compensation promotes short-termism behaviour and a tendency towards 
more profitable financial investments (Guttmann, 2008; Crotty, 2009).  
 
The literature reports the existence of PIP in both developed and developing countries. For 
instance, Van Treeck (2008a) shows that the financialisation process and the rise of the rentiers 
class are associated with less capital accumulation for the US economy. However, their 
findings do not hold for the late 1990s, the so-called “new economy boom”. Similarly, in the 
context of developing countries, the tendency of Indian non-financial firms to increase their 
portfolios of financial assets can be mainly attributed to deregulation, high profits and the 
ability to redeploy the capital offered by financial investments (Sen and Dasgupta, 2018). 
Notably, Van Treeck (2008a) stresses the necessity of more research to demystify the PIP at 
the international level. 
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3.7 Finance and Income Inequality 
Analogous to the finance-growth nexus, the finance and income inequality literature postulates 
conflicting predictions, although it has been studied extensively, both theoretically and 
empirically (Townsend and Ueda, 2006; Claessens and Perotti, 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2009). In general, finance, economic growth, and income distribution are directly and 
indirectly interrelated within the process of economic development. Levine (2005) states the 
following: 
The relationship between finance and income distribution is independently relevant for 
understanding the process of economic development and is indirectly related to growth 
because income distribution can influence savings decisions, the allocation of resources, 
incentives to innovate, and public policies. 
 
Therefore, the theory illuminates a set of direct and indirect mechanisms through which 
financial services aggravate or alleviate inequality (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009).  
 
The premises underpinning economic development theories suggest that a large part of 
financial sector benefits accrue to the poor, as financial development improves capital 
allocation and eases credit constraints for the wealth-deficient entrepreneurs to obtain finance 
(Beck et al., 2007; Ben Naceur and Zhang, 2019). This line of research posits that capital 
market imperfections represent a key driver of the evolution of income distribution. The 
literature often refers to this observation as the inequality narrowing hypothesis. Galor and 
Zeira (1993) build a model of growth based on human capital investment, which predicts that 
credit constraints are relevant to the income distribution effect on growth, as individuals who 
inherit wealth will have better access to human capital and prevent the poor from exploiting 
investment opportunities. Therefore, at an aggregate scale, a country’s growth depends on the 
initial level of income in the presence of credit constraints. 
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Likewise, Banerjee and Newman (1993) demonstrate theoretically that, in higher return 
technology sectors that require indivisible investments, countries with higher credit constraints 
(less developed financial systems) should exhibit a higher level of income inequality. 
Moreover, the trickle-down theory put forward by Aghion and Bolton (1997) states that capital 
accumulates in the hands of rich produces benefits that trickle down to the poor, although it 
may increase income inequality in the early stages of economic development.33 
 
On the other hand, the inequality widening hypothesis posits that financial development 
operates on the intensive margins, benefiting those who already have access to the financial 
system (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). The financial service benefits accrue exclusively 
to those who are rich and politically connected, at the early stages of financial development 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003). However, the relevant empirical studies are based mainly on a 
linear relationship between financial development and income inequality. Nevertheless, both 
hypotheses indicate that the initial level of inequality may be persistent as the rich have an 
advantage over the poor in both political influence or the early and cheap access to credit. 
 
In addition, finance my influence economic growth indirectly through the channel of income 
distribution. Shin (2012) argues that income inequality can be growth-enhancing or detrimental 
where income inequality hinders economic growth at the early stages of economic development 
and enhance growth in a country approaching steady state. However, the literature is equivocal 
about the effect of inequality on growth, as an extensive amount of literature finds conflicting 
results (Panizza, 2002; Shin, 2012; Rubin and Segal, 2015; Gründler and Scheuermeyer, 
 
33 Aghion and Bolton (1997) recognise this as a consistency of the trickle-down theory with the Kuznets 
hypothesis. However, the trickle-down theory and the great moderation have been refuted (or at least considered 
highly problematic) after the global financial crisis (Quiggin, 2009). From a policy-maker point of view, the New 
Zealand labour member of parliament Damien O'Connor has described the trickle-down theory as “the rich pissing 
on the poor”. 
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2018).34 However, Panizza (2002) argues that the conflicting results of the effect of income 
inequality on economic growth are sensitive to the econometric technique used to derive the 
empirical results. He further suggests that small changes in model specification or the 
econometric technique could change or even reverse the results. He reports a negative effect 
on income inequality on growth using cross-state panel data for the United States.35  
 
The dominant effect of inequality on economic growth is channelled through human and capital 
development, which is represented by education and physical capital investment. Gründler and 
Scheuermeyer (2018) find that inequality hinders economic growth through lower education 
levels, higher fertility rates, and lower physical capital investment.  
 
3.8 Financial Structure, Nonlinearity and Income Inequality  
The literature suggests that financial markets are the main driver of income inequality in 
developed economies (Kim and Lin, 2011; Brei et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the literature 
remains equivocal on the effect of financial structure on income distribution. Zhang and Ben 
Naceur (2019) argue that the effect of finance on income inequality is channelled through banks 
rather than financial markets.  
 
Hsieh et al. (2019) investigate the effect of financial deepening and structure on income 
inequality in a panel of 86 countries during the period 1989-2014. They find that financial 
deepening aggravates income inequality in general and that the effect is reversed in a market-
oriented financial systems. On the contrary, Brei et al. (2018) examine the effect of financial 
 
34 For summary of the mix findings in the literature, see Shin (2012). 
35  Moosa (2018b) argues that empirical analysis in economics and finance are prone to the model uncertainty 
problem, due to the sensitivity of the results to the many choices made through econometrics exercises, arising 
from model specification, sample period, estimation method, functional form, and variable definition and 
measurement. 
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structure on income inequality in advanced and emerging economies over the period 1989-
2012. Their results indicate that market-oriented financialised economies are the main driver 
of income inequality, suggesting that further expansion of the financial sector (in market-based 
financial systems) is associated with rising inequality. However, this is not the case when the 
financial sector grows via traditional banking activity. Seven and Coskun (2016) find that stock 
markets are an insignificant predictor of income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) 
in emerging economies. 
 
The early theoretical literature recognises the existence of nonlinearity between finance and 
inequality. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) built on the Kuznets hypothesis and developed a 
theoretical model that predicts a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped relationship between financial 
development and income inequality. Their model suggests that income inequality tends to rise 
in the initial stages, where the initial level of income restricts the development of the financial 
structure needed to enhance growth. Therefore, slow economic growth and credit constraints 
might prevent the poor from getting the benefits of a fully developed financial sector.  
 
In line with the work of Greenwood and Jovanovic, several studies have uncovered a negative 
effect of financial development on income distribution.36 For instance, Kim and Lin (2011) 
find that a country must reach a certain threshold of financial development before it can exert 
positive effects on income inequality. They apply the threshold regression methodology to a 
set of panel data covering 65 countries over the period 1990-2005. Nevertheless, Law et al. 
(2014) find that the significance of the relationship between financial development and income 
inequality is contingent upon the level of institutional quality. They particularly suggest that a 
 
36 Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) contend that income inequality tends to rise in the initial stages, until an 
adequate level of development of the finance sector relaxes credit restraints. 
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certain level (threshold) of institutional quality must be achieved for the inequality narrowing 
effect of finance to be significant. 
 
Apart from the conventional factors income causing inequality, the financialisation process is 
a major factor that has led to a substantial aggravation of inequality, particularly since the 1980s 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2013; Van Arnum and Naples, 2013). The effect of 
financialisation on income distribution is mainly channeled through the relative decline in the 
labour share of income and bargaining power, as a result of different financialisation 
dimensions. Hein (2012b) identifies three channels through which the financialisation process 
leads to a decline in the labour share of income: (i) changes in the sectoral composition of the 
economy (due to the growing weight of financial activity and a decline in government activity); 
(ii) the spread of the shareholder value orientation (which leads to an increase in management 
salaries and rising profit claims of the rentiers); and (iii) weakening of trade unions power. 
Tridico and Pariboni (2018) suggest two additional channels related to shareholder value 
orientation, the aggressive implementation of the “downsize and distribute” doctrine and short-
termism, whereby managers focus on maximising their bonuses and the distribution of 
dividends to shareholders (in the short run), which come at the expense of lower wages and 
lost jobs. 
 
Although financialisation affects income distribution through many channels, the increase in 
inequality is mainly due to the shift in bargaining power from labour to the owners of capital. 
This is due to the rise of the shareholder value orientation, which also affects investment and 
consumption (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011; Hein, 2012a; Dünhaupt, 2013; Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Flaherty, 2015). The financialisation era has been dominated by the 
redistribution of income at the cost of workers and the low-income class (Hein, 2012a; 
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Dünhaupt, 2017). This redistribution of income has taken place at different levels: (i) from 
labour to capital (a decline in the wage share of national income); (ii) from workers to top 
managers; and (iii) from low income households to the rich. These factors have led to a higher 
level of income inequality (Hein, 2015). 
 
The literature that investigates the relationship between financialisation and income 
distribution, with the focus  mainly on the effect of financialisation on the labour share of 
national income, aims to estimate the effect of financialisation as the main determinant of the 
decline in labour share (Dünhaupt, 2013; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Stockhammer, 
2013b; Alvarez, 2015; Dünhaupt, 2017). Other studies focus on the impact of financialisation 
on the top income share or rentiers class (Epstein and Jayadev, 2005b; Dünhaupt, 2012; 
Flaherty, 2015).  
 
A limited part of the literature examines the effect on income inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient (Kus, 2012; Van Arnum and Naples, 2013; Barradas and Lagoa, 2017b). Kus (2012) 
investigates the effect of financialisation on the Gini coefficient in OECD countries. She finds 
that a higher level of financialisation is associated with a higher level of income inequality. 
According to her, this might be attributed to the deterioration of the union density as a 
consequence of the financialisation process. Van Arnum and Naples (2013) obtain similar 
results for the United States. They argue that financialisation exerts upward pressure on the 
Gini coefficient as a result of a shift of power from workers to rentiers (labour to capital).  
 
The financialisation process also boosts the share of top income earners by altering the balance 
of bargaining power between capital and labour and between state regulatory controls and 
redistributive mechanisms (Flaherty, 2015; Hein et al., 2017a; Kohler et al., 2019). Alvarez 
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(2015) finds negative association between the financial activity of French non-financial firms 
and the wage share. According to him, the decline in the wage share is a result of higher 
dependence on profit from financial origins, which reduces labour’s bargaining power. 
 
3.9 The Empirical Literature on Inequality 
The literature on finance and inequality is quite extensive. Theoretical and empirical works on 
the finance-inequality nexus do not reach a clear conclusion (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 
2009). With this issue in mind, the effects of financialisation provide an alternative explanation 
for the negative impact of finance on income distribution. In what follows, studies that link 
financialisation to income inequality are explored. 
 
Some of the recent studies uncovered a contradiction between finance and income distribution. 
For instance, by using a sample of 72 countries over the period 1992-2005, Beck et al. (2007) 
find that financial development is negatively related to the Gini coefficient,. Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) and Alvarez (2015) show similar results at the industry and firm 
levels in the United States and France, respectively. 
 
Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2011) examine causality from finance to income inequality. They 
investigate specific channels linking banks, capital markets and income inequality with a panel 
structural vector autoregressive model for a sample of 49 countries over the period from 1994 
to 2002. Their findings confirm causality running from financial development to income 
inequality. This suggests that financial development aggravates income inequality and that the 
banking sector has the largest influence on income distribution.  
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A recent controversial study by Denk and Cournède (2015) finds that higher levels of credit 
intermediation and stock market capitalisation are associated with a higher level of income 
inequality. Moreover, the results suggest that financial expansion obstructs income growth for 
low and middle-income households. Likewise, De Haan and Sturm (2017) conclude that all 
finance variables are positively associated with income inequality.  
 
The post-Keynesian literature, mostly using the Kaleckian income distribution theory, 
investigates the relationship between financialisation and the wage share. Dünhaupt (2016) 
shows that financialisation has a negative impact on the labour share of income, mainly through 
the intensification of the shareholder value orientation and the short-termism of the firm’s 
management. The sample covers a panel of 13 OECD countries, over the period 1986-2007. 
The findings imply that the rise in overhead obligations (interest and dividend payments) 
contribute to the rise of mark-ups and causes labour share to decline as well as a shift towards 
the financial sector (sectoral composition change). These results strongly support the work of 
Hein (2015).  
 
In the same vein, Hein et al. (2017b) examine the effect of financialisation on wage share and 
gross profit before and after the global financial crisis in six OECD countries (the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Sweden, and France). The analysis, which is based on 
the Kaleckian theory of income distribution, provides evidence for the effect of financialisation 
on income inequality. In addition, the results indicate a common feature of income distribution 
before the crisis, despite differences in the determinants.  
 
Another strand of studies focus on the effect of financialisation on the top income share, mainly 
the top 1% income earners. Dünhaupt (2014) investigate the role of the shareholder value 
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orientation as a dimension of financialisation on the Gini coefficient and the top 1% income 
share. Her sample consists of 13 OECD countries for the period between 1980 and 2010. She 
finds that financialisation has a positive significant impact on the Gini coefficient and the top 
1% income share, implying that financialisation aggravate income inequality. Flaherty (2015) 
also examines the impact of financialisation on the income shares of the top 1% in 14 OECD 
countries during the period from 1990 to 2010. The results show that financialisation worsened 
the relative bargaining power of labour relative to capital, suggesting that financialisation is a 
key predictor of the top income share growth. 
 
In addition to the country-level studies, Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) provide one of the 
few studies at the industry level, using panel data for non-financial industries in the United 
States between 1970 and 2008. Their results indicate that financialisation, apart from 
conventional determinants, accounted for more than half of the decline in the labour share 
during the sample period. In addition, growth in the financial activity of non-financial firms 
contributed to a rise in the executives share of compensation and earnings dispersion by 9.6% 
and 10.2%, respectively. Nevertheless, the contribution of financialisation to the decline of the 
labour share was much smaller for Portugal where the effects were transmitted mainly through 
changing sectoral composition and weakening trade unions (Barradas and Lagoa, 2017b). 
 
Financialisation also affects income inequality by increasing the chances of bankruptcy for 
highly leveraged non-financial corporations (Orhangazi, 2009). Lin (2016) argues that growing 
financial payments and high dependence on debt in non-financial firms generate a vicious cycle 
of downsising and distributing, which comes at the expense of labour. He concludes that 
financialisation was associated with unemployment, stagnation and diminishing job security in 
the non-financial industries of the United States during the period between 1982 and 2005.  
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Recent evidence portrays income inequality as the root cause of the recent financial crisis 
(Stockhammer, 2013a, 2015; Russo et al., 2016). Although the finance-inequality nexus has 
been studied extensively, little attention has been paid to the role of income inequality as a 
relevant determinant of financial crises. A line of studies led by Kumhof et al. (2015) set the 
seeds for plausible explanations of the link between inequality and crises. They argue that 
increasing income inequality, coupled with stagnated incomes, leads to a higher level of 
leverage as workers are forced to borrow to maintain their consumption “consumption 
smoothing”, which further leads to accumulation of debt to unsustainable levels and boosts 
vulnerability to financial crises. They contend that their results are consistent with those of 
Rajan (2011), implying that this process is shared between the great depression and the 2008 
financial crisis.  
 
Rajan (2011) argues that rising inequality is the root cause of the 2008 crisis and financial 
crises in general. He suggests that rising inequality puts pressure on politicians to deregulate 
financial markets, allowing for new types of financial innovation such as home equity finance 
whereby low-income households can cash-out loans against their home equity to maintain their 
consumption against wage stagnation. However, this led to a run-up in house prices, more 
borrowing for increased consumption, and higher household leverage, producing destabilising 
effects that ended up in the 2008 crisis. The literature refers to the previous premises as the 
“Rajan Hypothesis”, which has been examined in several studies (Bordo and Meissner, 2012; 
Gu and Huang, 2014; Kumhof et al., 2015).  
Bordo and Meissner (2012) follow Kumhof and Rancière (2010) and Rajan (2011) and extend 
the analysis to 14 advanced countries for the period between 1920 and 2008. They find no 
evidence for rising inequality (measured by the top 10% income) as a determinant of financial 
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crises. However, their results support the traditional role of low interest rates and business cycle 
expansions as robust determinants of financial crises. Kirschenmann et al. (2016) employ a 
data set of 14 developed countries over 100 years and find income inequality as a powerful 
predictor of financial crises, more significantly at high levels of inequality. Similarly, Perugini 
et al. (2015) examine the causal relationship between income concentration (top 1%, top 5% 
and top 10%) and banking crises as well as household indebtedness. Their analysis is based on 
18 OECD countries for the period from 1970 to 2007. Their findings provide evidence for a 
positive relationship between the share of the top 1% and both private sector indebtedness and 
banking crises. Thus, their results directly challenge those of Bordo and Meissner (2012). 
 
In addition, Gu and Huang (2014) re-examine the inequality-crisis nexus using a data set 
similar to that of Bordo and Meissner (2012). In contrast to the lack of evidence found by Bordo 
and Meissner (2012), they were successful in finding strong evidence for rising income 
inequality as a significant determinant of credit booms and thereby a determinant of financial 
crises (where the latter relationship holds). They conclude that the Rajan Hypothesis is mainly 
evident in highly financialised market-based economies.37 
 
Finally, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) provide an extensive review of the finance and 
inequality literature. They recognise the nexus between finance and inequality as an empirical 
observation and stress the need for more extensive empirical research that will contribute to a 
“framework for assessing the dynamic, endogenous relationships among finance, growth, and 
inequality”. 
 
 
37 Bazillier and Hericourt (2017) provide a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on the relationship 
between inequality, leverage, and financial crises 
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One of the consequences of excessive financialisation has been the growth of household 
indebtedness as a substitute for their lost income. This process provides an indirect channel 
whereby financialisation aggravates income inequality through financial expropriation 
(indebtedness) parallel to slowing growth and stagnation. Wage stagnation, in particular, draws 
more households towards private indebtedness to meet their basic needs and desired level of 
consumption (Lapavitsas, 2009b; Ryoo and Kim, 2014; Tridico and Pariboni, 2018).38 In this 
sense, the household debt stimulates growth and reduces inequality initially, but interest 
payments and high leverage (high probability of default) will put more downward pressure on 
the creditworthiness of households (Hein, 2010). In particular, the main effect will be on the 
lower part of the income distribution, income is distributed from low to high income groups. 
For instance, the outstanding debt of American households nearly reached 100% of GDP in 
2006, right before the global financial crisis (Ryoo and Kim, 2014). 
 
Moreover, financial liberalisation and the expansion of the equity market have allowed big 
companies to turn to open financial markets for funding, thus forcing financial institutions to 
turn to household credit as well as investment banking activities to sustain their profitability 
(Lapavitsas, 2009a, 2009b). This practice resembles financial expropriation which, according 
to Lapavitsas (2009a), can be defined as “the extraction of financial profits directly out of 
wages and salaries”. 
 
Additionally, Lapavitsas (2009b) argues that financial expropriation is an integral part of the 
financialisation process, which has created a debt-driven consumption regime as a means of 
mortgage and consumer lending, concomitant with the rise of the top 10% share of income. 
This has changed the traditional role of households from net savers to net borrowers and 
 
38 Basic needs include, for example, housing, consumption, education and health. 
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allowed for more exploitation of labour as manifested by higher profits for finance, followed 
by a relative increase in the size of the financial sector (Baragar and Chernomas, 2012). Kim 
et al. (2019) predict negative effects of household debt on income inequality. They use a bi-
directional model to show that household debt creates “a vicious circle of rising inequality, job 
insecurity, and indebtedness”. In their model, workers who experience rising debt are exposed 
to a rise in the consequences of job losses, thus weakening their bargaining power, and 
aggravating income inequality and initiating more borrowing.  
 
3.10 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the significant finance-growth and finance-inequality literature was explored, 
highlighting the current issues that are of interest for economists and policy-makers, 
particularly in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Emphasis is placed on the 
nonlinearity of the of interaction between financial and real variables, which provides one of 
the most prominent modern economic complexities and a top priority on the research agenda 
(Carré and L’œillet, 2018). In addition, a synthesis was provided of the significant theoretical 
and empirical studies that discuss the consequences of the financialisation process, both at the 
macro and micro levels. Contributions to the explanations of excessive finance effects have 
been critically reviewed, as well as non-traditional transmission mechanisms whereby the 
effects of financialisation are transmitted to the real economy.  
 
Moreover, the non-monotonic relationships between finance and growth and finance and 
income inequality motivate the following logical question: what is the optimal size of the 
financial sector? Another issue would be to explore the channels through which the finance 
effect is transmitted to the economy and the potential negative consequences of a large financial 
sector. This is often referred to as “the dark side of finance” (Panizza, 2014; Beck et al., 2016).  
67 
 
Chapter Four 
 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to provide cross sectional and time series evidence on the 
macroeconomic consequences of financialisation. The relevant literature was discussed in 
chapters two and three, the discussion revealing changes in the perceived view of the impact 
of finance on the real economy. The previous literature shows a positive linear effect of finance 
on economic growth and income inequality, but the post-crisis literature reveals weakening and 
negative effects. Many theoretical and empirical explanations have been introduced, including 
the financial structure, type of finance, nonlinearity and model uncertainty.39 In fact, the model 
uncertainty issue comes at the top of list.  
 
Many economists refer to the inherent model uncertainty in econometric analysis and the 
impossibility of running thorough specification checks for each potential model (Fernandez et 
al., 2001; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004; Sturm and De Haan, 2005). Steel (2017) expresses this 
view as follows: 
It is important to realize that this uncertainty is an inherent part of economic modelling, 
whether we acknowledge it or not. Putting on blinkers and narrowly focusing on a 
limited set of possible models implies that we may fail to capture important aspects of 
economic reality. 
 
Hence, econometricians realise that it is hard to run a regression with more than a handful of 
variables. However, almost in every economic field, the literature suggests a large number of 
potential explanatory variables that are proven to be significant predictors of the dependent 
 
39 A comprehensive discussion of these explanations was introduced in chapter 3. 
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variable. The results and significance of these variables may vary according to the set of 
information included in the regression model.  
 
A recent example from the finance-growth literature is the study of  Beck et al. (2014b), who 
find that financial sector size and non-intermediation activities promote economic growth in 
high income countries, while the intermediation activities have no effect. They use basic OLS 
without attempting to examine the robustness of their results. However, their results turned out 
to be fragile under the robustness analysis carried out by Sturn and Zwickl (2016) who revisit 
the Beck et al. (2014b) study. They examine the robustness of their results to different 
estimation techniques, existence of outliers and changes in model specification (the inclusion 
and exclusion of other explanatory variables). They argue that a slight change to the Beck et 
al. (2014b) model specification changes the results considerably, hence they do not find 
supporting evidence for a positive effect of financial sector size and non-intermediation 
activities. 
 
The research methodology used in this thesis is of utmost importance because, inter alia, it 
addresses the model uncertainty issue to confirm the robustness and validity of past results 
using the extreme bounds analysis methodology introduced by Edward Leamer (1985). In 
addition, different time series methodologies are applied to examine the validity of the 
nonlinearity hypothesis between financialisation and economic growth (income distribution).  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.2, the extreme bounds analysis 
methodology for cross sectional analysis is introduced, whereas section 4.3 is devoted to the 
application of the EBA technique. In section 4.4 various forms of EBA are illustrated and 
compared. In section 4.5 some previous studies that applied EBA are reviewed. In section 4.6 
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the debate on EBA are presented. In section 4.7 some alternatives for the EBA methodology 
are provided. In section 4.8 the time series methodologies to be used in chapter 7 are explained. 
Section 4.9 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Model Uncertainty and Extreme Bounds Analysis 
Economic theories do not often reveal the set of explanatory variables that should appear in the 
true empirical model (Moosa and Cardak, 2006). Therefore, finding the one regression equation 
to estimate would be a “mission impossible”, particularly where a large number of potential 
explanatory variables are provided by the literature. 
 
A common practice among researchers is to explore an exhaustive number of regressions and 
cherry-pick the few that confirm prior beliefs, while ignoring unfavourable evidence. This 
behaviour is widespread and documented in different fields of social science due to three 
known types of behavioural biases. First is confirmation bias, which is formally defined by 
Moosa and Ramiah (2017) as “the tendency to give more weight to evidence that supports a 
prior belief and ignore evidence that does not support the same belief”. Moreover, Dr Shahram 
Heshmat, from Psychology Today, argue that confirmation bias is initiated when people believe 
that a certain idea is true and motivate these ideas by wishful thinking. Therefore, they tend to 
select evidence that confirms their views while rejecting evidence that casts doubt on it. He 
further argues that individuals, influenced by confirmation bias, are more likely to stop 
gathering evidence once they found enough information to support their perceived ideas.40 
 
 
40 Shahram Heshmat, 2015. What Is Confirmation Bias? Published in Psychology Today. 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/au/blog/science-choice/201504/what-is-confirmation-bias.  
70 
 
The second type of bias stems from the influence of ideology on economics—that is, 
ideological bias, which occurs when economists ignore and dismiss arguments without 
considering the views expressed by critics (Javdani and Chang, 2019). Ideological bias has 
always been a matter of concern in economics due to its theoretical consequences and policy 
implications. In her presidential address to the American Economic Association, Rivlin (1987) 
stressed that “economists need to be more careful to sort out, for ourselves and others, what we 
really know from our ideological biases”. 
 
The third is research selectivity bias (publication bias), which is defined as “the tendency by 
some researchers, referees or editors to report, selectively, statistically significant findings or 
those consistent with conventional theory” (Card and Krueger, 1995). Publication bias is 
exacerbated by the absence of replication and validation culture in economics as well as the 
incentives for publication and promotion in academia (Ioannidis et al., 2017). Overall, these 
biases have been widely recognised as a threat to the validity of empirical results in economics 
and social science fields (Card and Krueger, 1995; Stanley, 2008; Ioannidis et al., 2017). 
 
Edward Leamer, the well-known statistician, took the lead to criticise this behaviour in his 
provocative article, “Let’s Take the Con out of Econometrics”, published in 1983.  
Subsequently, he introduced extreme bounds analysis (EBA) as a systematic solution for the 
specification problem (Leamer, 1985).  Moosa (2012) provides a thorough example of the 
manipulation of the set of information included in cross-sectional regression models to change 
the sign and/or significance of the coefficients on the explanatory variables. Using a data set 
on the capital structure and its determinants, Moosa demonstrates how researchers could obtain 
their favourable results by gradually adding (deleting) variables to (from) the regression 
equation to change the sign and significance of a coefficient of a variable that is already 
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included in the model. In the same vein, Korobilis (2018) argues that a conflict of economic 
interpretation might arise due to the high number of possible combinations, which produces a 
large set of predictors that might be with comparable explanatory ability for the dependent 
variable. 
 
As an illustration, Moosa’s work is replicated in the appendix to this chapter, using data on 
financialisation and income inequality. The results show how the explanatory variables 
included in the model can be changed to get the desired significance and sign. The estimated 
coefficients and their t-statistics are reported in Table A4.1 (10 rgressions) and Figure A4.1 
(varying number of regressions). To alleviate the model specification problem and potential 
data mining, the extreme bounds analysis technique is used to examine the robustness of the 
determinants of economic growth and income inequality, with a focus on the variables 
representing financialisation. 
 
4.3 Application of Extreme Bounds Analysis  
The application of EBA is centred on the estimated coefficient on the variable of interest, Q. 
In order to estimate this coefficient, a large number of regressions are run, exhausting all 
possible combinations of the set of explanatory variables.  
 
Technically, each regression contains a set of one or more free variables (𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗), the variable of 
interest Q, and a combination of a fixed number of Z variables (selected from a predetermined 
pool of explanatory variables, which are potentially significant predictors of the dependent 
variable. The model takes the following form: 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛼𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 +  𝛽𝛽 𝑄𝑄 + ∑  𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 +𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 έ                                         (4.1) 
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where 0α  is a constant, X is the free variable(s) (always included in the model), Q is the 
variable of interest whose robustness is under investigation, and Z  is a subset of potentially 
important but doubtful variable.41 The procedure involves varying the subset of Z variables 
included in the regression to find the widest range of significant coefficients on the variable of 
interest, β . By running a large number of regressions for each variable of interest, the highest 
and lowest values of β will be identified. The variable of interest is “robust” if the value of its 
coefficient remains significant and of the same sign within the extreme bounds—otherwise the 
variable would be “fragile”. 
 
To illustrate the procedure, suppose that we want to examine the robustness of domestic credit 
to private sector (DOMSPR) as a determinant of income inequality measured by the Gini index 
(GINI). DOMSPR will be included as the variable of interest, Q. The pool of potential 
explanatory variables contains 36 other potential determinant of income inequality.42 The free 
variable, GDP per capita growth (GDPPCG), is included in each regression equation. The 
choice of the free variable(s) is based on theory or consistently significant results in the past 
literature. Then, the regression equations would be 
 
 GINI =  α +  δ GDPPCG +  β DOMSPR +  γ1 LIFEEX +  γ2 FDIGDP + γ3 INSQTY +  𝜀𝜀 GINI =  α +  δ GDPPCG +  β DOMSPR +  γ1 LIFEEX + γ2 FDIGDP + γ4  TRDGDP + 𝜀𝜀 GINI =  α +  δ GDPPCG +  β DOMSPR +  γ1 LIFEEX +  γ2 FDIGDP + γ5  REMMI + 𝜀𝜀 
   GINI =  α +  δ GDPPCG +  β DOMSPR + γ34 TNTR +  γ35 AGEDEP +  γ36  HDI + 𝜀𝜀 
 
41 The free variable is identified as an important explanatory variable. The choice of the free variable is of a matter 
of importance—that is, the results reported by the literature must be consistent. 
42 To be considered for the analysis, the potential explanatory variables must be reported in the literature as 
significant once at least. 
(4.2) 
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In this case, a total of 7140 regression coefficients are estimated for DOMSPR. The estimated 
coefficients will be used to identify the extreme bounds and calculate the cumulative 
distribution function, CDF(0), which are needed to judge the robustness of DOMSPR as a 
predictor of the Gini index.43  
 
4.4 Variants of Extreme Bounds Analysis 
Three variants of EBA appear in the literature: the traditional EBA proposed by Leamer (1983, 
1985), the extension suggested by Granger and Uhlig (1990), and the modification introduced 
by Sala-i-Martin (1997). In what follows, each EBA variant is described. 
 
 4.4.1 The Traditional EBA (Leamer’s EBA) 
Leamer was the first to confront the problem of model uncertainty by using extreme bounds 
analysis. He suggested that EBA provides the means whereby robustness of the explanatory 
variables can be determined. EBA is carried out by estimating regression parameters of all 
possible combinations for a given set of explanatory variables that are deemed to predict the 
dependent variable. Judging the robustness of an explanatory variable is based on the sign and 
significance of the coefficient on the variable. The extreme bounds are calculated as follows 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 =  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 2𝜎𝜎                                                       (4.3) 
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 =  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛 − 2𝜎𝜎                                                         (4.4) 
If both the upper and lower extreme bounds are significant and of the same sign then the 
variable is marked as robust, otherwise it will be considered fragile. The use of extreme bounds 
as a measure of variable robustness has been criticised strongly by some economists, as theses 
bound might be the output of poorly fitted models that are economically unreasonable. This 
 
43 In general, EBA produces (N! / (Z! N-Z!)) combinations for each variable of interest, where N is the number of 
potential explanatory variables available for selection, and Z is a fixed number of explanatory variables selected 
for each model.  
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criticism has led to the development of a new version of extreme bounds analysis by Granger 
and Uhlig (1990), which is discussed next. 
 
4.4.2 The Granger and Uhlig Restricted EBA  
Granger and Uhlig (1990) introduced a slightly modified form of EBA, which is called 
restricted or reasonable extreme bounds analysis. This procedure excludes equations with poor 
goodness of fit for the purpose of calculating the extreme bounds. In particular, Granger and 
Uhlig added a restriction, based on the level of goodness of fit (represented by R2), on the 
results to be considered for the calculation of extreme bounds. Therefore, only models with R2 
equal or greater than 𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿 2  shall be considered. If δ = 1, all estimated equations will be included 
in the calculations of the extreme bounds, while if δ = 0, only the equation with highest R2 is 
used to calculate the extreme bounds. Hence 
𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿 2 ≥ [(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2 + 𝛿𝛿𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛2 ], 𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 0 <  𝛿𝛿 < 1.                           (4.5) 
By excluding the equations with goodness of fit that is less than 𝑅𝑅𝛿𝛿 2 , the range of estimated 
coefficients will be narrower, and the results will provide a more reasonable base to mark the 
variables as robust or fragile. Leamer’s EBA and the Granger and Uhlig restricted form of EBA 
have made a great leap into a new methodology to test the robustness of the explanatory 
variables. However, both forms of EBA have received many criticisms as being an “extreme 
test” that is “too strong to pass”, producing very few (or no) robust variables (Levine and 
Renelt, 1992).44 A variable is robust only if all of the estimated coefficients are significant and 
of the same sign in all estimated regressions, which means that only one regression coefficient 
with a different sign is enough to mark the variable as fragile.  
 
44 If three variables are chosen from 40 potential variables, there will be 9,880 possible combinations, which make 
it highly likely that at least one coefficient of different sign will be obtained. 
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4.4.3 The Sala-i-Martin EBA  
Sala-i-Martin (1997) modified the traditional form of EBA, departing from the zero-one 
labelling scheme into the analysis of the entire distribution of the estimated coefficients  𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗. 
The cumulative density function (CDF) lying on each side of the zero is used as a criterion to 
determine the robustness of explanatory variables.45 As the exact form of the coefficients 
distribution is unknown, Sala-i-Martin proposes to calculate CDF(0) when the distribution of 
the coefficients estimates is normal, and when it is not normal. 
 
Moreover, the Sala-i-Martin form of EBA allows the option of different weighting schemes to 
give more weight to the estimated regression models based on their goodness of fit (measured 
by R2, adjusted R2 and the likelihood ratio) as models with higher goodness of fit are more 
likely to be the true model. When the coefficient estimates 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 , are normally distributed, the 
weights are proportional to the R2, adjusted R2 and the likelihood ratio. In case of the likelihood 
ratio, the estimation of weighted parameters for each 𝒾𝒾 = 1, 2... M models will be as follow:  
𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 =  𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∑ 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1                                                               (4.6) 
𝛽𝛽𝚥𝚥� =  ∑ 𝜔𝜔𝔦𝔦𝑗𝑗 .𝑀𝑀𝒾𝒾=1 𝛽𝛽𝒾𝒾𝑗𝑗                                                      (4.7) 
𝛿𝛿𝚥𝚥2� =  ∑ 𝜔𝜔𝔦𝔦𝑗𝑗.𝑀𝑀𝒾𝒾=1 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗2                                                        (4.8) 
where 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is relative likelihood weight of the model j, 𝛽𝛽𝚥𝚥�   is the weighted average of model j 
points of estimate 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗, and 𝛿𝛿𝚥𝚥2� is the weighted average of model j estimated variances.46 The 
variable is marked as robust at 1%, 5%, 10% when the CDF(0) is greater or equal to  99%, 95% 
and 90%, respectively—otherwise the variable is marked as fragile.  
 
 
45 Sala-i-Martin (1997) notes that zero divides the area of the probability distribution. The larger area is called 
CDF(0), regardless of its side (negative or positive). Thus, CDF(0) falls between 0.5 and 1. 
46 When the coefficient estimates are normally distributed, only two moments (mean and standard deviation) are 
needed to measure the larger area under the probability density function CDF(0) for each variable. 
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Finally, Sala-i-Martin EBA provides a better representation of the sensitivity analysis 
originally suggested by Leamer, by reporting the distribution of estimated coefficients. In 
addition, it accounts for the fragility of the extreme bounds themselves by constructing 
weighted distribution of coefficients, as explained above. 
 
4.4.4 Econometric  Issues  
Two main econometric issues are considered when applying EBA. The first is 
heteroscedasticity, which results in biased estimates of standard errors. Therefore, robust 
standard errors (also called, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors) are used to obtain more 
efficient coefficient estimates. Sturm and De Haan (2005) find that using robust estimation 
affects the list of variables that are considered as robust determinants of economic growth.  
 
The second issue is that researchers often have concerns over potential multicollinearity in the 
estimation of regression equations, due to large number of explanatory variables. Few steps are 
taken to avoid this issue and enhance the quality of EBA estimation. First, following Levine 
and Renelt (1992), an exclusion criterion is set, based on variance inflation factor (VIF), 
whereby the models with 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 > 7 are excluded from the estimation of the bounds. Second, for 
each variable of interest, Q, the pool of variables from which the variables Z are chosen is 
restricted by excluding variables that potentially measure the same phenomenon. The empirical 
analysis will be carried out using the “ExtremeBounds” package developed by Hlavac (2016) 
in the R statistical software. The “ExtremeBounds” package can run both Leamer EBA and 
Sala-i-Martin EBA.  
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4.4.5 Other Sources of Model Uncertainty  
EBA and other model uncertainty methodologies have only been used to deal with model 
uncertainty arising out of results sensitivity to changes in the model specifications—the choice 
of explanatory variables. However, model uncertainty may also arise from sample period, 
estimation method, functional form, and variable definition and measurement (Moosa, 2018b). 
The present study will not provide the ultimate solution for model uncertainty problem, which 
requires dealing with the aspects mentioned by Moosa (2018b). Auffhammer and Steinhauser 
(2012) and Yang et al. (2015) provide two major attempts to cover the core aspects of model 
uncertainty in one study. They contend that reliable evidence can only be derived from a 
distribution of the estimated coefficients rather than single or few models. For instance, Yang 
et al. (2015) examine the robustness of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) to changes in 
the definition of the dependent as well as the explanatory variables, the choice of explanatory 
variables, form (linear, quadratic, cubic), functional form (log vs linear) and econometric 
techniques used which results in more than 140 million estimated models. Until now, such a 
study has not been conducted in the financial development literature. 
 
4.5 Previous Studies Using Extreme Bounds Analysis 
EBA is most prominent in the growth literature, where no single theory identifies the exact set 
of the true predictors of economic growth while different theories are not mutually exclusive 
(Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Fernandez et al., 2001).47 Sensitivity analysis studies of the determinants 
of economic growth start with Levine and Renelt (1992) who examine the robustness of the 
determinants of per capita growth rate in a sample of 119 countries using Leamer’s variant of 
EBA. They find that few variables—out of more than 50 variables—are robustly correlated 
with economic growth. The robust variables include investment share, initial income and 
 
47 At the time of writing, there were no studies that apply EBA to income inequality. 
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secondary education. Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that the results of Levine and Renelt (1997) 
are perceived by some researchers as implying that “nothing can be learned from this empirical 
growth literature because no variables are robustly correlated with growth”.  
 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that the traditional form of EBA designed by Leamer (1985) is 
hard to pass. He advocates the relaxation of the test by reporting the whole distribution of the 
estimated coefficient. Accordingly, he re-examines the determinants of growth in his famous 
article “I Just Ran Two Million Regressions” and concludes that many variables can be found 
to be robust. The article, which is published in the American Economic Review (the same 
journal that published Levine and Renelt (1992) article) shows that more than fifth of the 58 
explanatory variables are robustly correlated with the growth rate of per capita income. 
 
Sturm and De Haan (2005) use both OLS and robust regression when applying EBA to the 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) data set. They argue that the results produced by using OLS in cross 
country regressions are highly sensitive to presence of outliers, as they may be driven by one 
country. Indeed, they show that using the robust regression changes the list of robust 
determinants of economic growth. 
 
Other EBA studies in related fields include Moosa and Cardak (2006) who examine the 
determinants of FDI in 138 countries. Using Leamer’s EBA, they find three out of seven 
variables to be robust. Over the past three decades, it has been demonstrated that EBA is a 
credible methodology that has been utilised in almost all fields of social science to examine the 
robustness of the determinants of economic growth (King and Levine, 1993b; Sturm and De 
Haan, 2005; Reed, 2009), foreign direct investment (Chakrabarti, 2001; Moosa, 2009; 
Chanegriha et al., 2017), stock prices (Al-Deehani, 2005) national saving (Hussain and 
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Brookins, 2001), and medal winning at the Olympics (Moosa and Smith, 2004). Most recently, 
the techniques was used to examine the determinants of fiscal distress (Bruns and Poghosyan, 
2018) and financial crises (Inekwe, 2018). 
 
4.6 Debate on Extreme Bounds Analysis  
Leamer (1983) suggests sensitivity analysis as a form of remedy for the arbitrary choice of 
model specification in empirical econometrics, whereby researchers report one or few 
regressions with different subsets of explanatory variables, functional form, etc. These 
regressions include some core variables and a set of selected doubtful variables that are 
included in or excluded from the reported models.  
 
The common form of sensitivity analysis is the choice of the explanatory variables in linear 
regression. Leamer argues that by exhausting all possible combinations of explanatory 
variables, the maximum and minimum estimates for the coefficient of the variable of interest 
are obtained—hence the extreme bounds. Consequently, any estimate of the coefficient of the 
variable of interest, produced by any specification, would fall within these extreme bounds. If 
the estimates of coefficient remain significant and of the same sign, then, the variable is labelled 
as “robust”, otherwise it is “fragile”. Leamer (1983) suggests that “an inference is not 
believable if it is fragile, if it can be reversed by minor changes in assumptions”. 
 
Several scholars share the same concerns about the credibility of empirical econometric 
procedures. Temple (2000) advocates the use of EBA to address model uncertainty in the 
economic growth literature, suggesting that it should be combined with robust estimation and 
tests for outliers, which was done subsequently by Sturm and De Haan (2005). Angrist and 
Pischke (2010) argue in favour of Leamer’s criticism of econometrics practices at his time. 
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However, they contend that the “credibility revolution” in empirical economics, since Leamer’s 
time, is a result of improved data availability, research methodologies and focus on research 
design rather than the sensitivity analysis suggested by Leamer. Angrist and Pischke (2010) 
express Leamer’s view as they say, 
Leamer (1983) diagnosed his contemporaries’ empirical work as suffering from a 
distressing lack of robustness to changes in key assumptions — assumptions he called 
“whimsical” because one seemed as good as another. The remedy he proposed was 
sensitivity analysis, in which researchers show how their results vary with changes in 
specification or functional form. 
 
In addition, Breusch (1990) argues that EBA summarises and assimilates information about 
the sensitivity of the model to specification selection in a readily understandable form, which 
is hard to comprehend otherwise. 
 
On the other hand, some econometricians “prefer not to worry” about the model specification 
issue, and continue to use the average economic regression (AER) approach as a way of 
conducting empirical research in economics, which Leamer strongly criticised (Kennedy, 
2003).48 The strongest objection to EBA comes from McAleer et al. (1985) who admit that 
econometric practices at their time was not of the “most robust of health”. However, they 
undermine Leamer’s proposition to take the con out of econometrics using EBA and suggest 
their own prescription. They describe EBA as the “medicine to cure an ailing patient” and 
contend that “EBA is an inefficient (and incomplete) way of communicating to readers the fact 
that the doubtful variables are needed to explain the data”. Particularly, they contend that EBA 
 
48 Kennedy (2003) defines the AER (or specific to general) approach as a way of doing econometrics whereby 
the researcher begins with a validated specification and then expands it by adding more variables, or what he 
describes as “hunting for an alternative specification that is “better”, using age-old criteria such as correct signs, 
high R2s, and significant t values on coefficients “known to be nonzero”. Kennedy argues that AER is a blatant 
act of “data mining”. A similar approach that involves data mining is the test, test, test (TTT), whereby the 
researcher initiates the analysis with “more general” specification, then simplifies until several model diagnostics 
requirements are satisfied (the general to specific approach). 
81 
 
is a flawed method and that the extreme bounds are generated in an arbitrary manner, and 
wonder why these bounds should be of interest as “something of a mystery”.49 
 
4.7 Alternative Model Selection Methods 
The EBA methodology is used to deal with model uncertainty in this research. However, other 
methodologies can be applied for the same purpose, such as the Bayesian model averaging 
methods (BMA) and the method of random forest (RF).  
 
4.7.1 Bayesian Model Averaging 
The idea of Bayesian model averaging (BMA) was developed by Leamer (1978) but remained 
with limited application in the literature until recently. BMA is used to deal with the problem 
of model selection and extends the standard Bayesian inference to model parameters using the 
prior and posterior model distributions obtained through Bayes theorem, which allows for 
direct model selection by combining model estimation and prediction (Fragoso et al., 2018).50 
 
The rationale of using BMA is that averaging over all models provides a better predictive power 
than using a single model, which is usually the case in inference regressions. Therefore, BMA 
is a tool for finding a model with the best posterior probabilities that can be used to calculate 
the posterior predictive mean as the sum of the posterior predictive mean for each model, 
weighted by their respective posterior probability. Moreover, as the sum of the posterior 
probabilities is 1, if the best model has a posterior probability of 1 this means that all the weight 
 
49 A collection of research papers that argue for or against Leamer’s EBA, before 1991, can be found in Granger 
(1991). For an updated discussion on the critique of EBA, see Moosa (2017). 
50 See Fragoso et al. (2018) for a systematic review of the Bayesian model averaging literature and Moral‐Benito 
(2015) for an overview of Bayesian model averaging in economics. 
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is assigned to this model. Accordingly, if several models receive substantial weight, these 
models are included in the inference according to their respective weights. 
 
Despite its attractiveness, BMA has been hardly applied in the literature because of the 
complexity of its calculations.51 In addition, the use of Bayesian statistics is often subject to 
subjectivity criticism as it depends on the subjective definition of probabilities (Koop, 2003). 
This means that the researcher must assign prior probability to each model. The full Bayesian 
model averaging approach has been applied to economic growth by Fernandez et al. (2001) 
who re-examined the determinants of growth of Sala-i-Martin (1997). Subsequently, Sala-i-
Martin et al. (2004) investigated the same data with a slightly modified approach that they 
called a Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE), where they combine classical 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with Bayesian model averaging. Nevertheless, the 
results of both of these studies do not differ from the results of the comparable EBA study of 
Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
 
4.7.2 Random Forests 
Random forests (RF), introduced by Breiman (2001), is a machine learning algorithm that 
provides a tool for classification and regression tasks. RF is a modification of the bagging 
approach that combines multiple decision trees (learning models). This process enhances the 
accuracy and stability of the prediction and avoids overfitting that is often present in deep 
decision tree models, which is done by creating subsets of the predictors and building smaller 
trees from these subsets. RF makes it easy to measure the relative importance of regressors 
after training, as the sum of importance added to 1. Consequently, the researcher can decide 
 
51 The application of BMA requires the estimation of 2p number of regressions, where p is the number of 
regressors. However, the space of these equations could be reduced significantly by controlling the prior 
settings. 
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which of the predictors contribute the most to the outcome variable and should be included in 
the model. Similar to BMA, RF is rarely used. Of the few applications, it has been used as a 
tool of predicting poverty (Sohnesen and Stender, 2016) and forecasting economic growth 
(Biau, 2013; Bang et al., 2015).  
 
4.8 Time Series Analysis  
A time series analysis will be conducted to examine the relationship between financialisation 
and macroeconomic variables, as well as potential nonlinearity, over time. Several studies put 
forward theoretical and empirical explanations for the weakening (reversing) effect of finance 
on economic growth and income inequality (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Panizza, 2018).  
 
The variable addition test (VAT) is used to investigate the validity and significance of the 
functional form of the relationship (the nonlinearity hypothesis). The results of variable 
addition test will be supplemented by testing the significance of the difference between two 
models’ R2s. Moreover, non-nested model selection tests will be used to choose between the 
linear and quadratic specifications. The unobserved components model (UCM) is used to 
overcome the issue of model misspecification due to omitted variables bias. A major advantage 
of UCM is that it considers the effects of unspecified explanatory variables in its unobserved 
components without the need to include them explicitly in the model.  
 
4.8.1 Variable Addition Test (VAT) 
The variable addition test is used to choose between two model specifications by testing the 
significance of adding one more variable to the regression equation. In the present study, VAT 
is used to test for the significance of adding the quadratic term of financialisation variables to 
the regression equation. The linear and non-linear functional forms are specified as follows: 
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𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  β1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡                                                                (4.9) 
𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  β1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + β2𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡                                               (4.10) 
where 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 is the dependent variable, 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is the financialisation variable, and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is the error term. 
If the introduction of the quadratic term turns out to be significant, this provides support for 
the financial Kuznets curve hypothesis (or nonlinearity in general). The Lagrange-Multiplier 
(LM) and likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics will be used to judge the significance of adding 
the quadratic term 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡2. According to Kennedy, “the test statistics associated with these tests 
have unknown small-sample distributions, but are each distributed asymptotically as a chi-
square (𝜒𝜒2) with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions being tested”. Thus, 
Lagrange-Multiplier test (LM) and likelihood ratio test (LR) are both distributed as 𝜒𝜒2(1). An 
F test will be used for the same purpose. 
 
The existence of nonlinear (quadratic) form of the relationship between finance and economic 
growth (income inequality) implies an optimal level of financialisation—the level of 
financialisation at which the dependent variable has a maximum (minimum) value. 
Subsequently, the turning point (optimal level of financialisation) can be calculated by equating 
the first derivative of equation (4.10) to zero. Hence,  
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
=   β1 + 2 β2𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 0                                                                 (4.11) 
By solving for 𝑓𝑓, we obtain 
𝑓𝑓 = −β1
2 β2                                                                                 (4.12) 
The quadratic form relationship is depicted by either U-shaped curve or inverted U-shaped 
curve, depending on the sign of the quadratic coefficient, β2. If β2 > 0, then the curve is U-
shaped. Conversely, if β2 < 0, then the curve is inverted U-shaped. 
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The variable addition test will be supplemented by the Z-test of the significance of the 
difference between the two models R2s, where the null hypothesis is 𝑅𝑅12 = 𝑅𝑅22. To conduct this 
test, the R2s are transformed using the Fisher Z transformation as follows,  
𝑧𝑧1 =  log �1+𝑟𝑟11−𝑟𝑟1�21                                                               (4.13) 
𝑧𝑧2 =  log �1+𝑟𝑟21−𝑟𝑟2�21                                                              (4.14) 
This procedure is followed to normalise the combined distribution of 𝑅𝑅12 and 𝑅𝑅22. The standard 
deviation is calculated as follows:  
𝜎𝜎𝑧𝑧1𝑧𝑧2 = � 1𝑁𝑁1−3 + 1𝑁𝑁2−3                                                  (4.15) 
 
Finally, the Z-test statistics is calculated as follows 
𝑧𝑧 = (𝑧𝑧1−𝑧𝑧2)−(𝑑𝑑1−𝑑𝑑2)
𝜎𝜎𝑧𝑧1𝑧𝑧2
                                                         (4.16) 
where the difference between upper case Z’s (𝑍𝑍1 − 𝑍𝑍2) is the null hypothesis value which is 
equal to zero (𝑅𝑅12 − 𝑅𝑅22 = 0). 
 
4.8.2 Non-Nested Model Selection Tests  
Two models are said to be non-nested if one cannot be derived from the other by imposing a 
restriction (Kennedy, 2003). Non-nested model selection tests are used to choose between rival 
models. If the null model is correct, then the alternative model should add no value beyond 
what is explained by the null model. However, it may be the case that neither model is rejected 
when treated as the null model or both models are rejected. In such case, neither model is 
superior to the other. Non-nested model selection tests are appropriate when testing rival 
models with respect to their theoretical underpinnings or auxiliary assumptions (Pesaran, 
1990).  
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In this study, non-nested model selection tests are used to choose between the linear and 
quadratic forms. The tests are run both ways (M1 vs M2 and M2 vs M1), where  
𝑀𝑀1: 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  β1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡                                                            (4.17) 
𝑀𝑀2: 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  β2𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡                                                           (4.18) 
where 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡  is the dependent variable and 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is a measure of financialisation. Six tests and two 
information criteria are used. (i) the Cox N-test as derived in Pesaran (1974); (ii) the adjusted 
Cox (NT) test as derived by Godfrey and Pesaran (1983); (iii) the Wald-type (W) test proposed 
by Godfrey and Pesaran (1983); (iv) the J-test, proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981); 
(v) the JA-test is due to Fisher and McAleer (1981); and (vi) the encompassing (EN) test 
proposed, inter alia, by Mizon and Richard (1986). The first five test statistics follow a t-
distribution while the encompassing test statistic follows an F-distribution.  
 
Having examined the validity of the nonlinearity hypothesis, the financial Kuznets curve will 
be estimated using the Phillips-Hansen (1990) fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and the 
unobserved components model developed by Andrew Harvey (1989). Both methods are 
discussed in the following subsections.  
 
4.8.3 The Phillips-Hansen Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) 
The fully modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS) has been developed by Phillips and Hansen 
(1990) as a technique that corrects for simultaneity bias, non-normality and serial correlation, 
when the regressors are I(1). It produces more asymptotically efficient standard errors than 
ordinary least squares (OLS). This is because with integrated variables, the OLS standard 
errors, and in turn the t statistics. do not follow an asymptotic normal distribution. Therefore, 
the conventional t test critical values cannot be used to derive inference on the significance of 
the estimated coefficients. Phillips and Hansen (1990) contend that FMOLS provides more 
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efficient estimates of cointegrated unit roots than standard cointegration estimated by OLS. In 
addition, FMOLS is better suitable for estimation in small size samples (Pedroni, 2001).  
 
4.8.4 The Unobserved Components Model (UCM)  
The unobserved components model introduced by Andrew Harvey (1985, 1989), is a form of 
structural time series model estimated in a time-varying parametric framework (TVP). The 
UCM is used to decompose an observable time series into trend, cyclical and seasonal 
components. These components can account for missing variables without the need to express 
them explicitly, which is very significant as the list of potential explanatory variables is never 
exhaustive. In addition to the unobserved components, the UCM can incorporate linear, 
nonlinear, time-varying, and time-invariant regression effects (Selukar, 2011). Moreover, it 
overcomes many traditional obstacles in time series and econometric analysis as it can be used 
to represent a time series with any order of integration. 
 
Technically, the UCM is a special case of Gaussian state space models where the state and 
static parameters are estimated in a simple and efficient manner using the Kalman filter 
(Fomby, 2008; Mendelssohn, 2011; Selukar, 2011). Once a specific model has been cast in a 
state space form, the various components can be estimated using the Kalman filter (Harvey, 
1989; Koopman et al., 2009). The general specification of UCM with trend and cycle is as 
follows: 
𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 =  𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 +  ψ𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡                                                    (4.19) 
where 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 is the dependent variable. The terms 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 and ψ𝑡𝑡 represent the trend and cyclical 
components, respectively. 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables and 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 is the random 
(irregular) component. The components of the model are supposed to capture the salient 
features of the observable time series that are useful for explaining and predicting its behaviour. 
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The expected results fall under one of the following three cases. First, if the coefficient on the 
explanatory variable and the components are significant, the explanatory variable is an 
important predictor of the dependent variable, but there are other important predictors that are 
not included in the model whose effects are incorporated into the trend and/or cycle. Second, 
if the explanatory variable coefficient is significant and the trend and cyclical components are 
not, then it is concluded that the explanatory variable is the only determinant of the dependent 
variable. Third, if the coefficient on the explanatory variable is insignificant and the 
components are significant, the dependent variable is determined by explanatory variables 
other than those appearing explicitly in the model.  
 
The trend, which represents the long-run tendency of the time series, is specified as follows 
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 =  𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡  ,               𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡  ∼ 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 �0,𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2�               (4.20) 
𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 =   𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 ,                               𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡  ∼ 𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 �0,𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2�               (4.21) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡  and 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡  represent the stochastic level and slope of the trend, respectively. It is assumed 
that 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡   and 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡  are independent of each other. The trend is modelled as a random walk with 
drift 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 that follows a first order autoregressive process as represented by equation (4.21). The 
trend can also be reduced to a random walk with a drift if 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 = 0, which means that the trend 
remains roughly constant over time, or deterministic linear trend if both error variances are 
equal to zero, 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2 =  𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2 = 0. 
 
The cycle can be modelled as a stochastic or deterministic trigonometric cycle. The 
deterministic cyclical component is a sin-cosine wave with frequency 𝜆𝜆 (0 > 𝜆𝜆 > 𝜋𝜋), which is 
specified as follows 
𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 cos(𝜆𝜆𝐸𝐸) + 𝛽𝛽 sin(𝜆𝜆𝐸𝐸)                                                  (4.22) 
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where 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 is a periodic function with a period of 2𝜋𝜋/𝜆𝜆, an amplitude of (𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽2)1/2, and a 
phase of 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵−1 (𝛽𝛽/𝛼𝛼). The stochastic cyclical component comes as an alternative to specifying 
one or more deterministic cycles by introducing a disturbance and a damping factor (Koopman 
et al., 2009). The specification of the stochastic cycle is as follows 
�
𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡
𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡
∗� =  𝜌𝜌 � cos 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐 sin 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐−sin 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐 cos 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐� �𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡−1∗ � + �𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡∗�                                      (4.23) 
where 𝜆𝜆  is the frequency of the cycle with a range of  0 > 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐 > 𝜋𝜋. 𝜌𝜌 is the damping factor on 
the amplitude, (0 ≤ 𝜌𝜌 ≤ 1), whereas 𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡 and 𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡∗ are two mutually uncorrelated white noise 
disturbance terms   with zero means and common variance, 𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡 , 𝜅𝜅𝑡𝑡∗ ~𝑁𝑁𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝜅𝜅2). The resulting 
stochastic cycle has a fixed period but time-varying amplitude and phase. Note that if the period 
is 2π/𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐, the stochastic cycle becomes a first order autoregressive cycle if 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐 is 0 or π (Koopman 
et al., 2009). 
 
The empirical analysis is carried out using the STAMP software.52 The results are validated by 
using a set of diagnostic tests for normality, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The 
diagnostic test for normality (N) is the Doornik-Hansen statistic, which is the Bowman and 
Shenton (1975) statistic with the correction of Doornik and Hansen (1994), which is distributed 
as 𝜒𝜒2(2).53 The serial correlation test statistic is the Ljung-Box (1978) Q statistic, which is 
distributed as 𝜒𝜒2(𝑞𝑞).54 The heteroscedasticity test statistic (H) is the ratio of the squares of the 
last h residuals to the squares of the first h residuals, where h is the closest integer to T/3, where 
T is the number of observations. It has an F distribution with (h, h) degrees of freedom. The 
model’s overall statistical explanatory power is based on several measures of relative and 
absolute goodness of fit (𝑅𝑅2, 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑2). The traditional coefficient of determination R2 is most useful 
 
52  Mendelssohn (2011) presents a review of the STAMP software. 
53 The 5% critical value is 5.99. Koopman et al. (2009) argue that high values of the normality test are considered 
as a sign for outliers. 
54 q is the degrees of freedom, calculated as q=n+1-k, where k is the number of estimated parameters. 
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when the series appears to be stationary with no trend or seasonality. However, if the series 
show a trend, then 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑2 is a better approximation of the goodness of fit.55  
 
4.9 Conclusion  
Model uncertainty is inherent in econometric analysis and considered as a threat to the 
reliability of empirical results. In this chapter, several cross sectional and time series 
methodologies were discussed thoroughly. Extreme bounds analysis will be used in cross-
sectional analysis to examine the robustness of explanatory variables to changes in model 
specification (sensitivity of the results to the choice of explanatory variables). Two variants of 
EBA are used for empirical analysis, the traditional EBA proposed by Leamer (1985) and its 
modified variant of Sala-i-Martin (1997). These two variants of EBA will be used to test the 
robustness of the determinants of economic growth and income inequality with a focus on the 
financialisation variables. 
 
Several time series methodologies have been introduced and briefly discussed. The variable 
addition test and non-nested model selection tests are set to be used to check model 
specification in terms of functional form (the nonlinearity hypothesis). Finally, the FMOLS 
and UCM will be used to estimate the financial Kuznets curve, for both economic growth and 
income inequality. 
 
55 Description of the diagnostics tests and different measures of goodness of fit can be found in Koopman et al. 
(2009). 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Demonstration of the Sensitivity of Results to the Choice of Explanatory Variables 
 
Table A4.1: Estimation Results of Ten Models 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Cons 105.6069 53.4899 40.93939 42.2392 36.2631 33.5821 32.4732 66.304 40.7078 71.21678 
 (4.88) (6.25) (5.8) (6.41) (16.23) (22.04) (16.29) (7.84) (15.52) (7.9) 
DOMSPR -0.01518 -0.0354 -0.01297 -0.0103 -0.0453 - - 0.01385 -0.011 0.010536 
 (-0.59) (-1.37) (-0.52) (-0.39) (-1.85) - - (0.7) (-0.59) (0.52) 
STMCAP 0.020837 0.04708 0.049463 0.05767 0.05978 0.03483 0.04111 - - - 
 (0.82) (1.93) (2.02) (2.36) (2.31) (1.7) (1.89) - - - 
GDPPCC 0.884428 1.11782 0.80135 0.51048 0.50153 - - - - - 
 (1.77) (2.17) (1.56) (1.0) (0.99) - - - - - 
TNTR -0.101269 0.07466 0.04851 - - 0.4502 0.38816 -0.2474 -0.2569 -0.249007 
 (-0.45) (0.33) (0.21) - - (2.63) (2.09) (-2.59) (-2.65) (-2.32) 
INFCPI -0.085915 0.02361 -0.031969 0.29961 - - - - - - 
 (-0.27) (0.07) (-0.09) (1.15) - - - - - - 
ENRSEC -0.068216 -0.1224 -0.06128 -0.0998 - - - - - 0.017999 
 (-1.06) (-1.92) (-1.08) (-1.77) - - - - - (0.29) 
POPG 1.991772 1.26433 1.527014 - - - - 1.53794 3.05863 1.690481 
 (1.39) (0.85) (1.08) - - - - (1.61) (3.55) (1.65) 
UE 0.164838 0.19718 0.213824 - - - - - - - 
 (1.01) (1.16) (1.25) - - - - - - - 
TRDGDP -0.079239 -0.0804 -0.047111 - - - - -0.0511 -0.0606 -0.059892 
 (-3.83) (-3.71) (-2.97) - - - - (-2.78) (-3.26) (-3.1) 
AGRVAGDP -0.797291 -0.5362 - - - - 0.16144 -0.2878 -0.0335 -0.418047 
 (-2.84) (-1.95) - - - - (0.86) (-2.31) (-0.34) (-2.9) 
FDIGDP 0.199593 -0.5362 - - - -0.0532 -0.0431 0.16818 0.18 0.198736 
 (1.75) (-1.95) - - - (-0.6) (-0.48) (1.68) (1.75) (1.92) 
LIFEEX -0.727038 - - - - - - - - - 
 (-2.6) - - - - - - - - -            
R2 0.445 0.377 0.302 0.176 0.092 0.118 0.128 0.321 0.249 0.355 
Adj. R2 0.324 0.255 0.194 0.109 0.051 0.080 0.076 0.272 0.204 0.294 
F-stats (Prob > F) 0.000 0.003 0.0087 0.0312 0.089 0.033 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Figure A4.1: The t-statistics of the Constant Term and Coefficients on the Explanatory Variables  
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  Figure A4.1 (continued) 
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Chapter Five 
 Financialisation and Economic Growth: An Extreme Bounds Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the finance-growth nexus is considered in the light of the latest empirical 
evidence on the financialisation process, particularly in the post-2008 crisis era. By and large, 
a positive significant effect of financial sector development on economic growth was the 
profound conclusion of more than two decades of finance-growth literature (Levine, 2005; 
Beck, 2012). However, the recent evidence provides another dimension of the finance-growth 
relation, whereby financialisation may retard growth through different channels dominated by 
the crowding-out effect when the increasing share of the financial sector drives down the real 
economic sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012, 2015; 
Moosa, 2018a). This evidence triggers the need to revise the effects of finance as a determinant 
of economic growth, particularly following the great recession (Zingales, 2015; Alexiou et al., 
2018; Carré and L’œillet, 2018).  
 
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter reassesses the current divergence of the results 
in the finance-growth literature. For this purpose, the Leamer (1985) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
variants of extreme bounds analysis are applied. EBA deals with the problem of model 
uncertainty by finding out if the empirical linkages documented in the literature are robust or 
fragile with respect to changes in the conditioning information set included in the model.  
 
A number of proxies are used to represent financialisation variable. Moreover, the analysis is 
extended to examine the robustness of other economic growth determinants. The rest of the 
chapter is organised as follows. Data and empirical model are presented in sections 5.2 and 5.3, 
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respectively. The results of EBA are provided in section 5.4. Results for sub-samples are 
summarized in section 5.5. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in section 5.6. 
 
5.2 Data Description  
In this section a description is presented of the data used to conduct extreme bounds analysis 
of the relation between financialisation and economic growth. The sample comprises 5-year 
average cross-sectional data for 101 countries, over the period 2012-2016. The countries have 
been selected based on the availability of data on measures of financialisation. The IMF 
classification is followed as the countries are divided into three groups. The full sample 
comprises 32 developed countries and 69 developing countries.56 
 
The literature identifies three categories of financialisation measures. First is the 
macroeconomic weight of the financial motive, which focuses on the aggregate crowding out 
effect of the financial sector on other sectors of the economy (Crotty, 2005; Stockhammer, 
2010; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012, 2015; Moosa, 2016; Karwowski et al., 2017). Second is 
the financial origin of profit that measures the sources of revenue for non-financial corporations 
as well as the relative importance of the sources of profits from financial and non-financial 
sources (Krippner, 2005).57 Third is the rentiers share of income (interest and dividend income 
in relation to total income) for households and non-financial corporations (Epstein and Power, 
2003; Dünhaupt, 2012).  
 
In this study the following indicators (ratios) of financialisation are used: domestic credit to the 
private sector to GDP (DOMSPR), private credit by banks to GDP (DOMSBK), private credit 
 
56 See Table A5.1 in the appendix to this chapter for the list of countries and their respective development 
classification. 
57 The calculation of the “financial origin of profit” measures involve some methodological issues. For more 
details see Krippner (2005). 
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by depository institutions to GDP (DOMSFS) and liquid liabilities to GDP (LIQUID). In 
addition, stock market capitalisation to GDP (STMCAP) and total value of traded shares to 
GDP (STMVT) are used as proxies for financial markets development. Variables definitions 
and sources are presented in table A5.2, in the appendix to this chapter.   
 
Liquid liabilities are taken to be the classical measure of financial development in the growth 
literature as well as a direct way to compare with the results of past growth EBA studies. Credit 
to the private sector is the preferred measure of financial development in the finance-growth 
literature as it measures directly the intermediation functions of the financial sector as a 
facilitator of credit to the productive sectors (King and Levine, 1993a; Lynch, 1996; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998; Beck et al., 2000). However, recent research shows that the share of bank credit 
to households has been increasing and finds that it is associated with slower economic growth 
(OECD, 2015; Cournède and Denk, 2015b).  
 
The choice of credit indicators falls within the “macroeconomic weight of financial motive” 
category and consistent with the choice of Moosa (2018a). He suggests that credit indicators 
are closely related to the indebtedness of non-financial corporations and households, which is 
a major dimension of the financialisation process. Moreover, stock market capitalisation and 
value of traded shares are used to capture the rise in financial claims and income, as well as the 
tendency of non-financial corporations to channel money to financial markets through stock 
buybacks and engagement in speculation on financial assets (Krippner, 2005; Tomaskovic-
Devey et al., 2015; Moosa, 2018a; Tridico and Pariboni, 2018). In addition, the selected 
measures are grouped into bank-based measures (DOMSPR, DOMSBK, DOMSFS, LIQUID) 
and market-based measures (STMCAP, STMVT) for the purpose of testing the effect of 
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financial structure on economic growth. Table 5.1 exhibits the correlations matrix of the growth 
rate of real GDP per capita and various  measures of financialisation. 
Table 5.1 Correlations Between the Growth Rate and Financialisation Variables 
Variables  GDPPCG DOMSPR LIQUID DOMSFS DOMSBK STMVT STMCAP 
GDPPCG 1.00 
      
DOMSPR -0.16 1.00 
     
LIQUID -0.16 0.71 1.00 
    
DOMSFS -0.19 0.99 0.71 1.00 
   
DOMSBK -0.17 0.92 0.75 0.93 1.00 
  
STMVT -0.04 0.66 0.41 0.64 0.46 1.00 
 
STMCAP -0.14 0.56 0.38 0.56 0.43 0.66 1.00 
 
5.3 The Empirical Model and Estimation procedures 
The general specification of the model used to conduct extreme bounds analysis was introduced 
in chapter four. The cross-country growth regressions popularised by Barro (1991) are utilised 
for this purpose, such that the initial income per capita and investment are used as free 
variables. Thus, the model is specified as follows: 
𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼0  + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1,𝑗𝑗+ 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗  +  𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗  𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 + ∑  𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +3𝑗𝑗=1 έ𝑗𝑗                    (5.1) 
where 𝑔𝑔 is the growth rate of real GDP per capita. 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 and 𝐾𝐾 are proxies for initial income 
(previous period value of GDP per capita) and investment (gross fixed capital formation), 
respectively. 𝑄𝑄 is the variable of interest under investigation and Z  is a subset of three 
variables that are selected from a large pool of potentially important explanatory variables.58 
 
The choice of the free variables is based on theory predictions or consistently significant results 
in the past literature. Following Sala-i-Martin (1997), among others, the initial level of income 
 
58 The number of Z variables can take any value. However, Following Sala-i-Martin (1997), the number of Z 
variables is set to three. 
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per capita and gross fixed capital formation are used as the two free variables to be included in 
all regressions. The initial level of income per capita is used to incorporate the convergence 
hypothesis and it is widely supported by past empirical studies of economic growth.59 It is 
expected to have a negative relationship with the growth rate. Gross fixed capital formation, 
which is used as a proxy for investment, is expected to have a positive effect on the growth 
rate.  
 
Each regression equation contains two free variables, one variable of interest and three other 
potential explanatory variables chosen from a pool of 39 explanatory variables that are deemed 
to be significant at least once in the literature. Hence, for each variable of interest, 
approximately 9,139 equations are estimated. According to Leamer’s EBA, the variable of 
interest (𝑄𝑄) is robust if its estimated coefficients remains significant and with the same sign 
(within two standard errors of the minimum and maximum coefficients) in all regressions. 
According to the Sala-i-Martin EBA, 𝑄𝑄 is robust if its estimated CDF(0) is greater than 95%. 
 
The output of Sala-i-Martin EBA shows unweighted and weighted statistics. The weighted 
statistics are constructed using the (integrated) likelihood ratio to give more weight to the 
model that is more likely to be the true model. However, Sala-i-Martin (1997) suggests that the 
unweighted scheme is more appropriate to use, particularly in cases where some models have 
spurious good fits. Therefore, the discussion is based on the unweighted scheme. 
 
According to Sala-i-Martin (1997), the main problem encountered when analysing the 
distribution of coefficients is that “we don’t know the exact form of this distribution”. To 
 
59 According to the income convergence hypothesis, countries tend to converge in terms of their income level 
(GDP per capita), as rich countries tend to grow more slowly than poor countries. 
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circumvent this problem, he suggests analysing the results based on two assumptions: (i) the 
distribution of the coefficients across models is normal, and (ii) the distribution of the 
coefficients across models is not normal. Therefore, the coefficients are estimated based on 
these two assumptions. The correlation between the unweighted normal CDF(0) and the 
unweighted non-normal CDF(0) is equal to 0.986, which can be interpreted as evidence that 
the estimated density functions of the coefficients are approximately normal. 
 
5.4 Results and Discussion  
The results of the traditional extreme bounds analysis (Leamer’s EBA) are presented in Table 
5.2. The table shows the minimum and maximum coefficients estimated from all models and 
their corresponding t-statistics, the ratio of significant coefficients as a percentage of all 
estimated coefficients, the lower bound (LB) and the upper bound (UB), which are calculated 
as the minimum (maximum) coefficient minus (plus) two standard errors. The last column 
shows whether a variable is robust or not. 
 
The results reported in Table 5.2 show that all variables are fragile (including the 
financialisation variables). The results are consistent with the work of Levine and Renelt (1992) 
and their “nothing is robust” conclusion. This is due to the hard criteria put forward by Leamer, 
which are heavily criticised in the literature (McAleer et al., 1985; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). 
Several economists criticised the arbitrary focus on the changes of the signs of the extreme 
bounds as a “one-sided” criterion to determine the robustness of the explanatory variables 
(McAleer and Veall, 1989; Granger and Uhlig, 1990).60 Consequently, Granger and Uhlig 
 
60 McAleer et al. (1985) identify two types of fragility. (i) type A fragility when the extreme bounds exceed k 
times the standard deviation of the focus coefficient (Leamer (1985) uses k=2), whereas the literature is unclear 
about the choice; and (ii) type B fragility when the extreme bounds encompass zero. For a full discussion of 
McAleer et al. argument, see Moosa (2017). 
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(1990) suggest eliminating the models with poor goodness of fit to tighten the range of extreme 
bounds and enhance the reliability of the robustness decision. Moreover, Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
suggests reporting the entire distribution of estimated coefficients rather than solely extreme 
bounds. He argues that if 95% of the coefficient estimates fall on one side of zero, the variable 
should be regarded as robust. In addition, he suggests reporting the weighted coefficients by 
using the likelihood weights for the means and standard deviations in the construction of 
distributions. Therefore, it is more sensible to build our discussion based on the results of the 
Sala-i-Martin EBA.  
 
Sala-i-Martin EBA provides a more comprehensive view of the distribution of coefficients. 
The results reported in Table 5.3 include the unweighted and weighted normal CDF(0), mean 
coefficients and their corresponding t-statistics. Sala-i-Martin suggests that if 95% of the 
coefficients estimates lie on either side of the zero (that is, CDF(0) or 1-CDF(0)) the variable 
is regarded as robust. It follows from the full sample results that 10 out of 45 explanatory 
variables are considered to be robust determinants of economic growth. These variables are 
openness (TRDGDP), unemployment (UE), economic freedom (EFI), school years 
(SCHAVG), population growth (POPG), agriculture value-added (AGRGDP), manufacturing 
value-added (MANGDP), urban population growth (POPURBG), government size 
(GOVCONSGDP) and labour force (LF). Furthermore, Sala-i-Martin EBA results suggest that 
all financialisation variables are fragile determinants of the growth rate, including liquid 
liabilities. This contradicts the results of Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Sturm and De Haan (2005) 
who find that liquid liabilities constitute a robust determinant of economic growth.  However, 
the results are consistent with the recent evidence provided by Hasan et al. (2016) who find 
that measures of financial depth (private credit to GDP, stock market turnover and stock market  
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Table 5.2: Leamer EBA Results (all countries) 
Variables   𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛 t-stat 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  t-stat Significance  LB UB Robust?  
LagGDPC  -0.000107 -4.45 0.000040 1.10 50.9% -0.000159 0.000129 No 
INVFIXGDP  -0.091 -1.08 0.285 3.39 87.4% -0.307 0.450 No 
DOMSPR  -0.012 -2.28 0.005 1.46 1.0% -0.028 0.013 No 
DOMSFS  -0.013 -1.72 0.003 0.86 2.0% -0.029 0.013 No 
DOMSBK  -0.018 -2.01 0.005 0.76 2.9% -0.036 0.017 No 
LIQUID  -0.019 -2.60 0.009 1.87 1.2% -0.034 0.023 No 
STMCAP  -0.010 -1.67 0.005 0.92 0.2% -0.024 0.018 No 
STMVT  -0.009 -1.38 0.016 1.81 1.4% -0.025 0.032 No 
TRDGDP  -0.002 -0.49 0.021 2.73 95.7% -0.013 0.036 No 
EFI  0.176 0.23 1.727 3.92 82.8% -1.607 2.590 No 
UE  -0.127 -4.00 0.030 0.59 82.3% -0.224 0.130 No 
SCHAVG  -0.122 -0.62 0.295 2.29 74.1% -0.513 0.548 No 
POPG  -1.137 -4.29 0.695 1.99 78.6% -2.074 1.876 No 
AGRGDP  -0.011 -0.18 0.175 2.16 58.6% -0.142 0.335 No 
MANGDP  -0.032 -0.71 0.213 3.28 62.9% -0.131 0.340 No 
POPURBG  -0.937 -1.98 0.538 2.65 64.5% -1.920 1.081 No 
GOVCONSGDP  -0.217 -3.65 0.068 1.11 34.1% -0.355 0.187 No 
LF  -0.069 -2.18 0.100 3.78 49.6% -0.166 0.168 No 
RD  -1.392 -2.45 0.323 1.03 31.6% -2.506 0.936 No 
INFCPI  -0.427 -2.41 0.095 1.08 71.2% -0.774 0.349 No 
TNTR  -0.195 -4.37 0.126 1.19 26.8% -0.340 0.333 No 
FDIGDP  -0.067 -3.20 0.093 2.65 8.7% -0.111 0.182 No 
SERGDP  -0.134 -3.68 0.053 1.94 15.1% -0.218 0.116 No 
AREA  -0.00000033 -2.36 0.00000005 0.56 11.8% -0.00000060 0.00000037 No 
POPDENS  -0.004 -1.78 0.003 5.53 18.4% -0.009 0.006 No 
LIFEEX  -0.222 -2.56 0.141 2.84 10.7% -0.392 0.238 No 
LANG  -1.979 -1.79 2.785 3.20 8.8% -4.179 4.889 No 
GINI  -0.079 -1.48 0.052 1.13 1.2% -0.191 0.142 No 
ENRPRM  -0.115 -2.54 0.030 1.27 2.2% -0.203 0.081 No 
ETHTEN  -0.380 -2.05 0.345 1.41 2.3% -0.742 0.824 No 
TARRIF  -0.465 -2.73 0.177 1.69 6.8% -0.798 0.508 No 
REMMI  -0.104 -2.05 0.174 3.15 1.7% -0.212 0.292 No 
ETHN  -3.825 -2.53 1.003 1.07 4.0% -6.792 4.171 No 
RELIG  -2.589 -3.00 0.973 0.62 0.9% -4.708 4.032 No 
HDI  -14.657 -3.17 12.025 3.15 12.3% -25.949 20.037 No 
LAW  -0.479 -2.22 0.607 2.54 1.2% -1.126 1.102 No 
FEMLF  -0.140 -1.91 0.091 2.22 6.3% -0.316 0.275 No 
ENRSEC  -0.052 -2.74 0.025 1.28 14.8% -0.090 0.063 No 
DEMAC  -0.713 -2.65 0.333 1.12 0.8% -1.242 0.918 No 
TAX  -0.114 -2.67 0.062 1.20 0.6% -0.197 0.164 No 
AGEDEP  -0.098 -2.55 0.095 2.24 4.9% -0.174 0.178 No 
CORRUP  -0.964 -2.07 0.378 1.52 0.2% -1.877 1.067 No 
ARBL  -1.050 -1.59 3.219 3.16 0.8% -2.422 5.214 No 
EXCONF  -0.295 -2.29 0.243 1.52 0.2% -0.547 0.620 No 
BUREAU  -1.314 -2.98 0.912 1.91 0.8% -2.443 1.847 No 
ICTINV  -1.979 -2.01 1.613 1.85 0.1% -3.905 3.318 No 
FERT   -1.297 -2.58 1.594 3.49 5.2% -2.280 2.711 No  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛  ,𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚   are the minimum and maximum coefficients produced by the widest range of regressions. LB and UB are the lower and 
upper bounds, respectively (following equations 4.3 and 4.4). The last column shows the robustness decision, LagGDPC and 
INVFIXGDP are free variables. 
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Table 5.3: Sala-i-Martin EBA Results (all countries) 
Variables  
 Unweighted   Weighted    
  𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0)  𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0) Sign  
LagGDPC  -0.000031 -2.05 97.7%  -0.000034 -2.22 98.4% - 
INVFIXGDP  0.123 3.64 100.0%  0.123 3.58 100.0% + 
DOMSPR  -0.003 -0.76 77.4%  -0.003 -0.74 76.8% - 
DOMSFS  -0.004 -0.91 81.8%  -0.004 -0.92 82.0% - 
DOMSBK  -0.004 -0.89 81.1%  -0.004 -0.94 82.4% - 
LIQUID  -0.003 -0.57 71.1%  -0.003 -0.50 68.8% - 
STMCAP  -0.002 -0.51 69.4%  -0.002 -0.48 68.3% - 
STMVT  0.000 0.00 50.1%  0.000 0.05 51.9% - 
TRDGDP  0.010 3.20 99.9%  0.010 3.14 99.9% + 
EFI  0.811 2.70 99.4%  0.835 2.69 99.4% + 
UE  -0.072 -2.57 99.4%  -0.072 -2.61 99.5% - 
SCHAVG  0.163 2.29 98.7%  0.165 2.36 99.0% + 
POPG  -0.476 -2.33 98.7%  -0.457 -2.18 98.1% - 
AGRGDP  0.082 2.12 98.0%  0.083 2.07 97.7% + 
MANGDP  0.082 2.01 97.7%  0.080 1.95 97.3% + 
POPURBG  -0.334 -1.98 97.2%  -0.322 -1.85 96.3% - 
GOVCONSGDP  -0.055 -1.98 96.9%  -0.062 -2.04 97.2% - 
LF  0.041 1.72 95.6%  0.037 1.55 93.7% + 
RD  -0.366 -1.60 93.9%  -0.382 -1.64 94.2% - 
INFCPI  -0.071 -1.90 91.2%  -0.079 -1.78 89.8% - 
TNTR  -0.045 -1.40 90.2%  -0.048 -1.37 89.1% - 
FDIGDP  0.037 1.24 88.6%  0.034 1.16 87.2% + 
SERGDP  -0.039 -1.17 87.7%  -0.040 -1.19 88.0% - 
AREA  -0.00000008 -1.14 87.7%  -0.00000009 -1.29 85.3% - 
POPDENS  0.000 1.64 87.5%  0.001 1.88 91.0% + 
LIFEEX  -0.060 -1.07 85.2%  -0.062 -1.09 85.7% - 
LANG  0.848 0.99 83.6%  0.818 0.95 82.8% + 
GINI  -0.025 -0.92 81.9%  -0.026 -0.96 82.8% - 
ENRPRM  -0.022 -0.93 81.4%  -0.027 -1.03 83.7% - 
ETHTEN  -0.105 -0.87 80.3%  -0.087 -0.72 75.9% - 
TARRIF  -0.064 -0.85 79.0%  -0.075 -0.92 80.4% - 
REMMI  -0.032 -0.79 78.1%  -0.026 -0.65 73.8% - 
ETHN  -0.749 -0.77 77.7%  -0.793 -0.82 79.0% - 
RELIG  -0.691 -0.75 77.0%  -0.682 -0.74 76.8% - 
HDI  -2.561 -0.75 76.5%  -2.919 -0.82 78.3% - 
LAW  -0.100 -0.59 71.8%  -0.068 -0.39 64.9% - 
FEMLF  0.015 0.55 70.0%  0.007 0.25 59.5% + 
ENRSEC  -0.006 -0.50 69.0%  -0.009 -0.77 77.7% - 
DEMAC  -0.053 -0.45 66.9%  -0.064 -0.54 69.5% - 
TAX  -0.010 -0.37 64.2%  -0.011 -0.38 64.7% - 
AGEDEP  -0.008 -0.38 64.2%  -0.006 -0.27 60.2% - 
CORRUP  -0.049 -0.25 59.4%  -0.054 -0.27 60.4% - 
ARBL  -0.092 -0.20 57.6%  -0.024 -0.05 51.8% - 
EXCONF  0.010 0.14 55.0%  0.008 0.11 54.2% + 
BUREAU  0.034 0.11 54.4%  -0.015 -0.05 51.8% + 
ICTINV  0.027 0.05 51.8%  -0.022 -0.04 51.5% + 
FERT   -0.006 -0.02 50.7%   0.042 0.12 54.6% - 
𝛽𝛽 is the mean coefficient. CDF(0) is the cumulative density function on either side of zero. Sign refers to the sign of the effect. The 
weighted statistics are based on integrated likelihood ratio following equations 4.6 to 4.8. 
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capitalisation) are fragile determinants of long-term growth when accounting for model 
uncertainty by applying Bayesian model averaging techniques. 
 
Figure 5.1 exhibits histograms of the financialisation and robust variables as estimated by the 
Sala-i-Martin EBA for all countries sample. The magnitudes of the coefficients are on the 
horizontal axis, whereas the vertical axis indicates the corresponding probability density. The 
vertical line represents the zero line (default coefficient value under the null hypothesis), the 
bell-shaped curve shows the super-imposed normal distribution, and the meander curve 
represents the kernel density, a non-parametric approximation of the shape of each regression 
coefficient. 
 
The fragility of the financialisation variables confirms the previous divergence of the results, 
which is well documented in the finance-growth literature (Levine, 2005; Rousseau and 
Wachtel, 2011; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Law and Singh, 2014; Cournède and Denk, 
2015b). Beck et al., (2014) suggest that the mixed results are due to different samples or 
methodologies. In addition, the fragility of the financialisation indicators could be considered 
as possible evidence for the nonlinearity in the finance-growth nexus, which has been more 
noticeable in the literature following the global financial crisis (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; 
Arcand et al., 2015b; Cournède and Denk, 2015b; Benczúr et al., 2018). Accordingly, Masten 
et al. (2008) find that the effect of financial development on economic growth becomes close 
to zero in countries where the level of domestic credit to GDP exceeds the 70% threshold, 
which is close to the mean value of the sample.61  
 
 
61 See Table A5.3, in the appendix to this chapter, for descriptive statistics.  
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Figure 5. 1: Histograms of the Coefficients on Financialisation and Robust Variables. 
 
The results show that trade openness (TRDGDP) is a leading predictor of economic growth, 
which is consistent with the recent study of Asteriou and Spanos (2019) who find that trade 
openness is the leading determinant of economic growth for a sample of 26 European countries 
before and after the 2008 financial crisis. Unemployment rate (UE) has a robust negative 
relationship with the growth rate. The negative relationship between unemployment and 
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growth is clear in the literature and known as Okun’s law.62 In a consistent manner, the labour 
force (LF) is robust and positively related to the growth rate confirming the previous findings 
of Sala-i-Martin (1997), Fernandez et al. (2001), and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). 
 
The results also support some of the classical findings of the empirical studies of growth. 
Schooling years (SCHAVG), which is used as a proxy for the development of human capital, 
is a robust positive determinant of economic growth. By and large, growth models, as well as 
the empirical evidence, provide support for a significantly positive contribution of human 
capital to economic growth (Romer, 1989; Barro, 1991, 2001). Similarly, the economic 
freedom index (EFI) has a robust positive impact on economic growth. Economic freedom is 
consistently found to be a robust determinant of growth, which is seen as conducive to 
economic growth and an important factor in explaining cross-country growth differences 
(Alesina et al., 1997; Sturm and De Haan, 2001). 
 
Government size (GOVCONSGDP), measured by government consumption expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, is a robust predictor of economic growth (with CDF(0) of 96.9%) that 
affects economic growth negatively. The same result has been documented by Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1992); and Gould et al. (2016). The negative relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth implies that, on average, these countries fall on the 
downward sector of the Rahn curve.63  
 
Finally, manufacturing value-added to GDP (MANGDP) and agriculture value-added to GDP 
(AGRGDP) are robust and positive determinants of economic growth. This result indicates the 
 
62  Okun’s law provides an empirical observation on the negative relationship between unemployment and 
output. It was developed by Arthur Okun in 1962. 
63 The Rahn curve depicts the effect of the size of the government on economic growth whereby the relationship 
turns negative past the “optimal” government (Rhan and Fox, 1996). 
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relevance of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors as crucial contributors to long-run 
growth. This result is considered as providing support for the crowding-out hypothesis, 
whereby reducing the shares of these sectors in favour of financial sector hinders economic 
growth. The literature suggests that the financial sector absorbs scarce resources from the real 
economy (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015; Bolton et al., 2016; Moosa, 2018a). Therefore, the 
crowding out of capital and labour by the financial sector has an adverse effect on growth and 
productivity of other sectors (Kneer, 2013b; Panizza, 2014). 
 
5.5 Sub-Sample Results 
The literature suggests that the financialisation process is more concentrated in developed 
economies that are more financially developed and have big financial sectors relative to GDP. 
This is clearly shown by the mean values of financial variables exhibited in Figure 5.2. 
Therefore, EBA is run to check how the results may vary across developed and developing 
countries. The full results are reported in the appendix of this chapter (tables A5.4 through 
A5.7). They show that financialisation variables remain fragile in all samples. Table 5.4 
presents a summary of the robust determinants of economic growth across different samples. 
 
With respect to the remaining determinants of economic growth, the list of robust variables 
changes significantly in the two samples. The literature is equivocal about the set of growth 
determinants that are important for developed and developed countries (Fernandez et al., 2001; 
Lee and Chen, 2018). Therefore, the discussion is limited to the relation between 
financialisation and economic growth—only the main results of Sala-i-Martin EBA are 
presented.64  
 
64 Chirwa and Odhiambo (2016) provide a survey of the literature on the determinants of economic growth with 
distinction between developed and developing countries. 
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Figure 5. 2 Financialisation Variables (mean values, 2012-2016) 
 
 
For the developed countries sample, the robust variables include school years (SCHAVG), 
foreign direct investment (FDI), research and development (RD), life expectancy (LIFEEX) 
and labour force (LF). However, the openness variable is considered fragile as its CDF(0) is 
equal to 94.3%, which is just below the selected robustness level. In the same theme, the 
developing countries sample results reveal a different set of robust determinants, which include 
openness (TRDGDP), population growth (POPG), urban population growth (POPURBG), 
unemployment (UE), economic freedom Index (EFI), land area (AREA), manufacturing value 
added (MANGDP) and agriculture value added (AGRGDP).65   
 
5.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter we re-examined the effects of financialisation on economic growth using 
extreme bounds analysis, as introduced by Leamer (1985), and its modified variant as 
 
65 We should note that AGRGDP has an unweighted CDF(0) that is equal to 94.6%, which is just below the 
selected robustness level. However, the weighted CDF(0) is equal to 95.1% and this why it is considered as robust. 
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suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997). EBA overcomes the model uncertainty issues that are 
inherent in the growth literature.  
 
Table 5. 4 Summary of Sala-i-Martin EBA Results (Robust Variables) 
Variables  Full Sample Developed Countries Developing Countries 
TRDGDP R* (+)  R* (+) 
EFI R* (+)  R* (+) 
UE R* (-)  R*(-) 
SCHAVG R* (+) R* (+)  
POPG R* (-)  R*(-) 
AGRGDP R* (+)  R* (+) 
MANGDP R* (+)  R* (+) 
POPURBG R* (-)  R*(-) 
GOVCONSGDP R* (-)  R* (+) 
LF R* (+) R*(+)  
RD  R*(-)  
INFCPI   R*(-) 
FDIGDP  R* (+)  
AREA   R*(-) 
POPDENS   R* (+) 
LIFEEX  R* (+)  
REMMI   R*(-) 
R* indicates a robust variable. The sign of the relationship in parenthesis. 
 
 
The results of both variants of EBA suggest that all financialisation variables are fragile. 
Accordingly, the findings are consistent with the mixed evidence found in the literature. 
Moreover, the analysis is extended to investigate other determinants of economic growth. 
Leamer’s EBA reveals that “nothing is robust”, which is the conclusion of Levine and Renelt 
(1992). However, the Sala-i-Martin EBA reveals that trade openness, unemployment, 
economic freedom, school years, the agriculture sector share of GDP, the manufacturing sector 
share of GDP, population growth, urban population growth, government size, and labour force 
are robust predictors of economic growth.  
 
Nevertheless, these results change significantly in sub-sample analysis, where the sub-samples 
represent groups of countries with with similar levels of economic development. By and large, 
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the results provide support for the findings of Sala-i-Martin (1997), Fernandez et al. (2001), 
and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). It appears that the results of Sala-i-Martin EBA are more 
convincing and realistic in determining the important predictors of economic growth than those 
obtained by using traditional EBA. 
 
No evidence for a direct effect of financialisation is obtained by using cross-country 
regressions. However, the robust positive effects of manufacturing and agriculture sectors on 
growth suggest that further growth of the financial sector at the expense of these sectors may 
retard economic growth. Hence, this is taken to be evidence that supports the crowding-out 
hypothesis.  
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
Countries, Variables, Data and Detailed Results 
Table A5.1: List of Countries 
Developed Countries   Developing Countries  
Australia  Argentina Malaysia 
Austria  Armenia Malta 
Belgium  Bahrain Mauritius 
Chile  Bangladesh Mongolia 
Czech Republic  Bolivia Montenegro 
Denmark  Botswana Morocco 
Estonia  Brazil Namibia 
Finland  Bulgaria Nepal 
France  China Nigeria 
Germany  Colombia Oman 
Greece  Costa Rica Pakistan 
Hong Kong SAR, China  Cote d'Ivoire Panama 
Hungary  Croatia Papua New Guinea 
Iceland  Cyprus Paraguay 
Ireland  Ecuador Peru 
Italy  Egypt, Arab Rep. Philippines 
Japan  El Salvador Qatar 
Korea, Rep.  Fiji Russian Federation 
Luxembourg  Georgia Saudi Arabia 
Mexico  Ghana Serbia 
Netherlands  Guyana Singapore 
Norway  India South Africa 
Poland  Indonesia Sri Lanka 
Portugal  Iran, Islamic Rep. Tanzania 
Slovak Republic  Jamaica Thailand 
Slovenia  Jordan Trinidad and Tobago 
Spain  Kazakhstan Tunisia 
Sweden  Kenya Uganda 
Switzerland  Kuwait Ukraine 
Turkey  Kyrgyz Republic United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom  Latvia Uruguay 
United States  Lebanon Venezuela, RB 
   Lithuania Vietnam 
   Macedonia, FYR Zambia 
    Malawi   
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Table A5.2: List of Variables and Sources     
Code Variable  Description Source 
  
  
  
GDPCG GDPCG GDP per capita growth, annual percentage (calculated based 
on constant 2010 US$) 
WDI 
LagGDPC Initial GDP per 
capita 
lagged value of real GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) WDI 
INVFIXGDP Fixed Investment Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP WDI 
DOMSPR Private Credit Domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP GFDD 
DOMSBK Bank credit Private credit by deposit money banks as a percentage of 
GDP 
GFDD 
DOMSFS Financial system 
credit 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions as a percentage of GDP 
GFDD 
LIQUID Liquid Liabilities Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, which is also known as 
broad money, or M3 
GFDD 
STMCAP Market 
Capitalisation 
Stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP  GFDD 
STMVT Market Value 
Traded 
Stock market total value traded as a percentage of GDP GFDD 
EFI Economic freedom Economic Freedom Index  Fraisers Institue 
HDI HDI Human Development Index  UNDP 
ETHN Ethnic Index of Ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al. 
(2003) 
LANG Language Index of Language fractionalization Alesina et al. 
(2003) 
RELIG Religion Index of Religion fractionalization Alesina et al. 
(2003) 
GINI GINI GINI index GCIP, WDI 
FDIGDP FDI Foreign direct investment (net inflows) as a percentage of 
GDP 
WDI 
REMMI Remittance Remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP WDI 
GOVCONSGDP Government Size Government final consumption expenditure  as a percentage 
of GDP 
WDI 
INFCPI Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) WDI 
MANGDP Manufacturing Manufacturing, value added as a percentage of GDP WDI 
SERGDP Services Services, value added as a percentage of GDP WDI 
AGRGDP Agriculture  Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added as a 
percentage of GDP 
WDI 
ARBL Arable land Arable land (hectares per person) WDI 
ICTINV ICT Annual investment in telecommunication services  as a 
percentage of GDP 
ITU 
AREA Land area Land area (measured by squared kilo meters)  WDI 
TAX TAX Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP WDI 
TNTR Natural Resources Total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP WDI 
TRDGDP Openness Ratio of exports and imports to GDP WDI 
RD RandD Research and development expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP 
WDI 
ENRPRM Primary Enrolment. School enrolment, primary (% gross)  WDI  
Table A5.2: List of Variables and Sources (continued) 
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Code Variable  Description Source 
ENRSEC Secondary 
Enrolment. 
School enrolment, secondary (% gross)  WDI 
SCHAVG School Years Mean years of schooling  UNDP 
UE Unemployment Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) WDI, ILO 
FEMLF Female, LF Labor force, female (% of total labor force)  WDI, ILO 
LF Labor Force Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population 
ages 15+) 
WDI, ILO 
POPG Population Growth Population growth (annual %)  WDI 
POPURBG Urban Pop. Growth Urban population growth (annual %)  WDI 
POPDENS Population density Population density (people per sq. km of land area)  WDI 
FERT Fertility Fertility rate, total (births per woman) WDI 
LIFEEX Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, total (years) WDI 
AGEDEP Age dependency Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population) WDI 
TARRIF TARRIF Tariff rate, applied, weighted mean, all products (%) WDI 
BUREAU Bureaucracy Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is a 
shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy 
when governments change. (6 points scale) 
ICRG 
EXCONF External conflict The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the 
risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, 
ranging from non-violent external pressure  to violent 
external pressure (12 points scale) 
ICRG 
CORRUP Corruption rates This is an assessment of corruption within the political 
system. (6 points scale) 
ICRG 
DEMAC Democratic 
accountability 
This is a measure of how responsive government is to its 
people, on the basis that the less responsive it is, the more 
likely it is that the government will fall, peacefully in a 
democratic society, but possibly violently in a non-
democratic one. (6 points scale) 
ICRG 
LAW Law and Order “Law and Order” form a single component, but its two 
elements are assessed separately, with each element being 
scored from zero to three points. (6 points scale) 
ICRG 
ETHTEN Ethnic tensions This component is an assessment of the degree of tension 
within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or 
language divisions. (6 points scale) 
ICRG 
GOVSTA Government 
stability 
This is an assessment both of the government’s ability to 
carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in 
office (12 points scale) 
ICRG 
WDI: world development indicators (World bank). GFDD: the global financial development database. ILO: International 
Labour Organization, UNDP: United Nations Development Program, ITU: International Telecommunication Union, ICRG: 
International Country Risk Guide (PRS group). 
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Table A5.3: Descriptive Statistics (Mean Values: 2012-2016) 
Variable  Obs. Mean SD Min Max  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean SD Min Max 
   All Countries     Developed  Countries     Developing Countries    
GDPCG  101 1.87 2.02 -3.29 7.32  32 1.37 1.58 -1.48 7.32  69 2.11 2.16 -3.29 6.76 
LagGDPC  101 23309.83 21331.02 987.39 122022.10  32 37787.80 15087.50 15923.13 93122.32  69 16595.42 20517.68 987.39 122022.10 
DOMSPR  101 71.01 44.99 12.23 244.98  32 100.65 42.51 30.07 189.24  69 57.26 39.33 12.23 244.98 
DOMSBK  101 66.26 43.91 11.09 253.46  32 96.68 42.40 21.43 206.03  69 52.14 37.12 11.09 253.46 
DOMSFS  101 71.29 47.15 11.09 253.46  32 104.70 45.07 28.20 212.32  69 55.80 39.69 11.09 253.46 
LIQUID  100 73.52 51.24 14.71 342.59  31 96.50 60.01 27.71 342.59  69 63.19 43.41 14.71 236.34 
STMCAP  101 45.91 47.28 0.34 241.30  32 63.90 50.45 5.04 206.03  69 37.57 43.64 0.34 241.30 
STMVT  98 19.92 35.86 0.00 216.99  31 41.11 47.20 0.18 216.99  67 10.12 23.86 0.00 141.85 
EFI  101 7.04 0.78 3.25 8.97  32 7.55 0.45 6.65 8.97  69 6.80 0.80 3.25 8.76 
HDI  98 0.77 0.12 0.47 0.95  32 0.88 0.05 0.76 0.95  66 0.72 0.11 0.47 0.92 
ETHN  93 0.39 0.25 0.01 0.93  31 0.22 0.18 0.01 0.56  62 0.48 0.23 0.04 0.93 
LANG  92 0.35 0.27 0.01 0.92  31 0.22 0.18 0.02 0.64  61 0.42 0.28 0.01 0.92 
RELIG  93 0.43 0.24 0.00 0.86  31 0.39 0.23 0.00 0.82  62 0.45 0.24 0.00 0.86 
GINI  74 37.08 8.22 24.76 63.00  28 32.54 5.71 25.73 47.50  46 39.84 8.34 24.76 63.00 
FDIGDP  101 5.40 9.63 -1.71 65.38  32 7.46 14.41 -1.63 65.38  69 4.45 6.23 -1.71 44.79 
REMMI  98 3.52 5.58 0.01 29.32  32 0.82 0.91 0.02 3.38  66 4.83 6.39 0.01 29.32 
GOVCONSGDP  99 17.02 8.19 5.36 83.45  32 19.01 4.27 9.49 26.09  67 16.07 9.40 5.36 83.45 
INVFIXGDP  97 22.67 5.58 11.92 44.47  32 21.40 3.75 11.92 29.39  65 23.29 6.22 11.95 44.47 
INFCPI  101 4.83 10.42 -0.66 100.11  32 1.49 1.57 -0.66 8.14  69 6.37 12.29 -0.58 100.11 
MANGDP  101 12.85 5.48 1.27 30.11  32 14.29 5.92 1.27 27.55  69 12.19 5.17 2.35 30.11 
SERGDP  97 57.11 9.98 33.24 90.57  32 64.30 8.27 53.53 90.57  65 53.57 8.81 33.24 76.16 
AGRGDP  101 7.26 7.44 0.03 30.70  32 2.11 1.49 0.06 6.83  69 9.64 7.88 0.03 30.70 
ARBL  101 0.24 0.30 0.00 2.00  32 0.27 0.35 0.00 2.00  69 0.23 0.29 0.00 1.71 
ICTINV  73 0.53 0.28 0.17 1.84  21 0.53 0.29 0.17 1.46  52 0.54 0.27 0.23 1.84 
AREA  101 9.22E+05 2.32E+06 320.00 1.64E+07  32 7.80E+05 2.05E+06 1050.00 9.15E+06  69 9.88E+05 2.45E+06 320.00 1.64E+07 
TAX  88 16.82 7.01 0.24 34.29  31 19.34 6.82 1.35 34.29  57 15.45 6.79 0.24 31.83 
TNTR  101 5.71 8.82 0.00 50.69  32 1.31 2.93 0.00 13.82  69 7.75 9.86 0.00 50.69 
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Table A5.3: Descriptive Statistics (Average 2012-2016) 
Variable  Obs. Mean SD Min Max  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean SD Min Max 
   All Countries     Developed  Countries     Developing Countries    
TRDGDP  99 98.75 67.28 25.31 412.06  32 116.21 86.74 29.11 412.06  67 90.40 54.48 25.31 346.99 
RD  83 1.07 0.97 0.06 4.17  32 1.94 0.95 0.38 4.17  51 0.52 0.44 0.06 2.07 
ENRPRM  98 103.96 7.94 84.42 140.14  32 102.10 4.00 95.05 116.54  66 104.86 9.16 84.42 140.14 
ENRSEC  94 95.26 22.41 32.66 161.24  32 111.89 17.46 91.26 161.24  62 86.68 19.78 32.66 118.41 
SCHAVG  45 9.34 3.42 1.42 14.22  22 10.43 3.71 1.42 14.22  23 8.29 2.80 3.26 13.23 
UE  101 7.96 5.63 0.25 27.57  32 8.27 5.01 3.32 25.37  69 7.81 5.92 0.25 27.57 
FEMLF  101 41.07 10.11 11.85 79.07  32 45.89 7.00 31.36 79.07  69 38.84 10.57 11.85 51.47 
LF  101 62.01 8.82 39.42 86.71  32 60.02 5.19 48.55 76.09  69 62.93 9.97 39.42 86.71 
POPG  101 1.20 1.33 -1.08 6.25  32 0.56 0.64 -0.60 2.32  69 1.49 1.47 -1.08 6.25 
POPURBG  101 1.74 1.65 -0.95 7.84  32 0.81 0.69 -0.25 2.66  69 2.17 1.78 -0.95 7.84 
POPDENS  101 306.98 1035.00 1.88 7718.32  32 355.62 1200.32 3.06 6892.65  69 284.43 957.55 1.88 7718.32 
FERT  101 2.23 1.00 1.21 5.78  32 1.62 0.27 1.21 2.24  69 2.52 1.08 1.23 5.78 
LIFEEX  101 74.57 6.66 52.52 83.96  32 80.50 2.36 75.24 83.96  69 71.82 6.20 52.52 82.46 
AGEDEP  101 52.36 13.98 17.23 102.73  32 50.26 5.86 34.96 62.27  69 53.33 16.39 17.23 102.73 
TARRIF  99 3.92 2.98 0.00 12.54  32 2.03 1.18 0.00 7.19  67 4.83 3.16 0.07 12.54 
BUREAU  100 2.37 1.11 0.00 4.00  31 3.45 0.61 2.00 4.00  69 1.89 0.92 0.00 4.00 
EXCONF  100 9.28 2.78 0.00 12.00  31 10.26 1.06 7.33 12.00  69 8.85 3.18 0.00 12.00 
CORRUP  100 2.69 1.32 0.00 5.73  31 3.98 1.12 2.01 5.73  69 2.11 0.94 0.00 4.50 
DEMAC  100 4.17 1.81 0.00 6.00  31 5.76 0.45 4.08 6.00  69 3.46 1.74 0.00 6.00 
LAW  100 3.63 1.60 0.00 6.00  31 4.97 0.94 1.86 6.00  69 3.03 1.46 0.00 5.00 
ETHTEN  100 3.83 1.57 0.00 6.00  31 4.35 1.09 2.00 6.00  69 3.59 1.70 0.00 6.00 
GOVSTA   100 6.85 2.12 0.00 10.53   31 7.11 0.68 5.81 8.86   69 6.73 2.51 0.00 10.53 
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Table A5.4: Leamer's EBA Results (Developed Countries)     
Variables  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛  t-stat 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  t-stat Significance  LB UB Robust?  
LagGDPC -0.00012 -1.99 0.00015 1.66 28.8% -0.00024 0.00038 No 
INVFIXGDP -0.360 -1.62 0.440 3.27 70.1% -0.797 0.769 No 
DOMSPR -0.055 -2.53 0.022 1.86 12.2% -0.113 0.046 No 
DOMSFS -0.057 -2.32 0.024 1.56 11.7% -0.118 0.054 No 
DOMSBK -0.057 -2.25 0.015 1.30 13.7% -0.108 0.047 No 
LIQUID -0.022 -1.81 0.045 1.27 2.5% -0.047 0.115 No 
STMCAP -0.043 -1.88 0.025 5.81 2.0% -0.088 0.048 No 
STMVT -0.023 -1.65 0.020 2.08 6.3% -0.055 0.039 No 
SCHAVG -0.116 -2.76 0.337 5.29 94.8% -0.231 0.462 No 
FDIGDP -0.023 -2.55 0.188 9.17 74.7% -0.074 0.295 No 
LIFEEX -0.824 -1.84 0.271 0.74 67.2% -1.701 1.049 No 
RD -2.135 -2.39 0.324 0.81 44.8% -3.888 1.106 No 
LF -0.097 -3.45 0.232 3.33 43.8% -0.277 0.440 No 
TRDGDP -0.013 -4.53 0.044 10.54 49.7% -0.030 0.059 No 
HDI -5.700 -0.77 27.762 2.58 23.2% -21.874 48.870 No 
FERT -2.395 -3.22 6.761 1.90 4.7% -5.614 14.366 No 
MANGDP -0.183 -5.75 0.434 3.28 12.7% -0.276 0.693 No 
EFI -2.374 -1.60 4.645 2.04 7.6% -5.288 10.517 No 
SERGDP -0.333 -2.16 0.080 1.83 6.5% -0.636 0.238 No 
AGRGDP -0.161 -0.28 1.216 3.10 20.8% -1.289 1.985 No 
LANG -7.065 -2.18 0.494 0.35 8.7% -16.746 6.456 No 
GOVCONSGDP -0.445 -2.01 0.117 3.71 2.9% -0.926 0.383 No 
ETHTEN -0.247 -0.68 1.293 1.91 3.9% -1.143 2.624 No 
AGEDEP -0.234 -3.50 0.114 0.82 26.3% -0.397 0.389 No 
LAW -0.978 -1.87 2.068 1.97 3.9% -2.794 4.124 No 
ICTINV -3.748 -1.46 3.124 3.02 5.0% -8.788 5.149 No 
TNTR -0.397 -1.49 0.410 1.86 8.9% -0.922 0.842 No 
POPDENS -0.009 -5.19 0.003 0.50 7.1% -0.019 0.015 No 
BUREAU -0.848 -1.54 2.864 2.24 2.1% -2.489 6.146 No 
TARRIF -2.549 -1.88 0.918 1.05 6.3% -5.199 3.232 No 
POPG -2.360 -1.40 2.830 3.37 4.8% -5.654 5.315 No 
RELIG -4.388 -1.25 1.223 2.62 0.1% -11.257 5.362 No 
CORRUP -1.824 -2.16 0.729 2.01 1.8% -3.670 1.469 No 
EXCONF -1.615 -3.31 0.773 1.00 10.2% -2.570 2.282 No 
INFCPI -1.523 -1.70 1.236 2.10 17.4% -3.279 2.519 No 
ETHN -6.097 -1.65 5.883 3.27 2.2% -13.344 14.077 No 
GINI -0.201 -1.98 0.336 1.97 3.3% -0.400 0.669 No 
FEMLF -0.708 -1.53 0.225 2.11 2.3% -1.619 0.511 No 
POPURBG -2.765 -2.58 1.446 2.56 2.2% -5.137 4.278 No 
REMMI -0.981 -1.65 1.248 1.80 10.0% -2.540 2.608 No 
ARBL -1.756 -0.93 5.452 2.45 5.5% -7.228 10.490 No 
ENRPRM -0.144 -1.22 0.112 1.65 0.5% -0.375 0.266 No 
TAX -0.134 -1.85 0.239 1.54 1.5% -0.346 0.543 No 
GOVSTA -2.869 -1.55 1.364 6.78 1.5% -6.504 2.418 No 
ENRSEC -0.040 -3.82 0.041 1.06 1.4% -0.083 0.134 No 
UE -0.131 -2.38 0.470 1.40 0.1% -0.411 1.129 No 
DEMAC -1.431 -1.78 1.921 2.72 0.3% -3.006 3.717 No 
AREA -0.0000006 -1.27 0.0000004 3.17 6.6% -0.0000016 0.0000008 No 
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Table A5.5: Leamer's EBA Results (Developing Countries)       
Variables  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛 t-stat 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 t-stat Significance  LB UB Robust?  
LagGDPC -0.00036 -5.73 0.00019 1.54 35.6% -0.00050 0.00042 No 
INVFIXGDP -0.337 -2.04 0.333 3.15 85.5% -0.761 0.541 No 
DOMSPR -0.028 -2.46 0.009 1.19 4.6% -0.050 0.023 No 
DOMSFS -0.028 -2.67 0.007 0.99 6.5% -0.049 0.021 No 
DOMSBK -0.034 -2.69 0.014 1.56 6.2% -0.069 0.031 No 
LIQUID -0.029 -2.51 0.026 1.64 1.8% -0.052 0.058 No 
STMCAP -0.022 -2.20 0.010 1.22 1.7% -0.041 0.025 No 
STMVT -0.066 -2.24 0.026 1.18 0.8% -0.123 0.082 No 
TRDGDP 0.002 0.38 0.044 4.00 98.8% -0.009 0.070 No 
POPG -1.823 -3.18 0.908 2.29 84.9% -2.945 1.729 No 
UE -0.230 -4.24 0.038 0.96 84.2% -0.360 0.170 No 
EFI -0.890 -0.61 2.726 4.07 77.3% -3.763 4.037 No 
POPURBG -1.217 -1.94 0.532 1.56 80.3% -2.445 1.723 No 
MANGDP 0.007 0.21 0.286 3.85 73.2% -0.142 0.440 No 
AREA -0.0000006 -3.05 0.0000001 0.50 39.0% -0.0000011 0.0000003 No 
AGRGDP -0.205 -1.70 0.230 2.81 40.7% -0.442 0.442 No 
INFCPI -0.671 -3.39 0.273 3.98 79.4% -1.059 0.483 No 
POPDENS -0.012 -3.30 0.007 9.69 26.6% -0.019 0.012 No 
REMMI -0.315 -3.85 0.163 2.84 29.6% -0.475 0.423 No 
TNTR -0.534 -2.67 0.065 2.36 25.1% -0.925 0.243 No 
LANG -1.844 -1.08 4.258 3.91 23.1% -5.201 8.372 No 
GOVCONSGDP -0.278 -1.59 0.360 2.68 34.6% -0.664 0.623 No 
ETHTEN -0.704 -2.02 0.657 2.28 15.1% -1.388 1.221 No 
LF -0.233 -3.66 0.098 3.16 25.6% -0.357 0.184 No 
GINI -0.231 -3.01 0.043 0.89 8.8% -0.381 0.159 No 
TARRIF -0.716 -2.89 0.218 1.85 9.7% -1.202 0.644 No 
SERGDP -0.175 -2.51 0.104 2.39 11.9% -0.312 0.191 No 
SCHAVG -0.494 -1.85 0.906 3.05 15.1% -1.090 1.488 No 
ENRPRM -0.179 -3.36 0.057 1.67 4.1% -0.319 0.124 No 
ETHN -6.048 -2.41 6.192 2.04 6.7% -10.973 12.154 No 
LAW -0.774 -2.54 0.921 2.40 6.2% -1.462 1.827 No 
HDI -20.721 -5.30 20.731 1.80 15.2% -37.817 43.360 No 
LIFEEX -0.353 -3.56 0.258 3.65 5.0% -0.548 0.412 No 
ICTINV -3.239 -2.56 4.362 3.19 1.6% -6.686 7.726 No 
TAX -0.198 -5.75 0.102 1.43 8.7% -0.303 0.288 No 
RELIG -7.463 -3.50 2.196 0.92 1.1% -11.638 9.268 No 
FEMLF -0.330 -3.44 0.121 1.62 4.0% -0.530 0.408 No 
ARBL -2.635 -1.26 4.324 4.21 1.2% -6.748 6.336 No 
EXCONF -0.263 -1.25 0.636 3.66 3.0% -0.761 1.071 No 
AGEDEP -0.073 -2.86 0.148 3.77 9.2% -0.172 0.333 No 
DEMAC -0.886 -1.97 0.653 1.78 0.4% -1.769 1.383 No 
FERT -1.618 -2.56 1.726 2.75 13.6% -3.004 3.193 No 
RD -4.710 -4.96 1.683 1.31 1.4% -7.065 4.852 No 
FDIGDP -0.205 -2.61 0.097 1.53 6.0% -0.359 0.231 No 
ENRSEC -0.091 -3.60 0.066 1.67 12.1% -0.171 0.144 No 
GOVSTA -0.876 -2.35 0.390 2.40 3.1% -1.608 0.853 No 
CORRUP -1.983 -2.43 1.689 3.07 2.0% -3.581 2.768 No 
BUREAU -2.131 -4.94 1.011 3.49 0.9% -3.357 1.914 No 
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Table A5.6: Sala-i-Martin EBA Results (Developed Countries) 
Variables  Unweighted  
 Weighted     
 𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0)  𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0) Sign  
LagGDPC -0.00002 -1.03 82.5%  -0.00003 -1.94 96.2% - 
INVFIXGDP 0.147 2.15 97.9%  0.148 2.52 99.1% + 
DOMSPR -0.005 -0.70 73.9%  0.000 0.02 50.6% - 
DOMSFS -0.005 -0.71 74.0%  0.000 -0.08 53.0% - 
DOMSBK -0.008 -1.22 87.0%  -0.005 -0.95 80.9% - 
LIQUID 0.000 0.03 51.2%  -0.001 -0.27 59.5% - 
STMCAP -0.005 -0.76 76.5%  -0.003 -0.48 67.1% - 
STMVT -0.003 -0.51 68.8%  0.000 0.00 50.1% - 
SCHAVG 0.163 4.08 100.0%  0.164 4.16 100.0% + 
FDIGDP 0.077 2.22 98.4%  0.071 2.22 98.2% + 
LIFEEX -0.228 -2.26 98.2%  -0.225 -2.52 98.9% - 
RD -0.576 -1.80 95.6%  -0.550 -1.93 96.2% - 
LF 0.070 1.72 95.2%  0.060 1.59 93.9% + 
TRDGDP 0.009 1.69 94.3%  0.006 1.31 88.8% + 
HDI 7.478 1.36 90.7%  6.745 1.18 87.6% + 
FERT 1.667 1.24 88.4%  1.369 1.18 86.5% + 
MANGDP 0.105 1.22 88.1%  0.067 0.93 80.4% + 
EFI 1.269 1.24 87.8%  1.161 1.37 89.1% + 
SERGDP -0.057 -1.22 87.7%  -0.049 -1.21 86.9% - 
AGRGDP 0.242 1.20 87.7%  0.277 1.59 93.3% + 
LANG -2.477 -1.20 87.5%  -2.283 -1.34 88.9% - 
GOVCONSGDP -0.107 -1.23 87.5%  -0.088 -1.19 85.8% - 
ETHTEN 0.309 1.11 85.8%  0.287 1.22 87.2% + 
AGEDEP -0.045 -1.12 85.5%  -0.047 -1.28 88.4% - 
LAW 0.447 1.04 83.8%  0.442 1.19 86.1% + 
ICTINV -0.863 -0.98 82.1%  -0.679 -1.00 81.6% - 
TNTR -0.058 -0.94 81.4%  -0.022 -0.39 64.5% - 
POPDENS -0.001 -1.00 78.9%  -0.001 -1.07 81.4% - 
BUREAU 0.529 0.84 78.9%  0.482 0.86 79.1% + 
TARRIF -0.181 -0.89 78.8%  -0.104 -0.47 66.7% - 
POPG 0.380 0.79 77.4%  0.351 0.76 76.7% + 
RELIG -0.949 -0.74 75.9%  -0.598 -0.55 69.6% - 
CORRUP -0.261 -0.72 75.3%  -0.169 -0.55 69.2% - 
EXCONF -0.183 -0.68 74.1%  -0.222 -1.02 82.6% - 
INFCPI 0.133 0.66 72.5%  0.168 1.04 81.7% + 
ETHN -0.656 -0.47 67.5%  -0.852 -0.70 74.4% - 
GINI 0.018 0.39 64.3%  0.023 0.55 69.4% + 
FEMLF -0.028 -0.43 63.9%  -0.026 -0.44 64.7% - 
POPURBG 0.144 0.38 63.8%  0.135 0.38 63.8% + 
REMMI 0.096 0.35 62.6%  -0.008 -0.03 51.1% + 
ARBL 0.191 0.32 61.3%  0.527 0.81 77.4% + 
ENRPRM -0.011 -0.29 61.1%  -0.010 -0.28 60.8% - 
TAX -0.009 -0.29 60.7%  -0.002 -0.09 53.2% - 
GOVSTA -0.146 -0.19 57.4%  -0.009 -0.01 50.5% - 
ENRSEC -0.002 -0.12 54.5%  -0.003 -0.23 58.2% - 
UE 0.003 0.04 51.4%  -0.002 -0.04 51.4% + 
DEMAC -0.013 -0.03 51.0%  -0.091 -0.19 57.3% - 
AREA 0.0000000 0.00 50.1%   0.0000000 0.38 65.2% - 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
Table A5.7: The Sala-i-Martin EBA Results (Developing Countries) 
Variables  
Unweighted   Weighted     
 𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0)  𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0) Sign  
LagGDPC -0.00004 -1.51 90.4%  -0.00005 -1.55 90.9% - 
INVFIXGDP 0.114 2.89 99.7%  0.115 2.87 99.6% + 
DOMSPR -0.003 -0.54 70.5%  -0.004 -0.62 73.0% - 
DOMSFS -0.004 -0.69 75.2%  -0.004 -0.79 78.1% - 
DOMSBK -0.002 -0.33 62.8%  -0.003 -0.43 66.3% - 
LIQUID -0.004 -0.46 67.5%  -0.003 -0.37 64.2% - 
STMCAP -0.002 -0.36 63.9%  -0.002 -0.39 64.8% - 
STMVT 0.004 0.43 65.9%  0.003 0.35 63.2% + 
TRDGDP 0.015 3.64 100.0%  0.016 3.79 100.0% + 
POPG -0.629 -2.94 99.7%  -0.648 -3.14 99.8% - 
UE -0.088 -2.68 99.5%  -0.090 -2.76 99.6% - 
EFI 0.836 2.54 98.9%  0.895 2.79 99.4% + 
POPURBG -0.443 -2.42 98.9%  -0.456 -2.52 99.2% - 
MANGDP 0.095 2.23 98.6%  0.094 2.22 98.5% + 
AREA -0.0000001 -1.86 96.7%  -0.0000001 -2.00 97.9% - 
AGRGDP 0.075 1.68 94.6%  0.077 1.73 95.1% + 
INFCPI -0.101 -2.28 93.7%  -0.120 -2.32 94.5% - 
POPDENS 0.001 1.96 92.9%  0.001 2.16 94.2% + 
REMMI -0.061 -1.43 91.5%  -0.061 -1.44 91.7% - 
TNTR -0.058 -1.52 91.0%  -0.067 -1.63 92.1% - 
LANG 1.390 1.35 90.9%  1.382 1.37 91.1% + 
GOVCONSGDP -0.054 -1.66 90.0%  -0.067 -1.91 93.4% - 
ETHTEN -0.185 -1.28 89.0%  -0.168 -1.18 87.1% - 
LF 0.035 1.20 87.6%  0.033 1.14 86.3% + 
GINI -0.040 -1.14 86.9%  -0.040 -1.14 86.9% - 
TARRIF -0.093 -1.08 84.5%  -0.107 -1.17 86.0% - 
SERGDP -0.041 -1.00 83.7%  -0.043 -1.05 84.9% - 
SCHAVG 0.163 0.94 82.0%  0.172 1.05 84.5% + 
ENRPRM -0.025 -0.94 81.2%  -0.028 -1.00 82.4% - 
ETHN -1.066 -0.83 79.3%  -1.127 -0.89 80.8% - 
LAW -0.167 -0.82 78.4%  -0.146 -0.72 75.4% - 
HDI -3.888 -0.81 78.0%  -4.764 -0.99 82.6% - 
LIFEEX -0.048 -0.72 75.6%  -0.050 -0.74 76.5% - 
ICTINV 0.600 0.69 74.2%  0.503 0.57 70.2% + 
TAX -0.027 -0.61 72.4%  -0.031 -0.70 75.3% - 
RELIG -0.715 -0.56 70.7%  -0.743 -0.59 71.8% - 
FEMLF 0.018 0.57 70.4%  0.014 0.43 65.5% + 
ARBL -0.357 -0.48 68.1%  -0.387 -0.52 69.4% - 
EXCONF 0.043 0.51 68.0%  0.047 0.57 70.0% + 
AGEDEP -0.012 -0.49 67.8%  -0.009 -0.38 63.9% - 
DEMAC -0.065 -0.44 66.1%  -0.063 -0.43 65.7% - 
FERT -0.151 -0.42 65.5%  -0.112 -0.31 61.5% - 
RD -0.285 -0.42 65.2%  -0.279 -0.42 65.0% - 
FDIGDP -0.013 -0.37 64.1%  -0.016 -0.46 67.3% - 
ENRSEC -0.007 -0.35 63.1%  -0.012 -0.59 71.6% - 
GOVSTA -0.029 -0.30 60.8%  -0.026 -0.27 59.8% - 
CORRUP -0.029 -0.10 53.6%  -0.043 -0.14 55.3% - 
BUREAU -0.024 -0.07 52.5%   -0.046 -0.13 54.8% - 
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Chapter Six 
 Financialisation and Income Inequality: An Extreme Bounds Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
The literature on the effects of finance on income inequality produces conflicting results. Both 
theoretical and empirical studies are equivocal about the real effects of finance on income 
distribution. The majority of these studies reveal that financialisation reduces income 
inequality (for example, Clarke et al., 2006; Beck et al., 2007; Kappel, 2010; Meniago and 
Asongu, 2018; Zhang and Naceur, 2018). On the contrary, some studies find that finance 
aggravates income inequality (for example, Kus, 2012; Jaumotte et al., 2013; Dabla-Norris et 
al., 2015; Denk and Cournède, 2015; Assa, 2016). Another strand of studies reports a non-
linear (U shaped or inverted U-shaped) relationship between finance and inequality (for 
example, Kim and Lin, 2011; Nikoloski, 2012; Tan and Law, 2012; Law et al., 2014; Baiardi 
and Morana, 2016, 2018). 
 
The lack of consensus may reflect the model uncertainty problem inherent in economic 
modelling (Steel, 2017). Some of these uncertainties are due to differences in samples and 
methodologies. However, De Haan and Sturm (2017) suggest that a number of studies using 
similar methodologies and comparable samples reach different conclusions. Moreover, most 
of the mixed results may be attributed to model specification, where economic theory does not 
reveal the exact form of the econometric model.66 Another source of result variation is the 
underlying measure of financialisation, where different measures indicate the deepening of 
different financial structures (financial markets versus banks and financial institutions). In this 
 
66 The full argument of model uncertainty problem was introduced in chapter four. 
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sense, Furceri and Ostry (2019) suggest that the divergence of results in the income inequality 
literature echoes model uncertainty.  
 
As in chapter five, the two forms of the extreme bounds analysis of Leamer (1985) and Sala-i-
Martin (1997) are applied to deal with the model uncertainty problem. Hence, the objective is 
to determine the robustness of the financialisation variables (bank-based and market-based 
indicators) as determinants of income inequality (Gini index and the top 10% income share). 
Moreover, the analysis is extended to investigate the robustness of indirect channels, whereby 
financialisation influences income distribution, such as labour union density and sectoral 
composition as well as other potential drivers of income inequality as suggested by economic 
theory and the empirical literature. EBA is most effective when numerous potential explanatory 
variables are considered, which is the case in the income inequality literature. 
 
The rest of chapter is organised as follows. In section 6.2 the samples and data are described. 
The empirical methodology and estimation procedures are illustrated in section 6.3. The results 
and discussion are presented in section 6.4. A further discussion of the sub-sample results can 
be found in section 6.5. Some concluding remarks are presented in section 6.6. 
  
6.2 Data Description  
In this section a description is presented of the data used to examine the robustness of the 
relationship between financialisation and income inequality. The sample data comprises 5-year 
average cross-sectional data for 105 countries, over the period 2012-2016. The countries have 
been selected based on data availability of the financialisation indicators and Gini index. 
Moreover, the IMF’s development classification is adopted, whereby the sample is divided into 
additional two sub-samples: the full sample comprises 28 developed countries and 77 
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developing countries. The list of countries and their respective development classifications are 
presented in table A6.1 in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
Income inequality, the dependent variable, is proxied by the Gini index, which is a measure of 
the income distribution of a country’s residents. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, 
while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.67 The Gini coefficients were obtained from 
the global consumption and income project database (GCIP) created by Lahoti et al. (2016), 
while the missing values were obtained from the World Bank development indicators database 
(WDI). GCIP provides a broader coverage and improves comparability between countries. 
Moreover, the GCIP database builds on the work of many well-known databases of income 
inequality such as the world income inequality database (WIID) developed by UNU-WIDER, 
and the standardised world income inequality database (SWIID) developed by Frederick Solt 
(2009) . 
 
From the literature, another option for income inequality index would be the Palma ratio, which 
is represented by the ratio of the top 10% to bottom 40% income shares. However, we find that 
Gini index and Palma ratio are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.946), as 
represented in Figure 6.1. In addition, the Gini index is superior to other measures of inequality 
because of its broader coverage and direct interpretability. 
The top 10% income share is also used as a measure of income inequality. Data on the top 
decile income share were collected from the world inequality database (WID).68 The literature 
 
67 The Gini index is the percentage form of Gini coefficient, which is equal to the value of Gini coefficient 
multiplied by 100. 
68 Initially created as “The World Top Incomes Database (WTID)”. Source: https://wid.world/wid-world/ 
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on inequality suggests that the growing income inequality across advanced and developing 
economies has been driven by the increasing share of top income earners, mainly the top decile 
(Piketty and Saez, 2003; Atkinson et al., 2011; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; Saez, 2018). The 
choice of this variable is justified on the following grounds. First, the increasing size of the top 
income share is closely associated with the shareholders’ value orientation and the rentiers 
class income share. Second, financial sector executives and top employees are concentrated 
within the top decile income earners (Denk and Cournède, 2015). Third, the growing trend of 
top management salaries is concomitant with the deterioration of labour bargaining power and 
rising payments to financial markets (Barradas and Lagoa, 2017b). Fourth, a significant 
relationship can be observed between the top income shares and measures of income inequality 
such as the Gini index (Leigh, 2007).   
 
The financialisation measures used in this chapter were introduced in chapter five. Moreover, 
robustness analysis is extended to examine other potential drivers of income inequality, as 
suggested by economic theory, such as level of income, education, union density, technological 
progress, globalisation, business cycle and demographic variables. The list of variables and 
their sources as well as the descriptive statistics can be found in tables A6.2 and A6.3, 
respectively, in the appendix to this chapter. 
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Figure 6. 1: Correlation Between Gini Index and Other Income Inequality Measures 
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Table 6.1 is a correlations matrix of income inequality and various measures of financialisation. 
The bank-based measures are negatively correlated with the Gini index while the stock market 
measures are positively correlated with it, which gives some indications about the expected 
sign of the relationship between these variables.  
 
Table 6.1: Correlations Between Inequality and Financialisation Variables 
Variables  GINI Top 10% DOMSPR LIQUID DOMSFS DOMSBK STMVT STMCAP 
GINI 1.00        
Top 10% 0.98 1.00       
DOMSPR -0.10 -0.10 1.00      
LIQUID -0.26 -0.28 0.72 1.00     
DOMSFS -0.11 -0.11 1.00 0.73 1.00    
DOMSBK -0.25 -0.26 0.91 0.81 0.92 1.00   
STMVT 0.03 -0.01 0.65 0.40 0.61 0.41 1.00  
STMCAP 0.18 0.21 0.59 0.34 0.57 0.39 0.68 1.00 
 
6.3 The Empirical Model and Estimation procedures 
Following the general specification of EBA introduced in chapter four, the following equation 
is used in this chapter: 
𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼0  + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 +  𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗  𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 + ∑  𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +3𝑗𝑗=1 έ𝑗𝑗                            (6.1) 
where 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 is a measure of income inequality (Gini index or the top 10% income share). 𝑌𝑌 is 
real GDP per capita, which is included in all regressions (free variable). 𝑄𝑄 is the variable of 
interest under investigation, and Z  is a subset of three variables that are selected from a large 
pool of potentially important explanatory variables.69 
 
 
69 There is no rule to determine the number of Z variables. Following Sala-i-Martin (1997), the number of Z 
variables is taken to be three. 
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The free variable is the country’s level of income, measured by real GDP per capita, which is 
a leading determinant of income inequality as it is portrayed as having the biggest effect on 
income inequality (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). Real GDP per capita (GDPCC) reflects the stage 
of economic development. Following the Kuznets hypothesis, income inequality rises at the 
early stages of development, then drops thereafter (Kuznets, 1955). Accordingly, the 
coefficient on GDPCC is expected to bear a positive sign for developing countries, and a 
negative sign for developed countries.  
 
Each regression equation contains one free variable, one variable of interest and three Z 
variables chosen from a pool of 31 explanatory variables that are deemed to be significant at 
least once in the literature. Hence, for each variable of interest, approximately 4,495 equations 
are estimated.70 According to Leamer’s EBA, a variable of interest (𝑄𝑄) is labelled robust if its 
estimated coefficient remains significant and with the same sign, within two standard errors of 
the minimum and maximum values, in all regressions. When the Sala-i-Martin EBA is used, a 
variable of interest (𝑄𝑄) is labelled robust if its estimated CDF(0) is greater than 95%.71 The 
output of Sala-i-Martin EBA shows the unweighted and weighted statistics. The weighted 
statistics are constructed using the (integrated) likelihood ratio to give more weight to the 
model that is more likely to be the true model. However, Sala-i-Martin (1997) suggests that 
unweighted scheme is more appropriate to use particularly in cases where some models may 
have spurious good fits. Therefore, the following discussion is based on the unweighted 
scheme.  
 
 
70 According to the combinatorial calculation formula ( 31!(31−3)!3!). 
71 In some studies, this criterion is relaxed by considering a CDF(0) above 90% as a cut off (for example, Sturm 
and De Haan, 2005; Chanegriha et al., 2017). 
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Sala-i-Martin argues that the main problem encountered when analysing the distribution of 
coefficients is that “we don’t know the exact form of this distribution”. To solve this problem, 
he suggests analysing the results based on two assumptions: (i) the distribution of the 
coefficient estimates is normal, and (ii) the distribution of the coefficient estimates is not 
normal. Therefore, the coefficients are estimated based on these two assumptions. Following 
the procedures of Sala-i-Martin, the correlation between the unweighted normal CDF(0) and 
the unweighted non-normal CDF(0) is 0.97, which can be interpreted to imply that the 
estimated density function of coefficients is approximately normal. 
 
6.4 Results and Discussion 
This section provides two main sets of empirical results of the determinants of income 
inequality (measured by the Gini index and the top 10% income share). The baseline results 
are those of the Gini index. Subsequently, the EBA results for the top 10% income share will 
be presented and compared to the baseline results.  
 
6.4.1 The Gini Index  
The results of Leamer EBA are presented in Table 6.2 which reports the minimum and 
maximum coefficients and their t-statistics, as well as the ratio of significant coefficients as a 
percentage of all estimated coefficients. Also reported are the lower bound (LB) and the upper 
bound (UB), which are calculated as the minimum (maximum) coefficient minus (plus) two 
standard errors. The last column of the table 6.2 displays the robustness status. The results 
show that all variables turn out to be fragile, including the financialisation variables. This is 
due to the hard criterion put forward by Leamer, which is heavily criticised in the literature 
(McAleer et al., 1985; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). As in chapter five, the discussion of the results is 
based on the Sala-i-Martin EBA. 
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Sala-i-Martin EBA provides more reliability to the robustness decision by analysing the entire 
distribution. For instance, the stock market capitalisation (STMCAP) and law and order (LAW) 
variables are considered fragile according to Leamer’s EBA. However, both variables have 
almost 100% CDF(0) which makes them robust according to the Sala-i-Martin EBA. In fact, 
only one regression—with a different coefficient sign—is adequate for these variables not to 
pass the Leamer robustness criterion. Table 6.3 presents the results of Sala-i-Martin EBA, 
where the explanatory variables are sorted according to their CDF(0) values. The results show 
that financialisation is a robust determinant of the Gini index. The positive sign of the 
coefficients on the financialisation variables supports the inequality widening hypothesis, 
whereby financialisation has inequality-increasing effects. 
 
Bank-based financialisation measures (DOMSPR and DOMSFS) produce a positive sign, 
which means that a higher level of bank development is associated with a higher level of 
income inequality. This result contrast with the inequality narrowing effects of banking 
development (Beck et al., 2007; Kappel, 2010; Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot, 2011; Hamori and 
Hashiguchi, 2012; Zhang and Ben Naceur, 2019). However, this result is consistent with the 
evidence for the inequality widening effects of banking development (Kus, 2012; Jaumotte et 
al., 2013; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; Jauch and Watzka, 2016; Chiu and Lee, 2019). The result 
could be seen to be in line with the OECD (2015) finding that the increase in private credit is 
mainly accounted for a larger increase in household credit compared to business credit. Another 
explanation would be that the relationship between private credit and inequality is nonlinear 
and follows a U-shaped curve as in Tan and Law (2012) and Brei et al. (2018). Thus, the 
positive relationship implies that the sample countries are predominantly on the upward side 
of the curve—with high levels of private credit to GDP ratio.  
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Generally, the EBA results obtained by using credit variables support the general findings of 
the financialisation literature, whereby excessive finance aggravates income inequality 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011; Assa, 2012; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Hyde et 
al., 2018). The results, reported in Table 6.3, suggest that 1% growth in private credit leads to 
a rise in the Gini coefficient by more than 0.042 points. This result is interestingly comparable 
in magnitude, but it has the opposite sign, to the results of Zhang and Ben Naceur (2019) who 
find that a 1% decline in private credit leads to a rise in the Gini coefficient by 0.041 points.72 
Hyde et al. (2018) find that a 1% increase in private credit expansion generates 0.006 points of 
market Gini coefficient (Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers) in the long run.   
 
Market-based financialisation measures (STMCAP and STMVT) are robust and positively 
associated with the Gini coefficient, implying that higher levels of stock market capitalisation 
(value traded) aggravate income inequality. These results affirm the financialisation hypothesis 
that the negative effects of the financial sector on income distribution are associated with the 
shift towards market-based financial system (Skott and Ryoo, 2008; Stockhammer, 2008).  
Moreover, the positive link between finance and income inequality has been documented by 
many studies in the literature (Kus, 2012; Denk and Cournède, 2015; Tridico, 2018; Chiu and 
Lee, 2019).  
 
The results, displayed in Table 6.3, suggest that an increase in stock market capitalisation and 
the value of traded shares by 1% leads to an increase in the Gini coefficient by 0.077 and 0.047 
points, respectively. Hence, stock markets have a larger effect on income inequality as 
compared with banks and other financial institutions. The financialisation literature suggests 
 
72 The Zhang and Ben Naceur (2019) sample data comprises 143 countries over the period of 1961-2011. 
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that the effects of stock markets on income inequality are channelled through shareholder value 
orientation and short-termism—changing behaviour from “retain and reinvest” to “downsize 
and distribute”. Therefore, dividends and capital gains are likely to be distributed to the wealthy 
part of the income distribution pyramid (Dünhaupt, 2013; Owyang and Shell, 2016). Moreover, 
shareholder pressure for maximising their share value in the short run (through measures of 
stock market performance) are likely to induce increasing dividends and cutting the resources 
allocated to future growth, thereby boosting the top income share while reducing the labour 
wage share (Stockhammer, 2004; Hein, 2015; Riccetti et al., 2016; Turco, 2018). In addition, 
the increase in market capitalisation is concomitant with the decrease in labour union density, 
which reduces the bargaining power of labour and induces an indirect channel for negative 
financialisation effects on income distribution.  
 
The results suggest that stock markets have a larger effect than banks on income inequality, 
which is inconsistent with the existing literature that finds a stronger impact of banks on income 
inequality (Beck et al., 2007; Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot, 2011; Zhang and Ben Naceur, 2019). 
Brei et al. (2018) find that both structures of the financial system impact income inequality 
significantly in civil law countries, whereas financial markets are the predominant driver of 
income inequality in common law countries. Kappel (2010) reports a stronger impact of stock 
markets in developed countries. 
 
These findings suggest that excessive finance is harmful for egalitarian income distribution and 
should be limited. This is consistent with the view expressed by Jauch and Watzka (2016) who 
contend that the accumulation of financial excesses before the latest global financial crisis was 
a form of inefficient much finance and should be avoided with sufficient regulatory framework. 
Moreover, the results are indeed consistent with evidence on the inequality widening effects of 
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financialisation (Jaumotte et al., 2013; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; Denk and Cournède, 2015; 
De Haan and Sturm, 2017). However, Denk and Cournède (2015) argue that the current 
evidence does not imply a monotonic relationship between finance and inequality. In other 
words, less finance does not imply less income inequality for two reasons, the first of which is 
the bi-directional relationship between finance and inequality. For instance, causality can run 
from inequality to finance through credit-driven consumption by households (Rajan, 2011; 
Kumhof et al., 2015). The second reason is suggested by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
who put forward the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relation between finance and income 
inequality (Nikoloski, 2012). There are also those who believe in the inverse hypothesis that 
depicts a U-shaped relationship between finance and inequality (Tan and Law, 2012; Jauch and 
Watzka, 2016; Brei et al., 2018). 
 
In addition to financialisation, the EBA results reveal a set of robust key determinants of 
income inequality. These include law and order, labour union density, population, trade 
openness (globalisation), remittances, education and the share of agriculture. The results 
suggest that law and order (LAW) is a robust key driver of equality that is negatively related 
to income inequality. These results affirm the hypothesis of Rajan and Zingales (2003) who 
emphasise the importance of institutional quality for the effectiveness of the inequality 
reducing effects of financial development. The presence of sound and efficient institutions 
reinforces finance and opportunity access to well-educated individuals as opposed to politically 
connected interest groups (Botta et al., 2019).  
 
Looking at the labour unions density variable (LUD), the results suggest that higher levels of 
labour union density produce less income inequality because of the significant role of the 
union’s bargaining power in boosting the labour share of income. Hence, labour is mainly 
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concentrated at the bottom of income distribution. Moreover, the negative sign of the 
coefficient is consistent with the theoretical argument put forward by Hein (2012b), who 
suggests that labour unions represent one of three main transmission channels of 
financialisation that aggravate income inequality through the weakening of trade unions 
bargaining power. Empirically, Kus (2012) finds a negative association between union density 
and the Gini coefficient in OECD countries. Barradas and Lagoa (2017b) and Van Arnum and 
Naples (2013) confirm similar results for Portugal and the United States, respectively. 
 
Globalization, as proxied by trade openness (TRADE), is a robust determinant of income 
inequality with a negative sign. This result affirms the past literature of the positive role of 
trade globalisation in alleviating income inequality (Jaumotte et al., 2013; Seven and Coskun, 
2016; Furceri and Ostry, 2019). Beck et al. (2004) suggest that developed financial systems 
foster globalisation by facilitating the entry of new enterprises and alleviate the effect of 
politically connected interest groups on new entrants. In contrast, many studies find that 
openness to trade aggravates income inequality, particularly in developed countries, and that it 
is positively associated with the increase in the top income share (Barro, 2000; Ang, 2010; 
Dorn and Schinke, 2018). Nevertheless, the literature suggests that the equality enhancing  
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Table 6.2: Leamer EBA Results, Dependent Variable: Gini index         
Variables  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛 t-stat 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  t-stat Significance  LB UB Robust?  
GDPCC -0.0004 -4.35 0.0003 2.16 59.3%  -0.0007 0.0006 No 
DOMSFS 0.007 0.24 0.129 2.62 16.1%  -0.057 0.231 No 
DOMSPR 0.010 0.44 0.120 2.58 20.7%  -0.057 0.226 No 
DOMSBK -0.032 -1.96 0.099 1.58 8.1%  -0.073 0.222 No 
LIQUID -0.078 -1.16 0.040 2.13 0.5%  -0.212 0.089 No 
STMCAP 0.044 3.29 0.118 6.47 99.9%  -0.019 0.172 No 
STMVT 0.009 0.35 0.160 1.73 47.4%  -0.052 0.342 No 
LAW -6.945 -3.86 -1.688 -1.22 100.0%  -10.467 1.033 No 
LUD -0.198 -2.88 0.036 0.77 79.6%  -0.350 0.216 No 
POPURB -0.045 -0.81 0.390 4.87 70.7%  -0.153 0.547 No 
POPG -1.349 -0.88 7.437 3.55 64.4%  -4.368 11.542 No 
TRDGDP -0.115 -4.87 0.001 0.06 46.1%  -0.176 0.034 No 
REMMI -1.607 -3.84 -0.007 -0.03 63.6%  -2.427 0.494 No 
SCHAVG -1.996 -2.07 0.036 0.12 41.4%  -3.882 1.237 No 
ENRTER -0.399 -3.03 0.087 1.59 44.7%  -0.657 0.268 No 
AGRVAGDP -1.629 -4.21 0.224 0.97 31.6%  -2.387 0.845 No 
HDI -118.758 -3.96 32.440 1.75 29.6%  -201.363 73.883 No 
RIR -0.116 -0.64 0.557 3.62 17.8%  -0.597 0.945 No 
ICTINV -4.545 -1.04 13.755 4.40 27.9%  -24.136 23.036 No 
FDIGDP -0.764 -1.86 0.471 4.17 27.9%  -1.569 0.817 No 
ARBL -11.683 -2.19 14.933 3.37 19.8%  -22.128 23.628 No 
TARRIF -0.790 -1.07 2.835 4.18 10.2%  -2.241 4.755 No 
BUREAU -4.891 -2.17 3.609 1.59 3.0%  -11.839 10.117 No 
LIFEEX -1.330 -6.24 0.500 1.44 9.2%  -2.186 1.467 No 
FERT -4.946 -2.96 12.289 3.19 22.2%  -10.076 20.179 No 
AMIPPP -0.004 -3.13 0.005 1.98 6.8%  -0.009 0.009 No 
DEMAC -5.174 -3.06 4.778 4.72 4.2%  -9.548 7.542 No 
GOVCONSGDP -0.806 -2.60 0.553 1.17 8.6%  -1.415 1.480 No 
GOVSTA -1.916 -1.78 7.118 2.12 6.4%  -5.563 13.704 No 
AGEDEP -0.387 -1.91 0.646 3.90 12.0%  -0.846 0.971 No 
UE -0.289 -1.65 0.552 2.01 0.2%  -0.967 1.440 No 
FIXINV -0.777 -2.93 0.649 2.26 1.3%  -1.297 1.212 No 
ETHTEN -1.460 -2.03 2.056 2.44 0.3%  -3.293 4.599 No 
TNTR -0.859 -2.70 1.695 3.47 19.6%  -1.864 3.021 No 
CORRUP -2.514 -2.17 3.198 1.75 0.2%  -6.339 7.838 No 
FEMLF -0.462 -1.97 0.675 1.60 1.5%  -1.219 1.503 No 
EXCONF -2.840 -3.12 3.799 2.47 1.1%  -4.626 6.813 No 
INFCPI -0.852 -4.10 2.189 3.59 10.0%   -1.407 4.144 No 
𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛  and 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚   are the minimum and the maximum coefficients produced by the widest range of regressions. LB and UB are the 
lower and upper bounds respectively (following equations 4.3 and 4.4). The last column shows the robustness decision. GDPCC is the 
free variable. 
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Table 6.3: Sala-i-Martin EBA Results, Dependent Variable: Gini index 
Variables  
 Unweighted   Weighted    
  𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0)  𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0) Sign  
GDPCC -0.00011 -1.96 96.9% -0.00010 -1.75 95.3% - 
DOMSFS 0.042 1.55 93.6% 0.045 1.70 95.2% + 
DOMSPR 0.043 1.62 94.5% 0.046 1.76 95.8% + 
DOMSBK 0.011 0.60 72.2% 0.014 0.83 79.1% + 
LIQUID -0.007 -0.37 64.3% -0.006 -0.29 61.2% - 
STMCAP 0.077 3.70 100.0% 0.076 3.70 100.0% + 
STMVT 0.047 1.97 97.1% 0.050 2.09 97.7% + 
LAW -5.110 -4.99 100.0% -5.101 -5.00 100.0% - 
LUD -0.111 -2.64 99.5% -0.108 -2.58 99.4% - 
POPURB 0.129 2.40 99.1% 0.136 2.46 99.2% + 
POPG 2.573 2.26 98.6% 2.598 2.27 98.6% + 
TRDGDP -0.036 -2.20 98.5% -0.037 -2.38 99.0% - 
REMMI -0.481 -2.28 98.2% -0.535 -2.46 98.9% - 
SCHAVG -0.634 -1.81 96.1% -0.652 -1.89 96.7% - 
ENRTER -0.089 -1.76 95.6% -0.087 -1.74 95.4% - 
AGRVAGDP -0.324 -1.61 93.5% -0.385 -1.81 95.7% - 
HDI -20.770 -1.45 91.3% -24.042 -1.60 93.4% - 
RIR 0.222 1.38 90.8% 0.253 1.57 93.4% + 
ICTINV 5.156 1.31 89.9% 5.179 1.32 90.1% + 
FDIGDP 0.080 1.13 85.4% 0.083 1.22 87.1% + 
ARBL -3.218 -1.04 84.2% -2.832 -0.91 81.0% - 
TARRIF 0.434 0.98 82.5% 0.455 0.98 82.4% + 
BUREAU -1.586 -0.89 80.8% -1.418 -0.82 78.8% - 
LIFEEX -0.271 -0.91 80.2% -0.279 -0.93 80.9% - 
FERT 1.204 0.93 80.0% 1.498 1.10 84.1% + 
AMIPPP -0.001 -0.85 79.8% -0.001 -0.71 75.8% - 
DEMAC 0.812 0.84 79.5% 0.787 0.81 78.4% + 
GOVCONSGDP -0.182 -0.74 76.4% -0.155 -0.62 72.6% - 
GOVSTA 0.844 0.71 75.7% 0.882 0.73 76.4% + 
AGEDEP 0.052 0.61 71.5% 0.054 0.63 72.0% + 
UE 0.125 0.55 70.1% 0.141 0.63 72.9% + 
FIXINV 0.069 0.52 69.2% 0.079 0.57 71.0% + 
ETHTEN 0.239 0.34 63.3% 0.283 0.41 65.6% + 
TNTR 0.024 0.14 55.0% 0.072 0.39 64.0% + 
CORRUP -0.150 -0.12 54.8% -0.032 -0.03 51.0% - 
FEMLF 0.012 0.08 53.1% 0.017 0.11 54.2% + 
EXCONF -0.028 -0.04 51.4% -0.023 -0.03 51.1% - 
INFCPI 0.005 0.02 50.6% 0.095 0.33 62.2% + 
𝛽𝛽 is the mean coefficient. CDF(0) is the cumulative density function on either side of zero. “Sign” refers to the sign of the effect. The 
weighted statistics are based on integrated likelihood ratio, following equations 4.6 to 4.8.  Robust variables are in bold.  
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effects of trade globalisation are probably offset by the negative effects of financial 
globalisation on income distribution (Jaumotte et al., 2013). The remittances variable 
(REMMI) is also robust and negatively related to income inequality, which means that the 
inflow of remittances can help alleviate income inequality in the recipient’s country. However, 
the literature remains equivocal about the net impact of remittances on income inequality. In 
this sense, Tyson and McKinley (2014) argue that the macroeconomic effects of remittances 
are still under-researched. Evidence on the positive role of remittances is reported in Bang et 
al. (2016). 
 
The demographic profile of the country is a key driver of income inequality. Both population 
growth (POPG) and the ratio of urban population to total population (POPURB) are robust 
determinants of income inequality. The positive sign of the coefficient confirms the findings 
of Beck et al. (2007). Moreover, the proxies for education level, gross tertiary enrolment 
(ENRTER), and the average number of schooling years (SCHAVG) are robust determinants of 
income inequality. The results suggest that countries with higher levels of education tend to be 
more equal. This is consistent with models of Galor and Zeira (1993) and Galor and Moav 
(2004) who suggest that relaxing credit constraints on investment in human capital 
accumulation through education will reduce income inequality. In addition, education 
improves income distribution by enhancing the share of the bottom income earners and 
reducing the share of top income earners (Abdullah et al., 2015). 
 
Last, but not least, the agriculture share of GDP (AGRVAGDP) is negatively related to income 
inequality. This result is considered to be a classical finding in the literature, given the 
traditional role of the agricultural sector in creating employment, particularly for low or 
unskilled labour. Hence, income inequality is lower in countries with large agricultural sectors 
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(Clarke et al., 2003). The results are also consistent with the evidence provided by Jauch and 
Watzka (2016) and Jaumotte et al. (2013). 
 
Figure 6.2 exhibits coefficients histograms for financialisation and robust variables as 
estimated by the Sala-i-Martin EBA for all countries sample. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients are on the horizontal axis, whereas the vertical axis indicates the corresponding 
probability density, the vertical line represents the zero line (default coefficient value under the 
null hypothesis), the bell-shaped curve shows the super-imposed normal distribution, and the 
meandering curve represents the kernel density, a non-parametric approximation to the shape 
of each regression coefficient. 
 
6.4.2 Top 10% Income Share  
The growing income share of the richest 10% is an observable trend in most countries. As 
discussed in section 6. 2, the higher the top 10% income share, the higher the Gini index, 
implying income inequality. Therefore, no major change in the determinants of income 
inequality is expected when the top 10% income share is used as a measure of income 
inequality. The results of Leamer EBA and Sala-i-Martin EBA are reported in tables 6.4 and 
6.5, respectively. 
 
The results show that financialisation is positively associated with the share of the top 10% 
income. The results confirm the long-run historical analysis of Piketty (2014) who suggests 
that income is concentrated within the top of income distribution. In addition, the rising top 
incomes share corresponds to the falling labour wage share as a results of increasing demand 
for rents by shareholders and rentier class in general (Epstein and Jayadev, 2005; Dünhaupt, 
2012, 2013; Hein, 2015; Barradas and Lagoa, 2017b). 
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There is no significant change in the set of robust determinants of income inequality when the 
top 10% income share is used as a measure of income inequality. However, few additional 
variables appear as robust determinants of income inequality when the top 10% income share 
is used as a dependent variable. These are the human development index (HDI), real interest 
rate (RIR) and tariff rate (TARRIF).  
 
Figure 6. 2: Coefficients Histograms for Financialisation and Selected Variables 
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The robustly positive relationship between the real interest rate and the top 10% income share 
may be taken to indicate that the top 10% income earners are more reliant on income generated 
through financial activities. This result is consistent with findings of Flaherty (2015) and 
Epstein and Power (2003) who argue that monetary policy, which raised the real interest rates, 
has resulted in higher capital gains and growth of financial intermediation profits. Nevertheless, 
this result is inconsistent with the findings of Berisha et al. (2018) who find that low interest 
rates boost top incomes and more significantly the top 1% income share. Delis et al. (2014) 
contend that the liberalisation of interest rate controls reduces income inequality in a significant 
manner. Tariff rate has a positive relationship with the top 10% income share. This result is 
consistent with recent evidence provided by Furceri et al. (2018) who show that increased 
tariffs contribute to a higher level of inequality. Saha et al. (2019) contradict this result and 
suggest that lower tariffs boost top income shares. The human development index (HDI)—
which comprises measures of life expectancy, schooling average and gross national per 
capita—is negatively related to the top 10% income share. The negative relationship implies 
that an increase in HDI reduces the top 10% income share.  
 
6.5 Sub-Samples Results 
In this section, the analysis is extended to check the sensitivity of the results to the level of 
economic development to find out if the effects of financialisation (measured by the Gini index) 
vary across developed and developing countries. The full results are reported in the appendix 
to this chapter (tables A6.4 through A6.7). A summary of the robust determinants of income 
inequality across different samples are reported in Table 6.6.  
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Table 6.4: Leamer’s EBA Results (top 10% income share)     
Variables  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛  t-stat 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 t-stat Significance  LB UB Robust?  
GDPCC -0.0004 -4.76 0.0002 2.12 57.2%  -0.0006 0.0005 No 
DOMSFS 0.002 0.08 0.100 2.49 21.5%  -0.055 0.178 No 
DOMSPR 0.005 0.24 0.095 2.54 27.1%  -0.056 0.176 No 
DOMSBK -0.029 -1.98 0.070 1.32 12.3%  -0.066 0.173 No 
LIQUID -0.047 -1.98 0.034 2.69 0.8%  -0.096 0.065 No 
STMCAP 0.034 2.87 0.106 5.88 99.9%  -0.009 0.142 No 
STMVT 0.001 0.05 0.147 1.82 25.5%  -0.045 0.305 No 
LAW -5.300 -3.79 -1.512 -1.43 99.8%  -8.191 0.566 No 
POPG -0.172 -0.12 6.154 3.64 77.7%  -3.212 9.520 No 
TRDGDP -0.090 -4.07 0.000 0.01 55.1%  -0.143 0.031 No 
LUD -0.167 -2.23 0.040 1.11 70.3%  -0.314 0.197 No 
REMMI -1.183 -4.25 0.142 0.64 77.8%  -1.773 0.634 No 
ENRTER -0.349 -4.72 0.046 0.42 66.4%  -0.566 0.261 No 
HDI -113.531 -6.59 28.941 2.08 56.3%  -166.948 57.725 No 
TARRIF -0.399 -1.19 2.268 4.38 53.7%  -1.360 3.433 No 
SCHAVG -1.798 -2.76 0.049 0.19 29.8%  -3.168 1.188 No 
ARBL -10.767 -2.60 8.708 2.44 51.0%  -21.063 18.161 No 
RIR -0.022 -0.11 0.519 4.29 29.8%  -0.455 0.757 No 
POPURB -0.100 -1.09 0.246 3.64 22.7%  -0.280 0.378 No 
FDIGDP -0.424 -1.33 0.391 4.33 41.4%  -1.051 0.695 No 
GOVCONSGDP -0.566 -2.32 0.446 1.46 21.1%  -1.088 1.213 No 
FERT -3.698 -1.98 11.576 3.76 22.5%  -9.469 17.618 No 
AMIPPP -0.004 -2.29 0.002 1.35 14.7%  -0.007 0.006 No 
AGRVAGDP -1.372 -3.97 0.325 1.19 15.4%  -2.050 0.952 No 
LIFEEX -1.041 -5.74 0.479 1.78 9.3%  -1.831 1.245 No 
ICTINV -6.273 -1.74 9.853 3.86 9.4%  -21.971 17.990 No 
BUREAU -4.663 -2.16 5.033 2.85 6.9%  -9.612 8.488 No 
FEMLF -0.559 -2.29 0.527 2.00 3.0%  -1.221 1.207 No 
CORRUP -1.330 -1.37 3.082 1.74 2.0%  -4.421 6.563 No 
DEMAC -3.971 -2.13 2.980 2.45 3.8%  -7.627 5.362 No 
GOVSTA -1.971 -1.56 5.971 2.18 7.2%  -5.492 11.351 No 
AGEDEP -0.653 -3.65 0.484 3.90 13.5%  -1.005 0.727 No 
ETHTEN -1.724 -2.49 1.249 2.17 0.9%  -3.252 2.753 No 
UE -0.220 -1.40 0.487 1.80 0.3%  -0.733 1.207 No 
INFCPI -0.658 -4.17 1.681 3.07 7.3%  -1.049 3.166 No 
FIXINV -0.532 -2.28 0.456 1.96 1.4%  -1.121 0.923 No 
EXCONF -2.163 -2.93 2.635 2.66 1.0%  -3.611 5.269 No 
TNTR -0.687 -4.37 1.227 2.61 16.2%   -1.563 2.531 No 
 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛  and 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚   are the minimum and the maximum coefficients produced by the widest range of regressions. LB and UB are 
the lower and upper bounds respectively (following equations 4.3 and 4.4). The last column shows the robustness decision, 
GDPCC is the free variable. 
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 Table 6.5: Sala-i-Martin EBA Results (top 10% income share) 
Variables  
 Unweighted   Weighted   
  𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0)  𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0) Sign  
GDPCC  -0.00008 -1.88 96.2%  -0.00007 -1.67 94.4% - 
DOMSFS  0.033 1.59 94.0%  0.036 1.74 95.6% + 
DOMSPR  0.035 1.67 94.9%  0.037 1.81 96.2% + 
DOMSBK  0.008 0.65 73.6%  0.012 0.90 81.0% + 
LIQUID  -0.006 -0.36 64.0%  -0.005 -0.30 61.6% - 
STMCAP  0.063 3.74 100.0%  0.062 3.74 100.0% + 
STMVT  0.031 1.60 93.6%  0.032 1.68 94.5% + 
LAW  -4.034 -4.64 100.0%  -4.029 -4.66 100.0% - 
POPG  2.607 2.60 99.4%  2.597 2.60 99.4% + 
TRDGDP  -0.030 -2.46 99.2%  -0.030 -2.61 99.5% - 
LUD  -0.071 -2.40 99.1%  -0.069 -2.37 99.0% - 
REMMI  -0.418 -2.46 98.8%  -0.442 -2.57 99.2% - 
ENRTER  -0.100 -2.26 98.6%  -0.098 -2.23 98.5% - 
HDI  -32.385 -2.07 97.6%  -34.564 -2.15 98.0% - 
TARRIF  0.824 1.98 97.2%  0.860 2.01 97.5% + 
SCHAVG  -0.546 -1.66 94.6%  -0.540 -1.70 95.0% - 
ARBL  -3.729 -1.68 94.4%  -3.445 -1.56 92.9% - 
RIR  0.230 1.62 94.4%  0.230 1.69 95.0% + 
POPURB  0.072 1.46 92.5%  0.077 1.54 93.5% + 
FDIGDP  0.082 1.50 91.4%  0.082 1.55 92.2% + 
GOVCONSGDP  -0.240 -1.16 87.2%  -0.208 -1.00 83.6% - 
FERT  1.758 1.18 86.8%  1.896 1.25 88.1% + 
AMIPPP  -0.001 -1.08 85.5%  -0.001 -0.90 81.0% - 
AGRVAGDP  -0.223 -1.03 83.5%  -0.277 -1.25 88.3% - 
LIFEEX  -0.270 -0.96 82.0%  -0.269 -0.96 82.0% - 
ICTINV  2.303 0.70 75.1%  2.122 0.64 73.3% + 
BUREAU  -0.961 -0.69 74.9%  -0.745 -0.55 70.4% - 
FEMLF  -0.101 -0.70 74.7%  -0.101 -0.68 74.2% - 
CORRUP  0.631 0.66 74.2%  0.722 0.76 77.4% + 
DEMAC  0.476 0.61 72.6%  0.526 0.68 74.5% + 
GOVSTA  0.554 0.56 70.9%  0.600 0.61 72.4% + 
AGEDEP  0.051 0.57 70.9%  0.042 0.47 67.4% + 
ETHTEN  -0.287 -0.52 69.7%  -0.228 -0.42 65.9% - 
UE  0.087 0.43 66.3%  0.097 0.51 68.7% + 
INFCPI  0.080 0.35 62.6%  0.150 0.62 70.9% + 
FIXINV  0.025 0.21 58.0%  0.032 0.27 60.2% + 
EXCONF  -0.101 -0.16 56.0%  -0.103 -0.16 56.3% - 
TNTR  0.011 0.07 52.4%  0.037 0.22 58.1% + 
 𝛽𝛽 is the mean coefficient. CDF(0) is the cumulative density function on either side of zero. “Sign” refers to the sign of the 
effect. The weighted statistics are based on integrated likelihood ratio, following equations 4.6 to 4.8.  Robust variables are in 
bold.  
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As expected, financialisation has a stronger effect on income inequality in developed countries. 
The Sala-i-Martin EBA results—presented in Appendix tables A6.4 and A6.5 —show that 
credit, as well as stock market measures, are robust determinants of income inequality in 
developed countries. Stock market capitalisation is the only measure of financialisation that is 
found to be a robust determinant of income inequality in developing countries. This suggests 
that the financialisation effects in developing countries are mainly channelled through financial 
markets (capital mobility), which is consistent with the findings of Levy-Orlik (2013) for the 
Mexican economy. In addition, the magnitude of the financialisation effect on the Gini index 
is larger in developed countries. The results suggest that a 1% growth of private credit leads to 
0.05 points rise in the Gini index in developed countries, as opposed to 0.042 points in the full 
sample. 
  
Table 6.6 Summary of Sala-i-Martin EBA Results (Robust Variables) 
Variables  Full Sample Developed Countries Developing Countries Top10 
DOMSFS R* (+) R* (+)  R* (+) 
DOMSPR R* (+) R* (+)  R* (+) 
DOMSBK      
LIQUID      
STMCAP R* (+) R* (+) R* (+) R* (+) 
STMVT R* (+) R* (+)    
LAW R* (-) R* (-) R* (-) R* (-) 
LUD R* (-) R* (-) R* (-) R* (-) 
POPURB R* (+)  R* (+)   
POPG R* (+) R* (+) R* (+) R* (+) 
TRDGDP R* (-) R* (-) R* (-) R* (-) 
REMMI R* (-)  R* (-) R* (-) 
SCHAVG R* (-) R* (-)  R* (-) 
ENRTER R* (-)  R* (-) R* (-) 
AGRVAGDP R* (-)  R* (-)   
HDI  R* (-)  R* (-) 
RIR    R* (+) 
ICTINV  R* (+) R* (+)   
TARRIF    R* (+) 
FERT  R* (+)    
AMIPPP  R* (-)    
TNTR  R* (+)    
FEMLF   R* (-)     
R* indicates a robust variable. The sign of the relationship in parenthesis. 
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Few additional variables are revealed to be robust determinants of income inequality in 
individual samples. For the developed countries sample, these variables include human 
development index (HDI), annual investment in telecommunication services  as a percentage 
of GDP (ICTINV), fertility rate (FERT), average monthly income (PPP) (AMIPPP), total 
natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP (TNTR) and female percentage of the total 
labour force (FEMLF). In the developing countries sample, one additional variable appears to 
be robust, which is annual investment in telecommunication services as a percentage of GDP 
(ICTINV). 
 
6.6 Conclusion  
Apart from the conventional determinants of income inequality, financialisation is considered 
as a major contributor to income inequality. Several theoretical hypotheses predict conflicting 
effects of finance on income inequality. The lack of consensus is reinforced by the mixed 
findings of related empirical studies. Therefore, extreme bounds analysis (EBA) is applied to 
examine the robustness of the relationship between financialisation and income inequality. 
EBA is most effective in the case of numerous potential explanatory variables, which is the 
prevailing result in the income inequality literature. For the purpose of analysis, two measures 
of income inequality are used, the Gini index and the top income share. In addition, different 
measures of financialisation are used to account for the effect of financial structure on income 
inequality. 
 
The findings of this study suggest that financialisation is a leading driver of income inequality. 
Both bank-based and market-based financialisation variables are robust. The positive sign of 
the coefficients of the financialisation variables are in line with the inequality widening 
hypothesis and the recent evidence found in the financialisation literature. The results also 
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suggest that a higher level of financialisation boosts the top 10% income share which is 
consistent with the long-run historical analysis presented by Piketty (2014). Moreover, the 
results show that stock markets have a larger effect on income inequality than banks. In 
addition, the sub-sample analysis shows that the financialisation process is more evident in 
developed countries and that the effects of financialisation are channelled primarily through 
financial markets in developing countries. 
 
The results of EBA confirm some of the previous findings on the determinants of income 
inequality. Only 11 out of 31 variables are robust drivers of income inequality, including law 
and order, labour union density, population growth, trade openness (globalisation), 
remittances, education, and the share of agricultural sector. The set of robust variables changes 
slightly across developed and developing countries. 
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Appendix to Chapter Six 
Countries, Variables, Data and Detailed Results 
Table A6.1: List of Countries 
Developed Countries   Developing Countries  
Austria  Albania Kosovo 
Belgium  Argentina Kyrgyz Republic 
Chile  Armenia Latvia 
Czech Republic  Bangladesh Liberia 
Denmark  Belarus Lithuania 
Estonia  Benin Macedonia, FYR 
Finland  Bhutan Madagascar 
France  Bolivia Malta 
Germany  Bosnia and Herzegovina Mauritania 
Greece  Brazil Mauritius 
Hungary  Bulgaria Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 
Iceland  Burkina Faso Moldova 
Ireland  Burundi Mongolia 
Italy  Cameroon Montenegro 
Korea, Rep.  China Mozambique 
Luxembourg  Colombia Myanmar 
Mexico  Comoros Nicaragua 
Netherlands  Congo, Dem. Rep. Niger 
Norway  Costa Rica Pakistan 
Portugal  Cote d'Ivoire Panama 
Slovak Republic  Croatia Paraguay 
Slovenia  Cyprus Peru 
Spain  Djibouti Romania 
Sweden  Dominican Republic Russian Federation 
Switzerland  Ecuador Rwanda 
Turkey  Egypt, Arab Rep. Seychelles 
United Kingdom  El Salvador Solomon Islands 
United States  Fiji South Africa 
   Gambia, The Sri Lanka 
   Georgia Tajikistan 
   Ghana Thailand 
   Guatemala Timor-Leste 
   Guinea Togo 
   Haiti Uganda 
   Honduras Ukraine 
   Indonesia Uruguay 
   Iran, Islamic Rep. Vietnam 
   Iraq Yemen, Rep. 
    Kazakhstan   
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Table A6.2: List of Variables and Sources   
Code Variable Name Description Source 
GINI Gini index Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income 
among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution.  A Gini index of 0 represents perfect 
equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 
GCIP, 
WDI 
Top10 TOP 10% income 
share 
Percentage share of income held by the top decile of the population WID 
GDPCC GDP per capita, 
constant 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population 
(constant 2010 US$) WDI 
DOMFS Financial system 
credit 
Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as 
a percentage of GDP GFDD 
DOMPR Private Credit Domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP GFDD 
DOMBK Bank credit Private credit by deposit money banks as a percentage of GDP GFDD 
LIQUID Liquid Liabilities Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, which is also known as broad money, 
or M3 GFDD 
SMCAP Market 
Capitalisation 
Stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP GFDD 
SMVT Market Value 
Traded 
Stock market total value traded as a percentage of GDP GFDD 
ICTINV ICT Investment Annual investment in telecommunication services  as a percentage of 
GDP ITU 
AMIPPP Average monthly 
income (PPP) 
Average monthly income (PPP) ILO 
LUD Union density rate Union density rate conveys the number of union members who are 
employees as a percentage of the total number of employees. ILO 
FDIGDP Foreign direct 
investment 
Foreign direct investment (net inflows) as a percentage of GDP WDI 
TRDGDP Openness Ratio of exports and imports to GDP WDI 
REMMI Remittance Remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP WDI 
GOVCONS Government Size Government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP WDI 
FIXINV Fixed Investment Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP WDI 
INFCPI Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) WDI 
RIR Real interest rate 
(%) 
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator. WDI 
TARRIF Tariff rate Tariff rate, applied, weighted mean, all products (%) WDI 
LIFEEX Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, total (years) WDI 
FERT Fertility Fertility rate, total (births per woman) WDI 
POPG Population Growth Population growth (annual %) WDI 
POPURB Urban population Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by 
national statistical offices. WDI 
FEMLF Female, Labour 
Force 
Labour force, female (% of total labour force) WDI, 
ILO 
SCHAVG Schooling Mean years of schooling,  years 25+ UNDP 
ENRTER Tertiary Education School enrolment, Tertiary (% gross) WDI 
UE Unemployment Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) WDI, 
ILO 
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Table A6.2: List of Variables and Sources (continued) 
  
Code Variable Name Description Source 
AGRVAGDP Agriculture  Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added as a percentage of GDP WDI 
ARBL Arable land Arable land (hectares per person) WDI 
TNTR Natural Resources Total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP WDI 
HDI Human 
Development 
Index 
Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average 
achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and 
healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. 
UNDP 
AGEDEP Age dependency Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population) WDI 
CORRUP Corruption rates This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. (6 points 
scale) ICRG 
LAW Law and Order “Law and Order” form a single component, but its two elements are 
assessed separately, with each element being scored from zero to three 
points. (6 points scale) 
ICRG 
GOVSTA Government 
stability 
This is an assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its 
declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office (12 points scale) ICRG 
BUREAU Bureaucracy Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is a shock absorber 
that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. (6 
points scale) 
ICRG 
EXCONF External conflict The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the 
incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent 
external pressure to violent external pressure (12 points scale) 
ICRG 
DEMAC Democratic 
accountability 
This is a measure of how responsive government is to its people, on the 
basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that the 
government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly 
violently in a non-democratic one. (6 points scale) 
ICRG 
ETHTEN Ethnic tensions This component is an assessment of the degree of tension within a 
country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions. (6 points 
scale) 
ICRG 
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Table A6.3 : Descriptive Statistics (Average 2012-2016) 
Variable  Obs. Mean SD Min Max  Obs. Mean SD Min Max  Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
   All Countries  Developed  Countries   Developing Countries 
GINI  105 37.17 7.58 24.76 63.00  28 32.54 5.71 25.73 47.50  77 38.85 7.51 24.76 63.00 
Top10  105 29.13 5.95 20.95 50.50  28 25.43 4.19 20.95 38.20  77 30.48 5.94 21.06 50.50 
GDPCC  104 14376 20249 233 105906  28 39996 23584 9586 105906  76 4938 5249 233 27828 
DOMFS  104 57.53 46.29 4.67 253.46  28 99.77 40.38 28.20 177.56  77 42.17 38.17 4.67 253.46 
DOMPR  104 59.19 46.62 5.09 244.98  28 101.00 41.38 30.07 189.24  76 43.79 38.42 5.09 244.98 
DOMBK  105 53.71 43.24 4.67 253.46  28 93.14 38.68 21.43 175.17  77 39.37 35.29 4.67 253.46 
LIQUID  104 58.12 37.19 10.86 213.77  27 84.01 32.75 27.71 184.25  77 49.04 34.44 10.86 213.77 
SMCAP  69 41.31 44.35 0.34 241.30  28 58.37 45.47 5.04 204.30  41 29.66 40.07 0.34 241.30 
SMVT  71 21.12 38.94 0.00 216.99  28 39.63 48.15 0.18 216.99  43 9.06 25.68 0.00 141.85 
ICTINV  67 0.62 0.38 0.17 1.79  28 0.38 0.10 0.17 0.71  41 0.77 0.42 0.23 1.79 
AMIPPP  63 1879.29 1358.07 213.00 5447.00  25 3123.10 1236.42 668.80 5447.00  38 1061.00 604.93 213.00 3157.60 
LUD  55 26.65 19.29 2.60 89.28  26 28.98 23.11 5.35 89.28  29 24.56 15.21 2.60 52.20 
FDIGDP  105 5.86 9.54 -1.63 65.38  28 6.87 13.96 -1.63 65.38  77 5.49 7.40 -0.81 44.79 
TRDGDP  105 91.49 52.39 25.31 378.20  28 112.04 70.04 29.11 378.20  77 84.03 42.43 25.31 290.48 
REMMI  104 4.80 6.96 0.01 35.59  28 0.88 0.93 0.02 3.38  76 6.25 7.64 0.01 35.59 
GOVCONSGDP  103 16.58 4.97 3.45 30.44  28 19.38 4.17 11.94 26.09  75 15.53 4.86 3.45 30.44 
FIXINV  103 23.44 7.63 5.64 55.45  28 21.15 3.82 11.92 29.39  75 24.29 8.49 5.64 55.45 
INFCPI  104 3.91 4.15 -0.87 24.20  28 1.46 1.61 -0.66 8.14  76 4.82 4.44 -0.87 24.20 
RIR  84 8.10 7.86 -5.26 49.01  13 2.60 2.02 -1.21 6.80  71 9.11 8.11 -5.26 49.01 
TARRIF  101 4.76 4.09 0.58 24.87  28 2.12 1.19 1.52 7.19  73 5.77 4.36 0.58 24.87 
LIFEEX  105 72.50 7.52 52.52 82.90  28 80.32 2.25 75.24 82.90  77 69.65 6.70 52.52 81.61 
FERT  105 2.63 1.40 1.22 7.33  28 1.64 0.26 1.22 2.24  77 2.99 1.48 1.26 7.33 
POPG  105 1.15 1.12 -1.08 3.84  28 0.57 0.63 -0.60 2.32  77 1.36 1.19 -1.08 3.84 
POPURB  104 59.35 20.60 11.77 97.82  28 77.04 11.52 49.72 97.82  76 52.83 19.37 11.77 95.27 
FEMLF  102 42.58 7.52 8.76 54.98  28 44.86 3.75 31.36 48.70  74 41.71 8.38 8.76 54.98 
SCHAVG  55 8.38 3.82 1.25 14.22  25 10.35 3.47 1.42 14.22  34 7.18 3.38 1.25 13.23 
ENRTER  90 45.20 28.36 1.69 113.25  27 70.86 18.97 19.56 113.25  63 34.21 24.38 1.69 89.87 
UE  102 7.75 5.95 0.32 27.57  28 8.68 5.17 3.44 25.37  74 7.40 6.22 0.32 27.57 
AGRVAGDP  104 10.55 9.81 0.27 41.27  28 2.20 1.53 0.27 6.83  76 13.63 9.78 1.18 41.27 
ARBL  104 0.24 0.25 0.00 1.71  28 0.22 0.14 0.03 0.49  76 0.25 0.28 0.00 1.71 
TNTR  105 6.15 9.34 0.00 50.13  28 1.22 2.94 0.00 13.82  77 7.95 10.20 0.00 50.13 
HDI  102 0.71 0.16 0.35 0.95  28 0.88 0.05 0.76 0.95  74 0.65 0.14 0.35 0.85 
AGEDEP  104 58.25 16.49 34.88 111.59  28 50.63 4.82 36.60 58.15  76 61.05 18.32 34.88 111.59 
CORRUP  85 2.74 1.19 1.00 5.73  28 3.98 1.14 2.01 5.73  57 2.12 0.57 1.00 4.00 
LAW  63 3.96 1.30 1.79 6.00  28 4.97 0.98 1.86 6.00  35 3.15 0.91 1.79 5.00 
GOVSTA  63 7.21 0.78 5.55 9.28  28 7.15 0.70 5.81 8.86  35 7.25 0.84 5.55 9.28 
BUREAU  63 2.65 0.96 1.00 4.00  28 3.43 0.62 2.00 4.00  35 2.02 0.68 1.00 4.00 
EXCONF  63 9.98 1.19 5.92 12.00  28 10.27 1.09 7.33 12.00  35 9.75 1.23 5.92 12.00 
DEMAC  63 4.79 1.42 1.42 6.00  28 5.77 0.44 4.08 6.00  35 4.00 1.45 1.42 6.00 
ETHTEN   63 4.07 1.23 1.00 6.00   28 4.27 1.08 2.00 6.00   35 3.91 1.34 1.00 6.00 
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Table A6.4 : Leamer EBA Results-Developed countries, Dependent Variable: Gini Index 
Variables  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛  t-stat 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  t-stat Significance LB UB Robust?  
GDPCC -0.0006 -5.90 0.0005 8.06 21.3% -0.0010 0.0008 No 
DOMSFS -0.088 -2.44 0.227 3.20 45.6% -0.191 0.371 No 
DOMSPR -0.075 -2.36 0.228 7.86 47.1% -0.176 0.365 No 
DOMSBK -0.176 -4.03 0.187 2.38 8.8% -0.262 0.342 No 
LIQUID -0.219 -3.73 0.110 5.58 12.5% -0.335 0.156 No 
STMCAP -0.023 -2.28 0.200 10.03 78.0% -0.081 0.245 No 
STMVT -0.080 -2.02 0.129 3.30 51.3% -0.157 0.210 No 
GOVCONSGDP -1.757 -3.44 0.483 2.82 98.3% -2.757 0.883 No 
LAW -9.486 -4.40 2.370 1.15 86.7% -13.835 6.420 No 
SCHAVG -2.967 -8.37 0.436 1.88 93.1% -4.156 1.581 No 
LUD -0.363 -7.43 0.119 1.84 82.0% -0.459 0.406 No 
FEMLF -2.191 -3.47 1.199 2.59 85.8% -3.429 2.107 No 
POPG -6.410 -1.63 13.474 4.84 75.6% -14.117 21.574 No 
TNTR -2.433 -4.93 6.330 17.42 71.6% -3.401 8.544 No 
HDI -270.227 -10.58 20.891 0.46 35.7% -320.272 115.625 No 
TRDGDP -0.207 -6.52 0.031 2.56 28.9% -0.269 0.071 No 
AMIPPP -0.004 -3.20 0.002 1.21 46.6% -0.008 0.004 No 
ICTINV -43.939 -1.31 72.132 3.55 45.3% -109.795 128.916 No 
FERT -11.337 -3.22 35.584 5.11 40.9% -27.011 49.243 No 
EXCONF -4.730 -2.43 6.672 4.87 40.5% -10.095 12.166 No 
INFCPI -3.255 -1.34 9.177 7.06 48.9% -9.966 14.049 No 
REMMI -7.839 -5.37 4.832 3.80 28.1% -12.499 8.483 No 
FDIGDP -1.035 -2.44 0.579 3.57 38.7% -1.866 1.152 No 
BUREAU -13.356 -5.33 11.390 4.62 27.2% -23.120 16.226 No 
ENRTER -0.407 -4.45 0.452 2.30 18.8% -0.665 0.838 No 
POPURB -0.809 -5.03 0.824 3.02 15.9% -1.125 1.418 No 
AGEDEP -1.999 -3.71 1.237 2.39 19.5% -3.055 2.253 No 
TARRIF -2.847 -3.51 8.734 5.80 7.8% -4.971 11.688 No 
RIR -3.119 -2.58 2.588 3.31 17.1% -5.491 6.154 No 
UE -1.572 -3.64 4.028 3.64 24.9% -3.502 6.195 No 
FIXINV -1.294 -2.84 2.101 2.83 11.5% -2.186 3.557 No 
LIFEEX -3.824 -6.29 2.292 4.16 8.4% -5.318 4.112 No 
CORRUP -6.463 -2.73 6.788 1.76 10.4% -11.108 14.332 No 
GOVSTA -9.954 -3.66 13.334 4.61 14.4% -15.290 19.402 No 
DEMAC -24.003 -5.75 36.783 12.30 2.6% -37.220 46.796 No 
ARBL -31.712 -2.10 20.861 3.00 3.7% -61.324 44.564 No 
ETHTEN -4.280 -3.92 5.072 1.77 5.0% -9.229 10.696 No 
AGRVAGDP -4.201 -4.42 2.636 4.67 5.4% -6.066 4.285 No 
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Table A6.5 : Sala-i-Martin EBA Results- Developed countries, Dependent Variable: Gini Index 
Variables  
Unweighted  Weighted    
 Coef t-stat CDF(0) Coef t-stat CDF(0) Sign 
GDPCC -0.00004 -0.76 75.9% -0.00004 -0.74 75.3% - 
DOMSFS 0.050 1.76 95.0% 0.056 2.04 97.1% + 
DOMSPR 0.050 1.80 95.6% 0.055 2.06 97.3% + 
DOMSBK -0.002 -0.06 52.2% -0.001 -0.04 51.6% - 
LIQUID 0.002 0.07 52.7% 0.000 0.00 50.2% + 
STMCAP 0.057 2.58 99.4% 0.058 2.64 99.5% + 
STMVT 0.036 2.00 97.3% 0.039 2.31 98.6% + 
GOVCONSGDP -0.838 -4.05 100.0% -0.850 -4.17 100.0% - 
LAW -3.493 -3.44 100.0% -3.482 -3.49 100.0% - 
SCHAVG -0.918 -3.37 99.9% -0.938 -3.56 100.0% - 
LUD -0.093 -3.01 99.7% -0.090 -2.89 99.6% - 
FEMLF -0.747 -2.88 99.7% -0.721 -2.86 99.7% - 
POPG 4.669 2.59 99.4% 4.599 2.63 99.4% + 
TNTR 0.700 2.19 97.4% 0.771 2.59 98.8% + 
HDI -46.259 -1.88 96.5% -50.417 -2.13 97.9% - 
TRDGDP -0.032 -1.80 96.0% -0.040 -2.28 98.6% - 
AMIPPP -0.002 -1.72 95.3% -0.002 -1.71 95.2% - 
ICTINV 16.900 1.74 95.1% 17.709 1.90 96.3% + 
FERT 5.767 1.70 95.0% 5.824 1.76 95.5% + 
EXCONF -1.308 -1.55 93.0% -1.203 -1.49 92.2% - 
INFCPI 1.107 1.64 91.1% 1.121 1.68 91.4% + 
REMMI -1.329 -1.25 88.4% -1.335 -1.31 89.3% - 
FDIGDP 0.094 1.33 86.8% 0.107 1.49 89.8% + 
BUREAU -2.028 -1.08 85.1% -1.765 -0.97 82.4% - 
ENRTER -0.058 -1.05 84.1% -0.059 -1.10 84.8% - 
POPURB 0.096 1.03 83.8% 0.102 1.17 86.8% + 
AGEDEP 0.161 0.87 79.8% 0.211 1.24 88.1% + 
TARRIF 0.760 0.82 77.9% 0.827 0.92 80.2% + 
RIR -0.427 -0.78 76.6% -0.380 -0.78 76.5% - 
UE 0.165 0.90 76.5% 0.182 1.01 79.0% + 
FIXINV -0.144 -0.64 73.1% -0.169 -0.78 77.1% - 
LIFEEX -0.266 -0.48 68.0% -0.291 -0.55 70.2% - 
CORRUP -0.604 -0.45 66.6% -0.401 -0.32 61.8% - 
GOVSTA 0.661 0.43 66.0% 0.668 0.44 66.3% + 
DEMAC -1.145 -0.35 62.6% -0.762 -0.24 58.7% - 
ARBL -1.881 -0.27 60.2% -0.816 -0.12 54.7% - 
ETHTEN 0.117 0.14 55.2% 0.109 0.13 55.0% + 
AGRVAGDP -0.025 -0.04 51.4% -0.067 -0.11 54.1% - 
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Table A6.6: Leamer EBA Results-Developing countries, Dependent Variable: Gini Index 
  
Variables  𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛 t-stat 𝛽𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  t-stat Significance LB UB Robust?  
GDPCC -0.002 -3.13 0.003 7.28 14.8% -0.003 0.004 No 
DOMSFS -0.009 -0.28 0.177 4.45 6.6% -0.117 0.287 No 
DOMSPR -0.005 -0.17 0.167 4.40 7.0% -0.112 0.277 No 
DOMSBK -0.087 -2.49 0.197 3.14 4.3% -0.160 0.426 No 
LIQUID -0.158 -2.46 0.088 2.76 2.7% -0.283 0.159 No 
STMCAP -0.003 -0.09 0.156 5.53 97.3% -0.095 0.211 No 
STMVT -0.011 -0.10 0.240 2.06 16.8% -0.222 0.469 No 
LAW -8.729 -4.54 6.075 2.40 98.5% -15.272 11.027 No 
REMMI -1.696 -6.04 0.063 0.25 81.0% -2.526 1.167 No 
TRDGDP -0.170 -5.07 0.036 1.15 70.9% -0.240 0.155 No 
POPURB -0.153 -1.33 0.530 5.50 65.8% -0.485 0.754 No 
LUD -0.463 -3.07 0.351 2.09 65.0% -0.868 0.742 No 
AGRVAGDP -2.040 -3.38 0.236 1.66 35.1% -5.340 1.268 No 
ICTINV -4.378 -0.84 20.872 6.97 34.6% -21.996 32.851 No 
POPG -6.887 -1.72 8.906 4.92 36.0% -14.755 13.228 No 
ENRTER -0.675 -6.22 0.485 3.65 47.1% -0.887 0.925 No 
RIR -0.242 -0.79 0.773 4.99 24.4% -0.847 1.104 No 
ARBL -31.185 -5.30 18.266 2.10 31.8% -56.317 35.309 No 
DEMAC -5.537 -3.17 7.001 2.92 10.6% -9.232 16.965 No 
HDI -236.444 -10.37 71.937 2.39 19.1% -324.519 130.886 No 
GOVCONSGDP -0.586 -1.97 2.216 3.72 8.2% -1.518 4.132 No 
SCHAVG -4.663 -4.25 1.742 2.43 9.3% -6.812 3.897 No 
CORRUP -6.194 -2.23 10.986 2.06 1.2% -16.741 24.511 No 
TARRIF -1.528 -1.33 2.747 4.12 10.6% -3.786 4.831 No 
FERT -6.154 -2.57 21.065 2.83 18.7% -14.989 35.664 No 
AGEDEP -0.687 -1.63 0.809 3.57 17.5% -1.580 1.413 No 
LIFEEX -1.570 -5.00 1.045 2.39 6.0% -2.712 1.977 No 
EXCONF -4.879 -3.11 5.846 3.34 4.9% -13.367 11.530 No 
FIXINV -1.763 -4.32 0.884 1.53 9.9% -2.980 2.013 No 
FEMLF -0.866 -1.91 1.204 2.03 7.9% -2.215 2.366 No 
AMIPPP -0.010 -2.06 0.017 2.88 6.9% -0.020 0.031 No 
FDIGDP -3.246 -1.13 1.437 1.61 3.7% -8.891 3.604 No 
UE -0.438 -1.81 0.886 5.72 1.8% -1.146 1.710 No 
INFCPI -1.101 -2.91 2.284 3.28 18.1% -2.035 4.161 No 
TNTR -1.169 -1.89 2.672 1.93 28.0% -2.380 5.392 No 
GOVSTA -8.859 -3.42 7.376 3.66 0.9% -13.937 14.568 No 
ETHTEN -3.770 -2.65 2.610 2.18 1.9% -6.553 5.727 No 
BUREAU -9.161 -2.20 7.705 1.63 0.2% -18.497 16.986 No 
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Table A6.7: Sala-i-Martin EBA Results-Developing countries, Dependent Variable: Gini Index 
Variables  
Unweighted  Weighted    
 𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0) 𝛽𝛽 t-stat CDF(0) Sign  
GDPCC 0.00004 0.12 54.5% 0.0002 0.52 68.9% + 
DOMSFS 0.047 1.16 87.3% 0.056 1.38 91.1% + 
DOMSPR 0.048 1.21 88.4% 0.056 1.41 91.6% + 
DOMSBK 0.019 0.63 72.4% 0.029 0.90 80.1% + 
LIQUID -0.022 -0.69 74.8% -0.018 -0.53 69.7% - 
STMCAP 0.092 4.43 100.0% 0.094 4.79 100.0% + 
STMVT 0.090 1.51 92.4% 0.094 1.57 92.9% + 
LAW -6.152 -4.25 100.0% -6.072 -4.21 100.0% - 
REMMI -0.556 -2.48 98.8% -0.622 -2.67 99.4% - 
TRDGDP -0.054 -2.35 98.8% -0.056 -2.45 99.1% - 
POPURB 0.155 2.15 98.2% 0.165 2.17 98.3% + 
LUD -0.209 -2.05 97.7% -0.205 -2.11 97.9% - 
AGRVAGDP -0.489 -1.81 95.3% -0.617 -2.04 97.4% - 
ICTINV 7.532 1.70 95.0% 8.733 2.07 97.7% + 
POPG 2.409 1.71 94.9% 2.729 1.92 96.7% + 
ENRTER -0.137 -1.67 94.3% -0.150 -1.83 95.7% - 
RIR 0.232 1.46 92.0% 0.262 1.64 94.3% + 
ARBL -4.853 -1.31 89.4% -4.850 -1.36 90.0% - 
DEMAC 1.447 1.15 86.4% 1.351 1.04 83.6% + 
HDI -25.190 -1.18 85.6% -42.971 -1.73 94.1% - 
GOVCONSGDP 0.390 0.92 80.6% 0.567 1.23 88.0% + 
SCHAVG -0.612 -0.89 79.8% -0.815 -1.16 86.2% - 
CORRUP 2.188 0.83 79.0% 1.891 0.70 75.2% + 
TARRIF 0.408 0.86 79.0% 0.459 0.91 80.7% + 
FERT 1.295 0.88 78.7% 2.028 1.25 87.0% + 
AGEDEP 0.086 0.86 78.1% 0.105 0.97 80.8% + 
LIFEEX -0.294 -0.83 77.9% -0.353 -0.98 82.0% - 
EXCONF 0.919 0.78 77.1% 1.020 0.82 77.9% + 
FIXINV 0.095 0.62 71.5% 0.119 0.74 74.9% + 
FEMLF 0.091 0.59 70.4% 0.088 0.51 68.1% + 
AMIPPP 0.001 0.60 69.9% 0.002 0.78 74.3% + 
FDIGDP -0.155 -0.64 68.3% -0.162 -0.63 67.4% - 
UE 0.164 0.49 68.1% 0.205 0.63 72.7% + 
INFCPI -0.123 -0.43 65.3% -0.021 -0.07 52.5% - 
TNTR -0.077 -0.41 63.6% 0.018 0.08 52.8% - 
GOVSTA 0.344 0.21 58.2% 0.323 0.20 57.5% + 
ETHTEN 0.104 0.11 54.3% -0.034 -0.04 51.4% + 
BUREAU -0.182 -0.08 53.0% 0.018 0.01 50.3% - 
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Chapter Seven 
Nonlinearity in the Financialisation-Growth and Financialisation- 
Inequality Nexus  
7.1 Introduction 
The nonlinearity of interaction between financial and real variables provides one of the most 
prominent modern economic complexities that represent a top priority on the research agenda 
(Carré and L’œillet, 2018). The vast literature on financial and economic development 
produces several inconsistencies in the real effect of financial development on economic 
growth and income inequality. However, the new literature, in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, suggests that the marginal contribution of finance could be insignificant or 
negative when the size of the financial sector (measured by the ratio of credit to private sector 
to GDP) exceeds a certain threshold—about 100 per cent according to Arcand et al. (2015b).73 
In particular, many studies argue that the finance-growth relationship is subject to diminishing 
marginal returns as the financial sector grows (Feyen et al., 2011; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 
2012; Arcand et al., 2015b; Cournède and Denk, 2015b). 
 
The literature review presented in chapters two and three reveals much evidence for the non-
monotonicity of the finance-growth and finance-inequality relationships. Several explanations 
have been provided for the nonlinearity of these relationships, pertaining to aspects of the 
financial sector or the host economy. First is a fundamental change in the relationship 
(transmission channels) between finance and the real economy (Arcand et al., 2015b; Gründler, 
2018). Second is the structure of the financial sector (bank-based vs market-based) (Rioja and 
 
73 The new literature was introduced in chapter 2. 
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Valev, 2004b; Kim and Lin, 2011; Rioja and Valev, 2012, 2014; Benczúr et al., 2018; Brei et 
al., 2018). Third is the composition of finance, including the type of finance provided 
(household credit vs business credit and consumption loans vs investment loans) (Beck et al., 
2012; Cournède and Denk, 2015b); and the type of financial activity (intermediation vs non-
intermediation activities) (Beck et al., 2014b). Fourth is the relative growth of the financial and 
real sectors (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Ductor and Grechyna, 2015).  
 
Other explanations suggest that the significance and nonlinearity of the relationships among 
finance, economic growth and income inequality is conditional upon characteristics of the 
economy such as such the country’s level of income (economic development) (De Gregorio 
and Guidotti, 1995; Deidda and Fattouh, 2002; Rioja and Valev, 2004a, 2014; Baiardi and 
Morana, 2018), adequacy of regulatory frameworks (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011), inflation 
(Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002), and the level of institutional quality (Law and Singh, 2014; 
Law et al., 2014).74 
 
The nonlinearity hypothesis suggests that interaction between finance and economic growth 
(income inequality) takes the form of an inverted U-shaped or U-shaped curve. The inverted 
U-shaped curve is a depiction of the financial Kuznets curve (FKC), whereby 
financialisation—the increase in the size of the financial sector—has negative effects on the 
real economy beyond a certain threshold. Two versions of the financial Kuznets curve exist, 
which is a graphical representation of economic growth or income inequality as a function of 
financialisation (Nikoloski, 2012; Shahbaz et al., 2015; Baiardi and Morana, 2016; Moosa, 
2016). While there is limited evidence of the existence of the FKC, the validity of the 
hypothesis motivates the following question: what is the optimal size of the financial sector? 
 
74 A full discussion of these explanations is provided in chapter three, sections 3.4 and 3.8.  
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The objective of this chapter is to examine the validity of the nonlinearity hypothesis, for the 
finance-growth and finance-inequality relationships, using the variable addition test and non-
nested model selection tests. Subsequently, the two variants of the financial Kuznets curve will 
be estimated using the Phillips-Hansen fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and the unobserved 
components model (UCM). The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The countries and 
data are described in section 7.2. A mathematical exposition of the financial Kuznets curve is 
provided in section 7.3. The empirical methodology and estimation procedures are illustrated 
in section 7.4. The finance-growth and finance-inequality results and discussion are presented 
in sections 7.5 and 7.6, respectively. A graphical presentation of the FKC is exhibited in section 
7.7. Some concluding remarks are provided in section 7.8. 
  
7.2 Data Description  
The literature review presented in chapter 3 suggests that the impact of financialisation is more 
evident in developed countries and that it is affected by the structure of the financial sector. 
Therefore, annual data for 20 developed and developing countries have been collected for the 
period 1980 to 2015. The developed countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The developing countries are Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa 
and Thailand. These countries have been selected based on the availability of data. The choice 
of the sample period is consistent with the proposition that the financialisation era started in 
the 1980s (Palley, 2013; Sawyer, 2013; Davis, 2016; Storm, 2018).  
 
The empirical strategy for this chapter is to investigate the effect of financialisation on 
economic growth and income inequality separately, using time series data for each country. 
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The proxy for economic growth is real GDP per capita (GDPCC), which is the classical choice 
of the finance-growth literature for time-series studies (for example, King and Levine, 1993a; 
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Luintel and Khan, 1999; Demetriades and Rousseau, 2016). 
Real GDP per capita is obtained from the World Bank Development indicators database (WDI). 
The proxy for income inequality is the Gini index (GINI), which is obtained from the global 
consumption and income project database (GCIP) created by Lahoti et al. (2016).75 Consistent 
with the previous chapters, credit to the private sector (DOMSPR) and stock market 
capitalisation (STMCAP) are used as proxies for financialisation, and to account for the effect 
of financial structure.76 The individual countries’ variable correlations and descriptive statistics 
can be found in Tables A7.1 and A7.2, in the appendix to this chapter. 
 
7.3 A Mathematical Exposition of the Financial Kuznets Curve 
The financial Kuznets curve can be represented as a quadratic equation that takes the following 
form 
𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  β1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + β2𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡2                                                                 (7.1) 
where Z can be either income inequality or income per capita and 𝑓𝑓 is a proxy for 
financialisation. This form of FKC can be reached by combining two functional relations 
representing the effect of financialisation on income per capita and the Kuznets curve (KC). 
To start, the original Kuznets curve provides an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
income inequality and income per capita. This is represented by the following equation   
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 =  𝛿𝛿0 +  𝛿𝛿1𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿𝛿2𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡2                       𝛿𝛿1 > 0, 𝛿𝛿2 < 0            (7.2)  
where 𝑉𝑉 is income inequality and 𝑦𝑦 is income per capita. The inverted U-shaped relationship 
implies a positive coefficient of the linear term and a negative coefficient of the quadratic term. 
 
75 The Gini index was introduced in chapter six, section 6.2. 
76 Measures of financialisation were introduced in chapter five, section 5.2. 
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In addition, the literature reveals a significant effect of financialisation on growth but remains 
equivocal about the sign of the effect, which gives  
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 =  𝛾𝛾0 +  𝛾𝛾1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡                         𝛾𝛾1 ≷ 0                                            (7.3) 
 
By substituting (7.3) in (7.2), the following equation is obtained: 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 =  𝛿𝛿0 +  𝛿𝛿1(𝛾𝛾0 + γ1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) +  𝛿𝛿2(𝛾𝛾0 +  γ1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡)2                                       (7.4) 
 
By expanding and rearranging equation (7.4), we obtain 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 =  (𝛿𝛿0 +  𝛿𝛿1𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛿𝛿2𝛾𝛾02) + ( 𝛿𝛿1γ1 + 2𝛿𝛿2 𝛾𝛾0 γ1)𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + (𝛿𝛿2 𝛾𝛾12)𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡2           (7.5) 
 
By simplifying equation (7.5), the financial Kuznets curve (FKC) is obtained such that 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  β1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 +  β2𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡2                                                                 (7.6) 
where 𝛽𝛽0, β1, β2 are coefficients equal to (𝛿𝛿0 +  𝛿𝛿1𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛿𝛿2𝛾𝛾02), ( 𝛿𝛿1γ1 + 2𝛿𝛿2 𝛾𝛾0 γ1) and (𝛿𝛿2 𝛾𝛾12), respectively (their correspondent values in equation (7.5)). This equation suggests 
that the effect of financialisation on income inequality may be positive or negative, depending 
on the sign of the coefficient of the quadratic term, 𝛿𝛿2, in the Kuznets curve (equation 7.2). 
Hence, if 𝛿𝛿2 is significant and negative, then the Kuznets curve relationship holds and the 
coefficient of the quadratic term in the FKC—β2 (equation 7.6)—will also be negative 
(inverted U-shaped curve), which means that an increase in the level of financialisation reduces 
income inequality after a certain threshold has been reached. Otherwise, if 𝛿𝛿2 is significant and 
positive, then the Kuznets curve relationship does not hold and the coefficient on the quadratic 
term in the FKC, β2 , will also be positive (U-shaped curve), which suggests that an increase 
in the financialisation level above a certain threshold will lead to a rise in income inequality. 
Moreover, it could be that the coefficient of the quadratic term in the FKC equation, β2 , is 
insignificant. In this case, it might be that the country has not reached a turning point on the 
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inverted U-shaped or U-shaped curve. Therefore, the results can be explained in terms of where 
the country lies on the curve. For instance, countries with negative linear coefficient lie on the 
downward (falling) sector of the curve while countries with a positive linear coefficient are lie 
on the upward (rising) sector of the curve.  
 
7.4 The Empirical Model and Estimation Procedures 
The empirical analysis of this chapter commences by examining the validity of the nonlinearity 
hypothesis (quadratic vs linear), for the finance-growth and finance-inequality relationships. 
First, the variable addition test is used to determine the significance of adding the quadratic 
term to the linear equation, following equations (4.9) and (4.10) in chapter 4. Three test 
statistics will be used to judge the significance of adding the nonlinear restriction. These are 
the Lagrange-Multiplier test (LM), the likelihood ratio test (LR) and the F test (F). The first two 
test statistics are distributed as 𝜒𝜒2(1), while the F test is distributed as F(33,1). The results of 
the variable addition test will be supplemented by using the Z test to check the significance of 
the difference between the two R2s (linear vs quadratic models). In addition, the Z test is used 
to examine explanatory power for models of the higher-order polynomial—up to the sixth 
degree. Similarly, non-nested model selection tests are used to run the linear specification (M1) 
against the quadratic specification (M2) and vice versa, as given by equations (4.17) and (4.18) 
in chapter 4. As described in chapter 4, sub-section 4.8.2, six tests will be used for this purpose.   
 
Next, the financial Kuznets curve (equation (7.1)) will be estimated using the FMOLS and the 
unobserved components model (UCM). The Phillips-Hansen FMOLS is preferred to OLS as it 
corrects for simultaneity bias, non-normality and serial correlation when the regressors are 
integrated. This is because the FMOLS produces standard errors that follow asymptotic normal 
distribution—when the variables are integrated—whereas OLS does not. Therefore, the 
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FMOLS provides valid t-statistics that can be used to derive inference on the significance of 
the estimated coefficients. The UCM is a type of structural time-series model that is estimated 
in a state-space form with the Kalman filter. A major advantage of introducing unobserved 
components is that they account for missing variables without the need to include them 
explicitly in the model, thereby avoiding omitted variables bias. Recalling equation    (4. 19) 
from chapter 4, the growth equation comprises trend, cycle and explanatory variables 
(financialisation) as follows 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 =  𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 +  ψ𝑡𝑡 + β1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 +  β2𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡                                                    (7.7) 
where y is the real GDP per capita, 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡, and ψ𝑡𝑡 represent trend and cyclical components, 
respectively, 𝑓𝑓 is the financialisation variable, and  𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 is the irregular component.  Similarly, 
the income inequality equation comprises trend and explanatory variables (financialisation) as 
follows 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 =  𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 +  β1𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 +  β2𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡                                                    (7.8) 
where I is the Gini index.77 The specification of the trend and cycle were introduced in the 
methodology chapter, subsection 4.8.4.  
 
7.5 The Finance-Growth Results and Discussion  
In this section, the results of the empirical time series analysis are presented and discussed for 
each country. The validity of the nonlinearity hypothesis between financialisation and 
economic growth is tested using the variable addition test and the non-nested model selection 
tests. Subsequently, the growth version of the financial Kuznets curve (FKC) is estimated using 
the Phillips-Hansen (1990) fully modified OLS and the unobserved components model 
developed by Harvey (1989). 
 
 
77 Cyclical behaviour is not observed in a graphical presentation of the Gini index time series. 
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7.5.1 Evidence on the Nonlinearity of the Finance-Growth Relationship 
The empirical examination of the nonlinearity hypothesis starts with the variable addition test 
to find out whether the introduction of a nonlinear (quadratic) term to the linear model improves 
the specification, as represented by equations 4.9 and 4.10 (chapter 4, sub-section 4.8.1). Three 
test statistics, which are presented in Table 7.1, are used to judge the significance of introducing 
the quadratic term to the linear model. Two measures of financialisation are used, the ratio of 
private credit to GDP and the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP. The three variable 
addition test statistics are the Lagrange-Multiplier test (LM) and the likelihood ratio test (LR), 
which are distributed as 𝜒𝜒2(1), and an F test statistic that is distributed as F(33,1). If the results 
of these tests are significant, it means that the quadratic model specification is superior to the 
linear model specification. Hence, it is considered as evidence of the existence of nonlinearity 
between financialisation and growth. However, the significance of the quadratic term does 
necessarily imply support for the FKC. Evidence for the FKC also requires the coefficient on 
the quadratic term to be negative.  
 
The results support the nonlinearity hypothesis for 15 out of 20 countries when using private 
credit to GDP as a measure of financialisation, and for 14 out of 20 countries when using stock 
market capitalisation to GDP. Hence, except for few countries, the results provide strong 
support for the nonlinearity hypothesis and in turn for the existence of the financial Kuznets 
curve, between financialisation and economic growth. 
 
Moreover, similar to the widely recognised environmental Kuznets curve, the significance of 
the quadratic function (U- or inverted U-shaped curve) suggest that a cubic function (N-shaped 
curve) or even a higher-order polynomial function may provide a better fit for the relationship 
(between finance and economic growth) as measured by the R2. The null hypothesis of the Z 
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test is that there is no significant difference between the two R2. Under model 2, the quadratic 
model R2 is tested against the linear model R2, while for the rest of the models the n-order 
model R2 is tested against the quadratic model R2.   
 
Table 7.1: Results of the Variable Addition Test, Quadratic vs Linear (GDPCC) 
   
Private Credit/GDP 
(DOMSPR) 
 Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP 
(STMCAP) 
Country   LM  LR F  LM  LR F 
Australia  8.03*** 9.09*** 9.48***  4.12** 4.38** 4.27** 
Austria  1.8 1.9 1.79  19*** 27.4*** 37.6*** 
Belgium  26.5*** 48.3*** 93.3***  7.87*** 8.89*** 9.24*** 
Brazil  3.93* 4.16* 4.04*  1.86 1.91 1.8 
Denmark  0.102 0.102 0.935  9.19*** 10.6*** 11.3*** 
France  1.13 1.15 1.07  22.2*** 34.6*** 53.5*** 
Germany  3.83* 4.05* 3.93*  14.9*** 19.2*** 23.3*** 
Greece  23.3*** 37.5*** 60.5***  22.2*** 34.5*** 53.1*** 
India   2.62* 2.72* 2.59*  8.25*** 9.37*** 9.81*** 
Indonesia  12.8*** 15.9*** 18.3***  1.19 1.21 1.13 
Italy  20.8*** 31.2*** 45.6***  11.7*** 14.2*** 16*** 
Japan  13.4*** 16.9*** 19.7***  16.1*** 21.4*** 26.9*** 
Malaysia  7.34*** 8.2*** 8.45***  21.3*** 32.2*** 47.8*** 
Mexico   0.741 0.749 0.693  0.024 0.024 0.022 
South Africa  22.8*** 36.1*** 57.1***  19.9*** 29.1*** 41*** 
Spain  14.9*** 19.2*** 23.3***  13.7*** 17.3*** 20.4*** 
Thailand  9.01*** 10.3*** 11***  2.43 2.52 2.39 
Turkey  0.652 0.658 0.609  0.924 0.937 0.87 
UK  3.09* 3.23* 3.1*  2.04 2.1 1.98 
USA   9.94*** 11.6*** 12.5***  11.8*** 14.3*** 16.1*** 
The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significant statistics at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. LM is the Lagrange-
Multiplier test, LR is the likelihood ratio test, and F is the F test. 
 
The results of the Z test, which are displayed in Table 7.2, show little support for the findings 
of the variable addition test as only a few cases are significant under model 2. Moreover, the 
significance of higher-order models, for some countries, suggests the existence of multiple 
turning points (thresholds) of the curve representing the relationship between finance and 
economic growth. 
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Table 7.2: The Z Statistics for Differences in Goodness of Fit, Polynomial vs Linear 
(GDPCC) 
  Private Credit/GDP (DOMSPR)  Stock Market Capitalisation /GDP (STMCAP) 
Country  2 3 4 5 6  2 3 4 5 6 
Australia  -0.52 -1.01 -1.04 -1.58 -1.64  -0.28 0.65 0.13 -0.02 -0.33 
Austria  -0.14 1.08 1.09 1.07 1.07  -1.77 0.29 -0.41 -0.92 -1.02 
Belgium  -3.23 -1.95 -2.55 -2.66 -2.73  -0.57 0.52 0.04 0.00 -0.01 
Brazil  -0.45 -1.37 -2.71 -2.73 -3.53  -0.13 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.06 
Denmark  0.00 -2.20 -2.26 -2.26 -2.33  -0.65 1.22 0.66 0.59 0.59 
France  -0.09 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.26  -2.05 0.10 -0.19 -0.20 -0.25 
Germany  -0.39 -1.04 -1.05 -1.07 -1.28  -1.25 0.41 0.30 0.30 0.12 
Greece  -2.63 -5.57 -5.57 -5.60 -5.61  -2.36 -1.38 -1.38 -1.70 -1.80 
India  -0.16 -1.06 -1.43 -1.46 -1.72  -0.61 -0.43 -0.65 -0.97 -1.05 
Indonesia  -1.47 -3.47 -4.91 -5.86 -6.92  -0.07 0.84 0.81 0.79 0.58 
Italy  -2.15 -0.52 -1.03 -1.07 -1.09  -0.98 -1.92 -2.02 -2.09 -2.83 
Japan  -1.39 -3.50 -4.38 -4.39 -4.40  -1.79 -0.44 -0.90 -0.91 -0.93 
Malaysia  -0.66 0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.03  -2.49 -1.20 -1.26 -1.31 -1.32 
Mexico  -0.07 0.69 0.65 0.65 0.64  0.00 1.30 0.89 0.69 0.57 
South Africa  -2.68 -3.11 -3.53 -3.80 -3.80  -2.06 -3.49 -3.53 -3.78 -3.88 
Spain  -1.24 -2.74 -2.90 -3.68 -3.74  -1.00 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.20 
Thailand  -0.71 1.84 1.68 1.64 1.62  -0.16 1.78 1.54 1.54 1.54 
Turkey  -0.04 -1.38 -1.44 -1.65 -1.90  -0.06 1.24 1.21 1.18 1.16 
UK  -0.20 -0.94 -0.99 -1.03 -1.02  -0.15 0.86 0.77 0.77 0.77 
USA  -0.67 0.85 0.76 0.76 0.76  -0.87 1.27 1.14 1.13 1.11 
Numbers in bold type are significant test statistics at 5% level or below. The numbers 2, 3, 4, 
5, and 6 refer to the order of the polynomial function. 
 
The last empirical exercise in examining the functional form is to run non-nested model 
selection tests to find out the relative importance of the linear and quadratic functions as 
specified by equations 4.17 and 4.18 in chapter 4, respectively. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 display the   
statistics of six non-nested model selection tests. The linear model (M1) is tested against the  
quadratic model (M2), and vice versa. When testing M1 against M2, a significant test statistic 
implies that M2 is preferred to M1 if the test statistics of M2 against M1 are insignificant, and 
vice versa. However, when the test statistics for M1 against M2 and M2 against M1 are both 
significant (or both insignificant), then this suggests that both models are misspecified. 
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Following this premise, the results suggest that both models are rejected, which implies that 
the preferred model specification should include both linear and quadratic terms. 
 
7.5.2 Estimation of the Growth Financial Kuznets Curve  
Having established evidence for nonlinearity in the finance-growth nexus for most of the 
countries, the next step is to estimate the growth version of the financial Kuznets curve using 
the Phillips-Hansen fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and the unobserved components model 
(UCM). The UCM accounts for missing variables, without the need for them to appear 
explicitly in the model, by including a stochastic trend and cyclical components as specified in 
sub-section 4.8.4 in chapter 4. The UCM is estimated in a time-varying parametric (TVP) 
framework, and the time variation process of the coefficients is modelled as a random walk.78 
Sturn and Zwickl (2016) argue that in conventional multiple regression model, a slight change 
to model specification, by means of inclusion and exclusion of other explanatory variables, 
changes the results considerably. Therefore, the use of UCM is useful for the purpose of 
addressing this issue without compromising the explanatory power of the model.  
 
78 It is noteworthy that the time variation process of the coefficients can also be modelled as smooth spline or 
return to normality. For more details, see Koopman et al. (2009). 
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Table 7.3: Results of the Non-Nested Models Selection Tests, Private Credit/GDP (Dependent Variable: GDPCC) 
  M1 vs M2  M2 vs M1 
Country  N NT W J JA EN  N NT W J JA EN 
Australia  -3.75 -3.64 -2.76 3.08 3.08 9.48  -7.94 -7.71 -4.31 6.20 6.20 38.39 
Austria  1.34 1.29 1.31 -1.33 -1.33 1.79  -1.68 -1.61 -1.59 1.65 1.65 2.71 
Belgium  4.47 4.28 4.65 -9.66 -9.66 93.35  -6.23 -5.87 -5.37 10.83 10.83 117.20 
Brazil  -8.09 -0.44 -0.44 2.01 2.01 4.05  1.10 0.57 0.58 -1.94 -1.94 3.79 
Denmark  0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.94  -1.26 -1.21 -1.16 1.18 1.18 1.38 
France  1.05 1.00 1.01 -1.03 -1.03 1.07  -1.26 -1.19 -1.18 1.22 1.22 1.49 
Germany  1.90 1.71 1.73 -1.98 -1.98 3.93  -2.12 -1.87 -1.86 2.11 2.11 4.44 
Greece  4.12 3.92 4.25 -7.78 -7.78 60.55  -6.06 -5.64 -5.16 8.83 8.83 77.88 
India  -1.74 -1.68 -1.57 1.61 1.61 2.60  0.11 0.11 0.11 -0.10 -0.10 0.01 
Indonesia  2.72 2.18 2.22 -4.28 -4.28 18.39  -5.46 -2.99 -2.94 4.51 4.51 20.37 
Italy  4.19 4.01 4.23 -6.75 -6.75 45.61  -5.21 -4.94 -4.67 7.40 7.40 54.76 
Japan  3.42 3.17 3.25 -4.44 -4.44 19.78  -4.12 -3.75 -3.65 4.74 4.74 22.45 
Malaysia  2.45 2.33 2.44 -2.90 -2.90 8.45  -3.60 -3.33 -3.15 3.59 3.59 12.88 
Mexico  0.84 0.80 0.80 -0.83 -0.83 0.69  -1.30 -1.18 -1.16 1.23 1.23 1.52 
South Africa  -5.49 -5.11 -4.80 7.56 7.56 57.18  4.06 3.86 4.09 -6.83 -6.83 46.70 
Spain  3.47 3.35 3.65 -4.83 -4.83 23.33  -4.90 -4.71 -4.26 5.93 5.93 35.15 
Thailand  2.65 2.56 2.79 -3.31 -3.31 11.01  -4.46 -4.25 -3.78 4.63 4.63 21.40 
Turkey  0.78 0.76 0.78 -0.78 -0.78 0.61  -2.60 -2.50 -2.26 2.39 2.39 5.73 
UK  1.55 1.51 1.69 -1.76 -1.76 3.11  -5.69 -5.48 -4.03 5.11 5.11 26.15 
USA  2.64 2.57 3.05 -3.54 -3.54 12.58  -6.24 -6.06 -4.45 6.69 6.69 44.76 
Numbers in bold type are significant test statistics at 5% level or below. N, NT, W, J, JA, EN are the non-nested model selection tests described in subsection 4.8.2, in chapter 
4.  
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Table 7.4: Results of the Non-Nested Models Selection Tests, Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP (Dependent Variable: GDPCC) 
  M1 vs M2  M2 vs M1 
Country  N NT W J JA EN  N NT W J JA EN 
Australia  1.81 1.76 1.93 -2.06 -2.06 4.28  -4.40 -4.22 -3.52 4.14 4.14 17.14 
Austria  3.24 3.14 3.83 -6.13 -6.13 37.65  -8.34 -7.84 -5.81 9.58 9.58 91.81 
Belgium  2.37 2.30 2.64 -3.04 -3.04 9.25  -5.61 -5.38 -4.25 5.53 5.53 30.62 
Brazil  1.24 1.21 1.30 -1.34 -1.34 1.81  -4.42 -4.20 -3.44 3.81 3.81 14.54 
Denmark  2.54 2.46 2.88 -3.36 -3.36 11.31  -6.02 -5.80 -4.42 6.17 6.17 38.06 
France  3.51 3.41 4.41 -7.31 -7.31 53.52  -8.86 -8.53 -5.62 12.51 12.51 156.50 
Germany  3.15 3.05 3.54 -4.83 -4.83 23.35  -6.24 -5.94 -4.83 7.05 7.05 49.68 
Greece  3.46 3.33 3.89 -7.29 -7.29 53.16  -8.08 -7.36 -6.03 9.71 9.71 94.29 
India  2.35 2.28 2.66 -3.13 -3.13 9.81  -6.47 -6.16 -4.63 6.13 6.13 37.61 
Indonesia  -1.20 -1.15 -1.06 1.06 1.06 1.13  -3.18 -3.07 -2.48 2.65 2.65 7.00 
Italy  2.93 2.83 3.14 -4.00 -4.00 16.02  -5.15 -4.88 -4.25 5.50 5.50 30.26 
Japan  3.28 2.99 3.12 -5.18 -5.18 26.92  -5.50 -4.51 -4.30 5.73 5.73 32.82 
Malaysia  3.51 3.26 3.50 -6.91 -6.91 47.87  -7.00 -5.76 -5.34 7.81 7.81 61.06 
Mexico  -0.16 -0.13 -0.13 0.15 0.15 0.02  -1.65 -1.55 -1.45 1.48 1.48 2.19 
South Africa  -5.43 -5.15 -4.55 6.41 6.41 41.07  3.41 3.28 3.63 -5.07 -5.07 25.80 
Spain  2.87 2.79 3.55 -4.51 -4.51 20.40  -10.00 -9.70 -5.39 11.21 11.21 125.60 
Thailand  1.40 1.36 1.49 -1.54 -1.54 2.40  -4.92 -4.71 -3.69 4.35 4.35 18.94 
Turkey  0.90 0.88 0.93 -0.93 -0.93 0.87  -3.72 -3.55 -2.99 3.26 3.26 10.61 
UK  1.31 1.27 1.36 -1.40 -1.40 1.99  -3.79 -3.61 -3.09 3.40 3.40 11.53 
USA  2.96 2.87 3.27 -4.01 -4.01 16.10  -5.36 -5.17 -4.29 5.97 5.97 35.66 
Numbers in bold type are significant test statistics at 5% level or below. N, NT, W, J, JA, EN are the non-nested model selection tests described in subsection 4.8.2, in chapter 
4. 
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Table 7.5 presents the estimates of the FKC using FMOLS. Evidence for the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between financialisation and economic growth is supported in 12 cases using both 
measures of financialisation. Similarly, Tables 7.6 and 7.7 show the estimates of the FKC using 
the unobserved components model, which reveals evidence for the inverted U-shaped curve in 
14 and 13 countries when the proxies for financialisation are private credit to GDP and stock 
market capitalisation to GDP, respectively.  
 
Evidence for the inverted U-shaped curve is found in 17 of these countries, as revealed by the 
significantly negative coefficient of the quadratic term 𝛽𝛽2. The inverted U-shaped curve, which 
is a representation of the financial Kuznets curve, is considered as evidence for the 
financialisation hypothesis, which implies that expansion of the financial sector beyond a 
certain point exerts a negative effect on economic growth. The evidence obtained lends support 
to the earlier findings of Moosa (2016). The only exception is South Africa, which shows 
evidence for a U-shaped curve only when using private credit to GDP as a measure of 
financialisation. A U-shaped curve suggests a negative relationship between financialisation 
and economic growth at low levels of financialisation whereas it becomes positive after the 
turning point is surpassed. 
 
Evidence for the financial Kuznets curve (inverted U-shaped curve) is found for all countries 
except for Mexico and Turkey. A direct explanation would be that both countries have the 
lowest levels of financialisation across the sample countries. The lack of evidence of 
nonlinearity does not rule out the materialisation of the financial Kuznets curve in the future. 
Moosa (2018a) contends that these countries are still on the upward sector of the financial 
Kuznets curve, and the threshold is yet to be reached. 
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Table 7.5: The Phillips-Hansen FMOLS Estimates of the FKC (Dependent Variable: Real 
GDP per Capita) 
Panel A: Private Credit/GDP  
Country  𝛽𝛽0 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽0) 𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽1) 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽2) 𝑅𝑅2 
Australia  25454.33 2.51*** 474.73 5.24*** -1.08 -2.32** 0.99 
Austria  -101695 -0.67 2628.4 0.75 -11.58 -0.57 0.54 
Belgium  -16864.1 -3.08*** 2211.95 9.09*** -20 -8.28*** 0.84 
Brazil  6455.74 2.8*** 93.52 1.3 -0.68 -1.45 0.08 
Denmark  41490.83 8.11*** 75.86 0.55 0.12 0.19 0.71 
France  -75181.9 -0.47 2305.12 0.61 -11.59 -0.52 0.35 
Germany  -101128 -1.59 2810.44 2.07** -14.05 -1.96* 0.17 
Greece  6165.44 2.08** 513.17 4.95*** -3.14 -4.36*** 0.77 
India  135.53 0.22 6.85 0.18 0.38 0.77 0.91 
Indonesia  -1609.38 -1.26 253.67 3.21*** -3.46 -3.22*** 0.31 
Italy  -46706 -4.62*** 2221.47 7.34*** -14.56 -6.78*** 0.8 
Japan  -116444 -2.26** 1765.98 3*** -4.87 -2.93*** 0.36 
Malaysia  -13462.1 -1.86 343.18 2.51** -1.37 -2.19** 0.44 
Mexico  4423.68 1.48 337.62 1.12 -6.38 -0.9 0.24 
South Africa 12367.28 11.2*** -139.8 -6.42*** 0.71 7.13*** 0.7 
Spain  -14157.9 -1.79 649.27 4.33*** -2.29 -3.6*** 0.81 
Thailand  -2730.62 -1.35 106.62 2.52** -0.4 -1.92* 0.67 
Turkey  3271.59 1.38 232.82 1.45 -1.17 -0.56 0.75 
UK  15646.6 4.1*** 183.5 2.62** -0.22 -0.73 0.85 
USA  -1197.67 -0.21 396.17 4.95*** -0.69 -2.53** 0.97 
Panel B: Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP 
Country   𝛽𝛽0 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽0) 𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽1) 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽2) 𝑅𝑅2 
Australia  16460.82 3.42*** 489.43 3.66*** -1.63 -1.93* 0.73 
Austria  24555.01 11.96*** 1263.52 6.53*** -15.71 -4.36*** 0.81 
Belgium  22672.72 6.74*** 444.22 2.83** -2.1 -1.3 0.77 
Brazil  7884.14 29.52*** 65.46 3.18*** -0.26 -0.85 0.65 
Denmark  29129.47 7.63*** 825.06 3.53*** -5.28 -1.69 0.85 
France  24948.27 27.84*** 364.08 8.41*** -2.09 -5*** 0.94 
Germany  16538.58 4.91*** 1051.04 4.77*** -11.04 -3.47*** 0.78 
Greece  16895.55 31.56*** 343.97 10.98*** -2.67 -8.36*** 0.79 
India   279.3 2.54** 21.83 3.89*** -0.1 -1.87* 0.76 
Indonesia  1434.97 11.76*** 19.47 1.27 0.7 1.93 0.83 
Italy  18965.39 6.37*** 843.3 3.9*** -9.45 -2.93** 0.71 
Japan  -7598.19 -0.71 1271.97 4.43*** -7.7 -4.22*** 0.41 
Malaysia  -4022.64 -2.25** 155.55 6.06*** -0.47 -5.65*** 0.62 
Mexico   7683.65 20.46*** 31.45 0.72 0.27 0.25 0.48 
South Africa 8754.27 12.31*** -44.41 -4.72*** 0.17 5.79*** 0.71 
Spain  16234.37 24.56*** 269.78 8.03*** -1.13 -3.44*** 0.96 
Thailand  1415.55 3.18*** 59.64 2.69** -0.21 -0.89 0.75 
Turkey  5224.89 6.89*** 211.84 1.87* -0.28 -0.08 0.67 
UK  15950.43 2.42** 227.35 1.57 -0.44 -0.56 0.62 
USA   10738.04 1.72* 552.9 3.62*** -2.03 -2.48** 0.86 
The asterisks ***, **, * show significant statistics at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.6: Estimation Results of the Unobserved Components Model, Private Credit/GDP (Dependent Variable: GDPCC) 
Country 𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽1) 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽2) μt 𝐸𝐸(μt) φt 𝐸𝐸(φt) φ𝑡𝑡∗ 𝐸𝐸(φ𝑡𝑡∗) R2  N H(10) DW Q(4,2) 
Australia 627.29 3.82*** -1.95 -2.27** 5779.0 0.88 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.95  10.04 0.13 2.27 3.74 
Austria 934.34 23.00*** -4.39 -9.27*** 19.7 0.82 0.001 0.00 -0.002 0.00 0.99  14.19 1.71 0.96 8.32 
Belgium 620.04 6.41*** -3.00 -2.85*** 18245.2 8.82*** 0.002 0.00 0.004 0.00 0.95  15.04 0.11 1.80 5.68 
Brazil 262.29 27.63*** -1.38 -9.81*** 11.8 41.16*** -13.037 -0.17 22.22 0.29 0.16  8.81 0.41 2.07 6.77 
Denmark 341.47 2.17** -1.51 -1.87* 45610.6 12.94*** -0.003 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.65  5.13 0.28 1.12 6.15 
France 839.46 17.58*** -4.22 -8.41*** 19.1 19.06*** -0.005 0.00 0.006 0.00 0.98  5.32 1.75 0.98 15.16 
Germany 970.08 19.91*** -4.97 -7.91*** 18.6 14.73*** -0.005 0.00 0.062 0.01 0.97  12.40 3.41 1.32 8.95 
Greece 285.52 4.11*** -1.88 -3.60*** 14381.8 8.85*** -0.016 0.00 -0.030 -0.01 0.87  1.20 0.83 1.41 5.87 
India -2.68 -0.33 0.02 0.21 8458.8 8.34*** -6623.4 -6.49*** 4554.1 11.46*** 1.00  0.29 7.94 1.28 3.52 
Indonesia 92.28 9.68*** -0.60 -3.75*** 1142.7 7.96*** 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.96  16.15 2.90 1.44 1.70 
Italy 437.54 1.68 -3.13 -1.62 19640.1 2.41** -0.046 -0.01 0.044 0.01 0.94  4.24 0.84 0.79 8.88 
Japan 804.25 3.51*** -1.82 -2.65** -35356.6 -1.81* 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.97  19.62 5.53 2.00 3.57 
Malaysia 63.38 7.24*** -0.09 -1.59 4211.5 9.49*** 0.023 0.01 0.017 0.01 0.97  7.64 1.83 1.60 1.15 
Mexico 107.98 1.46 -0.83 -0.47 7120.1 11.71*** -7.604 -0.19 27.59 0.69 0.62  2.76 0.75 2.00 2.17 
South Africa -4.99 -0.34 0.05 0.82 7139.7 8.66*** 0.001 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.88  13.74 0.30 1.26 10.51 
Spain 273.23 4.77*** -0.90 -3.26*** 10731.3 3.36*** 0.006 0.00 0.016 0.01 0.98  0.48 0.55 0.76 9.82 
Thailand 59.87 6.51*** -0.17 -3.63*** 504.4 1.19 0.000 0.00 -0.001 0.00 0.97  0.41 3.05 1.44 5.39 
Turkey 244.17 2.55** -1.77 -1.35 5474.8 7.96*** -11.86 -0.25 -59.45 -1.26 0.81  2.48 1.43 1.48 2.73 
UK 267.57 9.09*** -0.74 -4.05*** 18929.7 20.56*** 177.16 2.17** -23.17 -0.30 0.98  3.64 0.37 1.35 4.04 
USA 526.51 21.39*** -1.33 -10.18*** 8.1 6.12*** -0.021 -0.01 0.005 0.00 0.96  13.88 0.60 0.63 3.84 
The asterisks ***, **, * show significant statistics at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. β1 is the coefficient of the linear term, β2 is the coefficient of the quadratic term, 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 is 
the trend component, φt is the cyclical component. N is the test statistic for normality. H is the test statistic for heteroscedasticity. DW is the Durbin-Watson test statistic for 
serial correlation. Q is the Ljung-Box test statistic. 
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Table 7.7: The Estimation Results of the Unobserved Components Model, Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP (Dependent Variable: GDPCC) 
Country  𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽1) 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽2) μt 𝐸𝐸(μt) φt 𝐸𝐸(φt) φ𝑡𝑡∗ 𝐸𝐸(φ𝑡𝑡∗) R2  N H(10) DW Q(4,2) 
Australia 324.96 5.01*** -1.04 -3.11*** 26816.6 9.34*** 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.94  3.33 0.44 2.18 5.33 
Austria 135.40 1.87* -0.95 -1.00 45281.6 36.24*** 0.22 0.02 -0.14 -0.01 0.99  1.32 3.39 1.46 2.06 
Belgium 529.97 16.69*** -3.63 -10.05*** 25938.9 62.20*** -30.49 -0.68 -99.31 -1.95** 0.95  8.93 3.05 1.73 1.52 
Brazil 121.47 13.11*** -0.57 -3.06*** 7929.5 145.95*** 226.29 1.28 -140.09 -0.74 0.96  0.71 0.76 1.78 0.29 
Denmark 1072.71 15.26*** -10.28 -9.01*** 32037.9 31.74*** -1.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95  2.32 1.02 2.13 5.87 
France 45.12 1.38 -0.12 -0.55 31329.2 13.44*** 7478.56 3.18*** 1489.29 0.64 0.99  1.45 0.37 1.81 4.17 
Germany 717.02 10.69*** -6.18 -5.24*** 25039.7 30.57*** 324.33 3.04*** 88.31 0.87 0.93  1.22 1.81 1.93 3.80 
Greece 155.72 7.52*** -1.20 -2.34** 19639.7 60.25*** 110.07 1.55 201.18 2.68*** 0.93  5.67 2.43 2.42 10.11 
India  28.39 7.27*** -0.12 -2.27** 371.8 43.69*** 1.40 0.91 -1.29 -1.08 0.84  0.78 4.04 2.70 7.12 
Indonesia 12.77 1.48 -0.17 -1.10 5489.8 3.10*** -1890.83 -1.06 4014.11 4.24*** 0.99  23.95 6.21 0.82 15.22 
Italy 285.43 3.85*** -3.52 -2.42** 28479.0 25.65*** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92  2.09 1.77 1.95 9.73 
Japan 387.86 3.94*** -1.85 -2.74*** 26924.4 8.05*** -0.17 -0.02 0.20 0.03 0.86  6.19 8.39 2.67 9.21 
Malaysia 191.90 0.74 -0.63 -0.64 -3583.3 -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73  17.25 1.43 2.15 0.29 
Mexico  44.48 1.21 -0.48 -0.71 7991.7 14.37*** 743.56 1.52 289.35 0.42 0.89  9.09 1.06 1.57 8.20 
South Africa 3.03 0.61 0.01 0.39 6448.3 24.31*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77  3.94 0.35 2.31 1.32 
Spain 316.18 10.98*** -1.71 -4.21*** 16878.8 59.89*** 103.77 2.04** 43.06 0.95 0.95  5.36 0.79 1.53 0.43 
Thailand 117.27 9.37*** -0.77 -5.80*** 1500.6 60.42*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63  0.90 0.59 2.49 18.91 
Turkey 227.00 2.66** -1.67 -1.01 7542.7 2.86*** 2257.22 0.89 4715.50 2.04** 0.96  2.66 0.31 2.53 6.18 
UK 261.63 13.38*** -0.76 -4.38*** 21782.7 184.39*** 0.55 0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.96  15.86 2.09 2.56 7.96 
USA 324.96 5.01*** -1.04 -3.11*** 26816.6 9.34*** 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.94   13.88 0.07 1.94 0.82 
The asterisks ***, **, * show significant statistics at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. β1 is the coefficient of the linear term, β2 is the coefficient of the quadratic term, 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 is 
the trend component. φt is the cyclical component. N is the test statistic for normality. H is the test statistic for heteroscedasticity. DW is the Durbin-Watson test statistic for 
serial correlation. Q is the Ljung-Box test statistic 
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Table 7.8: Turning Points of the Financial Kuznets Curve (Dependent Variable: Real GDP 
per capita) 
Panel A: Private Credit/GDP  
    FMOLS   UCM 
Country  
 
Significance Curve Type Turning Point 
 Significance Curve Type Turning Point 
Australia  ** IU 219.78  ** IU 160.84 
Austria      *** IU 106.42 
Belgium  *** IU 55.30  *** IU 103.34 
Brazil      *** IU 95.03 
Denmark      * IU 113.07 
France      *** IU 99.46 
Germany  * IU 100.02  *** IU 97.59 
Greece  *** IU 81.71  *** IU 75.94 
India         
Indonesia  *** IU 36.66  *** IU 76.90 
Italy  *** IU 76.29     
Japan  *** IU 181.31  ** IU 220.95 
Malaysia  ** IU 125.25     
Mexico         
South Africa *** U 98.45     
Spain  *** IU 141.76  *** IU 151.79 
Thailand  * IU 133.28  *** IU 176.09 
Turkey         
UK      *** IU 180.79 
USA   ** IU 287.08  *** IU 197.94 
Panel B: Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP 
    FMOLS   UCM 
Country  
 
Significance Curve Type Turning Point 
 Significance Curve Type Turning Point 
Australia  * IU 150.13  *** IU 156.23 
Austria  *** IU 40.21     
Belgium      *** IU 73.00 
Brazil      *** IU 106.55 
Denmark      *** IU 52.17 
France  *** IU 87.10     
Germany  *** IU 47.60  *** IU 58.01 
Greece  *** IU 64.41  ** IU 64.88 
India   * IU 109.15  ** IU 118.29 
Indonesia         
Italy  ** IU 44.62  ** IU 40.54 
Japan  *** IU 82.60  *** IU 104.83 
Malaysia  *** IU 165.48     
Mexico          
South Africa *** U 130.62     
Spain  *** IU 119.37  *** IU 92.45 
Thailand      *** IU 76.15 
Turkey         
UK      *** IU 172.13 
USA   ** IU 136.18  *** IU 156.23 
The asterisks ***, **, * show significant test statistics at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. U represents evidence 
for U-shaped curve. IU represents evidence for inverted U-shaped curve. 
 
 
 
168 
 
The evidence for the growth-FKC (inverted U-shaped curve) implies the existence of a local 
maximum and the presence of  a turning point beyond which the effect of financialisation on 
economic growth is reversed. Table 7.8 reports the estimated turning points for individual 
countries, using FMOLS and UCM methodologies and two measures of financialisation: 
private credit to GDP and stock market capitalisation to GDP. The table summarises the 
evidence for the nonlinearity in the relationship between financialisation and economic growth. 
The average turning point of private credit to GDP ratio is around 130%, while the lowest and 
highest points range from 36.7% in Indonesia to 287% in the United States. Interestingly, the 
average turning point, across the sample countries, is approximately close to the findings of 
Arcand et al. (2015b) who report turning points ranging from 69% to 144%, which vary 
according to the selected sample period.79 Similarly, the calculated turning points of stock 
market capitalisation to GDP range from 40% in Austria to 172% in the United States, while 
the average across countries is approximately 100%.80 The lower threshold for the financial 
markets proxy (stock market capitalisation to GDP) suggests that the effects of financialisation 
are transmitted more rapidly through financial markets. 
   
7.6 Finance-Inequality Results and Discussion 
In this section, the nonlinearity of finance-inequality is investigated, in a similar way to the 
empirical investigation of the nonlinearity between finance and growth introduced earlier.  
 
7.6.1 Evidence on the Nonlinearity of Finance-Inequality Relationship 
Variable addition tests are carried out to find out whether the quadratic function provides a 
better fit for the relationship between financialisation and income inequality. Table 7.9 displays 
 
79 The results can be found in Table 6 of Arcand et al.’s (2015b) article.  
80 The calculated turning points are based on the estimated coefficients of the financial Kuznets curve, which in 
turn are sensitive to the choice of the methodology used (FMOLS and UCM produce different turning points).  
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the results for three test statistics used to judge the significance of the quadratic vs linear 
specification with two measures of financialisation: private credit to GDP and stock market 
capitalisation. A significant test statistic implies that the quadratic model provides a better fit 
for the relationship between income inequality and financialisation, thus showing support for 
the nonlinearity hypothesis.  
 
Table 7.9: Results of the Variable Addition Test, Quadratic vs Linear (GINI Index) 
  Private Credit/GDP 
(DOMSPR) 
 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation/GDP 
(STMCAP) 
Country  LM LR F  LM LR F 
Australia  12.6*** 15.6*** 17.9***  6.88*** 7.63*** 7.79*** 
Austria  2.22 2.29 2.17  0.587 0.592 0.547 
Belgium  0.354 0.356 0.32  2.2 2.27 2.15 
Brazil  7.68*** 8.64*** 8.96***  0.274 0.275 0.253 
Denmark  3.7* 3.9* 3.78*  2.37 2.46 2.33 
France  3.07* 3.21* 3.08*  0.003 0.003 0.003 
Germany  12.7*** 15.6*** 18***  14.2*** 18*** 21.5*** 
Greece  14.7*** 19*** 22.9***  17.2*** 23.4*** 30.3*** 
India  5.64** 6.14** 6.14**  11.3*** 13.6*** 15.2*** 
Indonesia  9.62*** 11.2*** 12***  1.5 1.53 1.43 
Italy  4.52** 4.83** 4.74**  2.49 2.58 2.45 
Japan  3.13* 3.28* 3.15*  1.99 2.04 1.93 
Malaysia  10*** 11.7*** 12.6***  23.9*** 39.4*** 65.7*** 
Mexico  1.22 1.24 1.16  3.17* 3.32* 3.18* 
South Africa  1.48 1.51 1.41  0.905 0.916 0.851 
Spain  0.516 0.519 0.479  6.06** 6.64** 6.68** 
Thailand  0.959 0.972 0.903  5.38** 5.83** 5.8** 
Turkey  0.916 0.928 0.862  3.21* 3.36* 3.23* 
UK  20.1*** 29.5*** 42***  12.6*** 15.6*** 17.9*** 
USA  20.4*** 30.3*** 43.6***  24.4*** 40.7*** 69.4*** 
The asterisks ***, **, * show significant statistics at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. LM is the Lagrange-
Multiplier test, LR is the likelihood ratio test, and F is the F test. 
 
The results displayed in Table 7.9 support the quadratic specification for most of the countries. 
Thus, the results of variable addition tests provide evidence that supports the nonlinearity 
hypothesis between finance and inequality. However, there is no consistent evidence for the 
best fit specification in developed or developing countries.  
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The variable addition test results are also supplemented by testing to find out whether the 
quadratic (n-order) specification provides a better fit (based on R2) than the linear (quadratic) 
specification. The results of the Z test are displayed in Table 7.10 where the numbers 2, 3, 4, 
5, and 6 refer to the order of polynomial.  
 
Table 7.10: The Z Statistics for Differences in Goodness of Fit, Polynomial vs Linear (GINI 
Index) 
  Private Credit/GDP 
(DOMSPR) 
 Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP 
(STMCAP) 
Country  2 3 4 5 6  2 3 4 5 6 
Australia  -0.91 1.32 0.20 0.12 -0.54  -0.49 1.52 1.27 1.25 1.10 
Austria  -0.23 -0.39 -0.38 -0.40 -0.40  -0.06 -0.09 -0.55 -0.69 -0.78 
Belgium  -0.02 1.52 1.51 1.50 1.37  -0.19 1.46 1.42 1.34 1.30 
Brazil  -0.88 -0.57 -2.07 -2.10 -2.86  -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 -0.16 -0.46 
Denmark  -0.32 -2.22 -3.60 -3.72 -3.76  -0.27 -0.34 -0.80 -0.91 -0.93 
France  -0.34 -2.40 -2.40 -2.41 -2.42  0.00 -0.37 -1.64 -1.64 -1.70 
Germany  -1.36 -0.69 -0.69 -0.71 -1.04  -1.34 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Greece  -1.49 -1.00 -1.13 -1.24 -1.68  -1.57 0.90 0.89 0.82 0.76 
India  -0.50 -8.01 -8.06 -8.35 -8.38  -1.03 -2.07 -2.21 -2.48 -2.60 
Indonesia  -0.92 -3.43 -4.22 -4.48 -5.15  -0.13 -0.92 -0.93 -0.94 -0.97 
Italy  -0.47 0.58 0.56 0.42 0.41  -0.23 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.22 
Japan  -0.32 -4.58 -5.45 -5.59 -6.49  -0.22 -0.41 -0.59 -0.59 -0.61 
Malaysia  -0.98 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.81  -3.16 0.28 0.13 0.08 0.08 
Mexico  -0.14 -0.07 -0.11 -0.18 -0.26  -0.35 -0.06 -0.10 -0.11 -0.83 
South Africa  -0.14 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.03  -0.08 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.04 
Spain  -0.06 -0.21 -0.71 -0.90 -1.03  -0.68 -0.48 -0.48 -0.55 -0.69 
Thailand  -0.09 0.56 0.35 0.35 0.34  -0.60 0.34 0.01 -0.11 -0.34 
Turkey  -0.10 -0.45 -0.55 -0.55 -0.59  -0.35 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.17 
UK  -2.15 3.08 3.05 3.00 2.99  -1.11 2.37 2.32 2.26 2.26 
USA  -1.84 1.30 0.74 0.69 0.70  -2.48 1.91 1.74 1.33 1.31 
Numbers in bold type are significant test statistics at 5% level or below. The numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 refer to the 
order of the polynomial function. 
 
Under model 2, the null hypothesis is that the goodness of fit of the quadratic model is better 
than that of the linear model. Under the rest of the models, the null hypothesis is that the n-
order model produces better fit than the quadratic model. These results are inconsistent with 
the results provided by variables addition tests, except for few countries. However, the 
significance of higher-order models, for some countries, supports the existence of multiple 
 
 
171 
 
turning points (thresholds) of the curve representing the relationship between finance and 
income inequality.  
 
Non-nested model selection tests are also used to examine the linear model (M1) against the 
quadratic model (M2). Table 7.11 exhibits the results of six non-nested models selection tests 
using private credit to GDP. Similarly, Table 7.12 exhibits the results using stock market 
capitalisation to GDP. By and large, the results of the non-nested models selection tests suggest 
that both models are rejected, which means that the preferred model should contain both linear 
and quadratic terms. 
 
 
7.6.2 Estimation of the Inequality Financial Kuznets Curve  
The inequality-FKC is estimated for 20 individual countries using the FMOLS and UCM. To 
begin, the results of the FMOLS, which are reported in Table 7.13, show supporting evidence 
for the existence of the FKC for 11 out of 20 countries when using private credit to GDP as a 
proxy for financialisation. Similarly, the results support the FKC for 9 out of 20 countries when 
using stock market capitalisation to GDP as a proxy for financialisation.  
 
The results of the unobserved components model are presented in Tables 7.14 and 7.15 which 
show the estimates of the unobserved components and coefficients on the explanatory variables 
for the FKC at final state vector (at period 2015). The UCM results provide evidence for the 
nonlinearity hypothesis in 9 out of 20 countries. Moreover, the trend component is significant 
in all cases and for both measures of financialisation. This suggests that there are other 
important variables that have not been included in the model but are accounted for by the trend.  
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Table 7.11: Results of the Non-Nested Models Selection Tests, Private Credit/GDP (Dependent Variable: GINI index) 
  M1 vs M2  M2 vs M1 
Country  N NT W J JA EN  N NT W J JA EN 
Australia  2.84 2.76 3.41 -4.24 -4.24 17.97  -7.65 -7.40 -4.96 8.44 8.44 71.23 
Austria  -1.52 -1.29 -1.29 1.48 1.48 2.18  1.38 1.20 1.21 -1.38 -1.38 1.92 
Belgium  -0.61 -0.58 -0.57 0.57 0.57 0.33  -0.62 -0.59 -0.58 0.58 0.58 0.34 
Brazil  -6.24 -1.33 -1.32 2.99 2.99 8.96  1.73 1.16 1.17 -2.85 -2.85 8.17 
Denmark  -2.04 -1.91 -1.85 1.94 1.94 3.78  1.33 1.27 1.30 -1.36 -1.36 1.85 
France  -1.83 -1.06 -1.05 1.76 1.76 3.08  1.65 1.04 1.04 -1.72 -1.72 2.96 
Germany  3.39 3.05 3.08 -4.24 -4.24 18.03  -3.84 -3.38 -3.34 4.39 4.39 19.28 
Greece  3.37 3.18 3.35 -4.79 -4.79 22.94  -4.82 -4.40 -4.15 5.44 5.44 29.56 
India  2.27 2.16 2.20 -2.47 -2.47 6.14  -2.78 -2.60 -2.54 2.82 2.82 7.96 
Indonesia  -3.54 -3.28 -3.09 3.47 3.47 12.04  2.31 2.20 2.31 -2.70 -2.70 7.32 
Italy  2.02 1.76 1.78 -2.17 -2.17 4.75  -2.39 -2.00 -1.98 2.34 2.34 5.46 
Japan  -1.84 -1.60 -1.59 1.77 1.77 3.15  1.55 1.39 1.41 -1.59 -1.59 2.54 
Malaysia  2.80 2.62 2.73 -3.56 -3.56 12.69  -4.05 -3.64 -3.47 4.12 4.12 16.97 
Mexico  -1.62 -0.17 -0.17 1.08 1.08 1.16  0.82 0.28 0.28 -1.04 -1.04 1.10 
South Africa  -1.26 -1.13 -1.12 1.19 1.19 1.42  0.85 0.80 0.81 -0.85 -0.85 0.72 
Spain  0.65 0.26 0.26 -0.69 -0.69 0.48  -0.85 -0.18 -0.18 0.73 0.73 0.53 
Thailand  0.94 0.88 0.89 -0.95 -0.95 0.90  -1.50 -1.30 -1.28 1.38 1.38 1.91 
Turkey  -1.05 -0.57 -0.57 0.93 0.93 0.86  0.76 0.56 0.56 -0.79 -0.79 0.62 
UK  3.55 3.38 3.74 -6.48 -6.48 42.06  -6.60 -5.97 -5.30 7.84 7.84 61.39 
USA  3.99 3.86 4.31 -6.60 -6.60 43.61  -5.67 -5.47 -4.81 8.05 8.05 64.73 
Numbers in bold are significant test statistics at 5% level or below. N, NT, W, J, JA, EN are the non-nested model selection tests described in subsection 4.8.2, in chapter 4. 
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Table 7.12: Results of the Non-Nested Models Selection Tests, Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP (Dependent Variable: GINI index) 
  M1 vs M2  M2 vs M1 
Country  N NT W J JA EN  N NT W J JA EN 
Australia  2.27 2.20 2.47 -2.79 -2.79 7.80  -4.97 -4.76 -3.93 4.87 4.87 23.76 
Austria  0.71 0.70 0.71 -0.74 -0.74 0.55  -1.70 -1.34 -1.30 1.43 1.43 2.05 
Belgium  1.37 1.32 1.37 -1.46 -1.46 2.15  -2.66 -2.45 -2.31 2.42 2.42 5.86 
Brazil  0.50 0.51 0.52 -0.50 -0.50 0.25  -2.36 -2.19 -2.02 2.06 2.06 4.23 
Denmark  -2.92 -0.37 -0.37 1.53 1.53 2.34  1.01 0.50 0.50 -1.46 -1.46 2.14 
France  0.06 0.08 0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.00  -1.13 -1.04 -1.01 1.04 1.04 1.08 
Germany  3.13 3.00 3.28 -4.63 -4.63 21.50  -5.46 -5.04 -4.51 5.85 5.85 34.21 
Greece  3.16 3.05 3.62 -5.51 -5.51 30.36  -7.52 -7.03 -5.51 8.22 8.22 67.51 
India  2.70 2.60 2.88 -3.89 -3.89 15.20  -5.74 -5.24 -4.55 5.46 5.46 29.75 
Indonesia  -1.32 -1.20 -1.16 1.20 1.20 1.44  0.14 0.17 0.17 -0.14 -0.14 0.02 
Italy  1.46 1.39 1.43 -1.56 -1.56 2.46  -2.40 -2.16 -2.08 2.21 2.21 4.87 
Japan  -2.60 -0.29 -0.29 1.39 1.39 1.93  0.94 0.43 0.44 -1.33 -1.33 1.78 
Malaysia  2.99 2.51 2.59 -8.11 -8.11 65.79  -13.00 -4.39 -4.25 8.52 8.52 72.59 
Mexico  -2.44 -1.22 -1.21 1.79 1.79 3.19  1.23 1.00 1.01 -1.51 -1.51 2.29 
South Africa  -0.99 -0.90 -0.89 0.92 0.92 0.85  0.29 0.30 0.30 -0.28 -0.28 0.08 
Spain  1.58 1.01 1.02 -2.58 -2.58 6.69  -5.87 -1.09 -1.08 2.70 2.70 7.31 
Thailand  1.40 0.96 0.97 -2.41 -2.41 5.81  -7.27 -1.04 -1.03 2.56 2.56 6.55 
Turkey  1.31 0.96 0.97 -1.79 -1.79 3.23  -3.25 -1.09 -1.08 2.00 2.00 3.98 
UK  2.91 2.80 3.16 -4.24 -4.24 17.98  -5.80 -5.42 -4.62 5.98 5.98 35.71 
USA  4.09 3.96 4.63 -8.33 -8.33 69.44  -6.66 -6.41 -5.30 10.65 10.65 113.50 
Numbers in bold are significant test statistics at 5% level or below. N, NT, W, J, JA, EN are the non-nested model selection tests described in subsection 4.8.2, in chapter 4. 
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The results are fairly consistent across the two methods—FMOLS and UCM—and they are 
consistent with the evidence for nonlinearity established by the variable addition test. However, 
mixed evidence is found for the U- shaped and inverted U-shaped curves. An inverted U-
shaped curve is consistent with the Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) nonlinearity hypothesis, 
which suggests that income inequality tends to rise initially as a result of credit constraints that 
limit access to the benefits of the financial sector. However, once the financial sector develops 
beyond a certain threshold, its benefits are transmitted to the poor, leading to a lower level of 
inequality.  
 
The evidence for the inverted U-shaped curve is consistent with the findings of Nikoloski 
(2012), Shahbaz et al. (2015), and Baiardi and Morana (2016). On the other hand, evidence for 
the U-shaped curve suggests that financialisation reduces income inequality initially, but this 
effect is reversed when the financial sector grows beyond a certain threshold. This suggests 
that excessive growth of the financial sector beyond a certain threshold leads to a higher level 
of income inequality. These results lend support to those of Tan and Law (2012) and Brei et al. 
(2018). 
 
Table 7.16 displays a summary of the empirical evidence for the inequality-FKC estimated by 
FMOLS and UCM methodologies, using private credit to GDP and stock market capitalisation 
to GDP as proxies for bank development and market development, respectively. The results 
correspond to the current divergence in the empirical literature and show support for the 
inverted U-shaped curve as well as the U-shaped curve. The table also reports the estimated 
turning points for individual countries. The calculated turning points are sensitive to the 
selected measure of financialisation. For instance, the turning points for the ratio of private 
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credit to GDP range from as low as 30% in Indonesia up to 192% in Japan. The average turning 
point across all countries is reached when the ratio of private credit to GDP is around 100%. 
Similarly, the turning point for the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP appears 
approximately at the 80% level on average, while the lowest and highest turning points range 
from 16.5% in Turkey up to 160% in Malaysia, respectively.  Again, the lower threshold of the 
stock market capitalisation to GDP implies that the effects of financialisation are intensified 
through financial markets. 
 
7.7 Graphical Representation of the Financial Kuznets Curve  
The original Kuznets suggests that the inverted U-shaped relationship explains income 
inequality based on economic development progression within countries rather than across 
countries (Gallup, 2012; Jovanovic, 2018). However, the Kuznets curve is also found to be 
evident in cross-sectional data. Therefore, the financialisation proxies are plotted against real 
GDP per capita in Figure 7.1 and the Gini index in Figure 7.2, based on the mean values of the 
time-series data used in this chapter. Hence, the fitted curves in these figures provide a cross-
country depiction of the financial Kuznets curve.81 
 
Figure 7.1 exhibits the relationship between financialisation and economic growth across the 
sample countries. The fitted curve suggests a non-monotonic relationship between 
financialisation and real GDP per capita. Moreover, the growth-FKC is evident, more 
apparently, when using stock market capitalisation as a proxy for financialisation. The inverted 
U-shaped curve between financialisation and GDP per capita suggests that the contribution of 
financialisation to growth weakens (or that it is insignificant) when the financial sector is too 
 
81 The fitted curves using time series data for individual countries are displayed in Figures A7.1 through A7.4, in 
the appendix to this chapter. 
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small or too large relative to the overall size of the real economy. Moosa (2016) provides a 
cross-sectional depiction of the growth-FKC using real growth rates as a measure of economic 
growth and the value of traded shares to GDP as a measure of financialisation. Similarly, Figure 
7.2 shows the cross-sectional relationship between financialisation and income inequality as 
measured by the Gini index. The fitted U-shaped curve is a depiction of the inequality-FKC, 
which suggests that up to a certain threshold, an increase in financialisation is associated with 
lower inequality, then income inequality rises as financialisation intensifies. The U-shaped 
relationship is consistent with the beneficial to detrimental path evidence documented by Brei 
et al. (2018) and Tan and Law (2012). It is more visible when using stock market capitalisation 
as a proxy for financialisation.  
 
Finally, the results support the findings of recent sensitivity studies such as that of Sturn and 
Zwickl (2016) who show that the results obtained by previous studies in the finance-growth 
literature are fragile when subjected to slight changes in model specification, by means of 
inclusion and exclusion of other explanatory variables, or changes in the estimation method. 
This is consistent with the comprehensive argument provided by Moosa (2017) who contends 
that time-series studies, like cross-sectional studies, are sensitive to model specification, 
estimation method and variable definition and measurement. Moosa supports his argument by 
showing how the results of widely accepted relationships, such as Wagner’s law and Okun’s 
law, are sensitive to the above-mentioned factors.  
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Table 7.13: The Phillips-Hansen FMOLS Estimates of the FKC (Dependent Variable: GINI 
Index) 
Panel A: Private Credit/GDP  
Country   𝛽𝛽0 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽0) 𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽1) 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽2) 𝑅𝑅2 
Australia  30.41 86.41*** 0.06 5.68*** -0.0002 -2.64** 0.94 
Austria  135.93 2.31** -2.57 -1.88* 0.0153 1.93* 0.03 
Belgium  24.47 15.61*** -0.01 -0.1 0.0012 1.79* 0.71 
Brazil  67.11 11.00*** -0.43 -2.24** 0.0031 2.47** 0.19 
Denmark  26.13 17.06*** -0.02 -0.55 0.0002 0.98 0.41 
France  93.54 1.44 -1.49 -0.96 0.0091 0.99 0.1 
Germany  -13.31 -1.14 0.91 3.64*** -0.0046 -3.53*** 0.39 
Greece  42.59 24.39*** -0.19 -3.09*** 0.0011 2.63** 0.55 
India   36.59 10.84*** 0.43 2.13** -0.0052 -1.96* 0.32 
Indonesia  33.06 4.63*** 1.14 2.59** -0.0189 -3.15*** 0.45 
Italy  12.07 1.15 0.63 2.01* -0.0042 -1.89* 0.18 
Japan  12.57 0.49 0.25 0.85 -0.0009 -1.06 0.12 
Malaysia  67.99 11.63*** -0.35 -3.19*** 0.0015 2.9*** 0.42 
Mexico   58.41 5.16*** -1.08 -0.95 0.0266 1.00 0.02 
South Africa 71.9 4.81*** -0.23 -0.78 0.0015 1.11 0.19 
Spain  30.65 7.01*** 0.08 0.94 -0.0003 -0.89 0.01 
Thailand  47.16 7.07*** 0.09 0.66 -0.0003 -0.42 0.11 
Turkey  46.09 10.98*** -0.16 -0.55 0.0025 0.68 0.02 
UK  27.12 30.43*** 0.12 7.3*** -0.0005 -6.44*** 0.64 
USA   19.32 6.41*** 0.24 5.64*** -0.0007 -4.7*** 0.9 
Panel B: Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP 
Country  𝛽𝛽0 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽0) 𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽1) 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽2) 𝑅𝑅2 
Australia  30.19 56.55*** 0.07 4.77*** -0.0003 -2.89** 0.75 
Austria  26.93 20.76*** 0.16 1.35 -0.0016 -0.69 0.16 
Belgium  23.08 10.26*** 0.17 1.65 -0.0012 -1.08 0.36 
Brazil  57.34 52.29*** -0.12 -1.42 -0.00004 -0.03 0.38 
Denmark  29.02 10.46*** -0.2 -1.18 0.0029 1.28 0.03 
France  34.96 30.73*** -0.03 -0.54 -0.0002 -0.29 0.38 
Germany  26.24 33.18*** 0.23 4.46*** -0.0027 -3.66*** 0.59 
Greece  39.05 130.53*** -0.15 -8.75*** 0.0011 5.91*** 0.77 
India  42.95 133.59*** 0.06 3.6*** -0.0004 -2.77** 0.54 
Indonesia  43.94 23.58*** 0.01 0.03 0.0043 0.77 0.34 
Italy  30.95 22.8*** 0.18 1.82* -0.0019 -1.31 0.27 
Japan  21.27 2.9*** 0.22 1.14 -0.0015 -1.23 0.03 
Malaysia  58.81 37.76*** -0.16 -7.19*** 0.0005 7.11*** 0.62 
Mexico  47.07 26.84*** 0.27 1.31 -0.0076 -1.51 0.09 
South Africa 60.97 7.15*** 0.01 0.07 0.0002 0.48 0.28 
Spain  33 35.86*** 0.1 2.17** -0.0009 -2.04** 0.17 
Thailand  51.03 26.24*** 0.15 1.57 -0.0015 -1.49 0.12 
Turkey  46.77 31.61*** -0.42 -1.88* 0.0127 1.88* 0.07 
UK  27.98 16.38*** 0.11 2.89** -0.0005 -2.32** 0.59 
USA   29.7 37.22*** 0.19 9.87*** -0.0008 -7.89*** 0.93 
The asterisks ***, **, * show significant statistics at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 7.14: The Estimation Results of the Unobserved Components Model, Private Credit/GDP (Dependent Variable: GINI Index) 
Country  𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽1) 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽2) μt 𝐸𝐸(µt) R2  N H(10) DW Q(4,3) 
Australia 0.0967 3.16*** -0.0004 -2.25** 29.8079 46.55*** 0.82  10.01 0.43 0.93 6.05 
Austria 0.62306 14.28*** -0.00376 -7.69*** 4.9 35.65*** 0.62  0.12963 0.38 1.82 1.47 
Belgium 0.0292 0.35 0.0003 0.38 24.5818 13.77*** 0.76  31.57 0.23 2.07 3.00 
Brazil 0.0054 0.06 -0.0028 -2.76*** 56.9969 29.89*** 0.80  0.67 5.26 2.07 4.08 
Denmark 0.0849 1.18 -0.0003 -0.75 22.5891 13.71*** 0.00  13.80 0.03 2.09 0.21 
France 0.7016 7.21*** -0.0038 -3.69*** 0.0198 6.49*** 0.18  12.75 0.30 1.54 11.20 
Germany 0.6717 29.53*** -0.0034 -11.68*** 0.0161 3.83*** 0.81  0.05 0.25 2.31 3.13 
Greece -0.0645 -0.97 0.0006 1.43 35.4329 16.69*** 0.06  2.64 0.92 1.26 2.12 
India  0.1428 1.21 -0.0016 -0.96 41.7124 24.60*** 0.75  19.94 0.03 2.42 11.99 
Indonesia -0.2202 -1.05 0.0038 1.07 54.8436 17.39*** 0.60  30.14 0.07 1.33 14.88 
Italy -0.6362 -2.11** 0.0040 2.01** 60.0325 5.33*** 0.53  4.41 0.03 2.05 2.65 
Japan -0.3462 -2.79*** 0.0009 2.73*** 64.2168 5.50*** 0.99  0.53 0.53 1.18 3.37 
Malaysia -0.0279 -2.93*** 0.0000 -0.37 49.9515 103.54*** 0.95  0.38 0.31 1.11 10.04 
Mexico  -0.5156 -0.79 -0.0188 -0.42 48.0673 7.81*** 0.18  11.03 34.41 1.56 4.02 
South Africa -0.0803 -0.42 0.0006 0.68 64.1602 7.99*** 0.03  8.93 63.21 1.92 5.49 
Spain -0.1776 -1.91* 0.0006 1.56 48.8585 8.51*** 0.51  13.82 0.10 1.29 4.45 
Thailand 0.1588 2.06** -0.0007 -1.74* 42.2167 11.94*** 0.47  13.39 0.06 1.97 1.33 
Turkey -0.2098 -0.56 0.0647 1.16 59.8601 9.22*** 0.47  4.64 376.12 1.95 4.02 
UK 0.1073 3.30*** -0.0005 -2.37** 27.6644 29.78*** 0.58  3.21 0.73 1.62 1.94 
USA 0.1449 3.31*** -0.0004 -2.51** 27.7974 10.31*** 0.82   6.76 0.12 1.35 3.71 
The asterisks ***, **, * show significant statistics at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. β1 is the coefficient of the linear term. β2 is the coefficient of the quadratic term. 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 is the 
trend component. N is the test statistic for normality. H is the test statistic for heteroscedasticity. DW is the Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation and Q is the Ljung-
Box test statistic. 
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Table 7.15: The Estimation Results of the Unobserved Components Model, Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP (Dependent Variable: 
GINI Index) 
Country  𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽1) 𝛽𝛽2 𝐸𝐸(𝛽𝛽2) μt 𝐸𝐸(µt) R2  N H(10) DW Q(4,3) 
Australia 0.05253 6.79*** -0.0002 -3.72*** 32.0 135.80*** 0.90  28.38 0.09 0.88 12.05 
Austria 0.07088 0.96 -0.001 -0.51 29.6 35.76*** 0.07  2.4553 0.12 1.82 3.49 
Belgium -0.0801 -0.74 0.00064 0.73 30.0 9.66*** 0.13  0.28 0.59 2.40 4.49 
Brazil -0.4767 -7.80*** 0.00185 1.67 57.7 46.14*** 0.93  13.90 6.26 1.67 1.62 
Denmark -0.103 -3.60*** 0.00254 4.96*** 27.9 168.11*** 0.82  7.93 3.09 1.76 6.24 
France -0.1521 -1.42 0.00093 1.33 38.8 8.99*** 0.56  8.38 0.52 1.62 9.55 
Germany 0.457 5.55*** -0.0069 -4.56*** 25.4 45.97*** 0.21  13.71 0.12 2.27 3.71 
Greece -0.038 -0.90* 0.00045 1.39 36.6 40.52*** 0.59  2.70 6.03 0.70 3.51 
India  0.00891 10.15*** -0.00004 -3.77*** 44.3 2968.39*** 0.95  0.16 3.16 1.28 5.60 
Indonesia -0.1366 -0.65 0.00292 0.76 52.6 18.36*** 0.84  6.18 0.06 1.03 11.30 
Italy 0.16234 1.83* -0.00204 -1.93* 31.8 11.57*** 0.80  13.08 0.26 1.52 5.65 
Japan -0.0077 -0.12 0.00023 0.52 29.9 12.93*** 0.89  0.30 0.50 0.72 8.05 
Malaysia -0.0201 -0.87* 0.00008 0.86 47.4 31.22*** 0.65  2.35 0.02 0.51 1.24 
Mexico  0.47046 0.81 -0.009 -0.30 40.2 4.06*** 0.47  2.67 0.98 1.97 0.51 
South Africa -0.0774 -0.39 0.00026 0.48 69.8 4.21*** 0.25  10.08 0.59 1.81 0.21 
Spain -0.1347 -2.37** 0.00084 1.83* 41.7 21.41*** 0.58  7.38 0.10 1.06 5.71 
Thailand -0.0177 -0.62 0.00004 0.14 52.5 99.71*** 0.55  2.05 1.95 2.51 8.02 
Turkey -0.6982 -2.77*** 0.0108 1.84* 55.8 19.89*** 0.89  3.34 0.09 0.82 4.15 
UK 0.07075 5.77*** -0.0003 -2.56** 28.8 388.53*** 0.77  5.98 0.85 1.83 3.64 
USA 0.13135 3.93*** -0.0005 -2.84*** 33.1 33.00*** 0.02  23.35 0.04 0.68 13.02 
The asterisks ***, **, * show significant statistics at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. β1 is the coefficient of the linear term. β2 is the coefficient of the quadratic term. 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 is the 
trend component. N is the test statistic for normality. H is the test statistic for heteroscedasticity. DW is the Durbin-Watson test statistic for serial correlation and Q is the Ljung-
Box test statistic. 
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Table 7.16: Turning Points of the Financial Kuznets Curve (Dependent Variable: GINI 
Index) 
Panel A: Private Credit/GDP  
    FMOLS   UCM 
Country  
 
Significance Curve Type Turning Point 
 Significance Curve Type Turning Point 
Australia  ** IU 150.00  ** IU 120.88 
Austria  * U 83.99  *** IU 82.85 
Belgium         
Brazil  ** U 69.35     
Denmark         
France      *** IU 92.32 
Germany  *** IU 98.91  *** IU 98.78 
Greece  ** U 86.36    53.75 
India  * IU 41.35    44.63 
Indonesia  *** IU 30.16     
Italy  * IU 75.00  ** U 79.53 
Japan    138.89  *** U 192.33 
Malaysia  *** U 116.67     
Mexico         
South Africa        
Spain         
Thailand      * IU 113.43 
Turkey         
UK  *** IU 120.00  ** IU 107.30 
USA   *** IU 171.43  ** IU 181.13 
Panel B: Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP 
    FMOLS   UCM 
Country  
 
Significance Curve Type Turning Point 
 Significance Curve Type Turning Point 
Australia  ** IU 116.67  *** IU 131.33 
Austria         
Belgium         
Brazil         
Denmark      *** U 20.28 
France         
Germany  *** IU 42.59  * U 39.66 
Greece  *** U 68.18     
India   ** IU 75.00  *** IU 111.38 
Indonesia         
Italy      * IU 39.79 
Japan         
Malaysia  *** U 160.00     
Mexico          
South Africa        
Spain  ** IU 55.56  * U 80.18 
Thailand         
Turkey  * IU 16.54  * U 32.32 
UK  ** IU 110.00  ** IU 117.92 
USA   *** IU 118.75  *** IU 131.35 
The asterisks ***, **, * show test significant statistics at 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. U represents evidence 
for U-shaped curve, whereas IU represents evidence for inverted U-shaped curve. 
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Figure 7.1: The Relationship between Financialisation and Real GDP per capita (Mean Values: 
1980–2015) 
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Figure 7.2: The Relationship between Financialisation and Gini Index (Mean Values: 
1980–2015) 
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7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter provides time series evidence on the nonlinear interaction among finance, 
economic growth and income inequality using different methodologies. The variable addition 
tests and non-nested model selection tests are used to find out if the quadratic specification 
provides a better fit of the model than the linear specification. The results of the variable 
addition test show solid evidence for nonlinearity of the finance-growth and finance-inequality 
relationships. Likewise, non-nested model selection tests suggest that the preferred model 
should include both linear and quadratic terms (of financialisation). 
 
The financial Kuznets curve (FKC) is estimated based on annual data for 20 developed and 
developing countries, using the Phillips-Hansen (1990) fully modified OLS and the unobserved 
components model developed by Andrew Harvey (1989). The use of the UCM is of great 
importance as it accounts for missing variables, without the need to include them explicitly in 
the model, by including stochastic trend and cyclical component. By and large, the empirical 
results lend support to previous findings of the inverted U-shaped curve, which is a 
representation of the growth version of the financial Kuznets curve, in all sample countries 
except for Mexico and Turkey. The results of the estimation of the inequality version of the 
financial Kuznets curve show support for the existence of a U-shaped curve as well as an 
inverted U-shaped curve in more than half of the sample countries whereas no significant 
evidence is found for the rest. The range of the estimated turning points of the growth and 
inequality financial Kuznets curves are 100% to 130%, depending on the measure of 
financialisation.  
 
Finally, the findings of this chapter suggest that there is no uniform effect of financialisation 
on economic growth and income inequality. The results vary according to the level of economic 
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development, financial structure, and potentially other factors that have not been considered in 
the empirical analysis provided in this chapter. 
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Appendix to Chapter 7 
Correlaions, Basic Statistics and Scatter Plotts 
 
Table A7.1: Correlations of Growth, Inequality and Financialisation 
Country GDPCC DOMPSR 
GDPCC 
STMCAP 
GINI 
DOMPSR 
GINI 
STMCAP 
Australia 0.96 0.85 0.99 0.85 
Austria 0.75 0.8 0.31 0.35 
Belgium 0.67 0.86 0.85 0.58 
Brazil -0.01 0.8 0.04 -0.65 
Denmark 0.84 0.91 0.58 0.03 
France 0.61 0.93 0.13 -0.59 
Germany 0.38 0.81 0.38 0.63 
Greece 0.62 0.68 -0.53 -0.76 
India  0.95 0.84 0.58 0.63 
Indonesia 0.23 0.92 -0.52 0.55 
Italy 0.68 0.75 0.32 0.49 
Japan 0.47 0.4 -0.34 -0.03 
Malaysia 0.57 0.45 -0.49 -0.26 
Mexico  0.47 0.71 0.03 -0.12 
South Africa 0.51 0.65 0.43 0.54 
Spain 0.83 0.97 0.06 0.13 
Thailand 0.77 0.87 0.41 0.14 
Turkey 0.87 0.83 0.13 -0.16 
UK 0.92 0.79 0.59 0.71 
USA 0.98 0.9 0.89 0.87 
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Table A7.2: Descriptive Statistics (Mean Values: 1980-2015) 
Variable  GINI  GDPCC  DOMSPR  STMCAP 
Country  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max  Mean SD Min Max 
Australia  33.64 1.08 31.34 35.36  41,788 8,485 29,864 55,017  80.06 35.07 27.09 136.59  75.16 33.30 24.60 144.16 
Austria  28.67 2.45 21.98 31.66  38,765 7,251 27,486 48,172  88.46 8.36 71.22 100.35  17.04 12.80 2.06 57.32 
Belgium  28.01 2.48 24.80 33.11  37,080 6,348 27,353 45,052  53.76 18.66 24.90 78.92  46.20 23.52 7.74 86.56 
Brazil  54.95 4.36 44.84 60.84  9,109 1,375 7,226 11,915  52.69 25.22 27.69 134.11  25.31 22.95 0.36 77.05 
Denmark  26.30 1.76 22.75 29.35  50,729 8,025 36,146 61,175  96.76 66.32 30.27 201.26  37.51 17.35 7.36 62.53 
France  32.95 2.14 29.78 38.11  35,446 5,168 26,919 41,642  83.76 8.61 70.92 96.83  48.52 30.84 5.29 101.17 
Germany  30.12 1.16 27.98 31.73  35,737 5,168 26,064 45,413  92.16 13.15 73.85 115.72  31.89 15.91 7.60 64.21 
Greece  36.37 1.88 33.64 38.39  22,328 3,767 18,049 30,055  56.54 31.96 26.64 118.11  28.34 27.41 2.47 109.89 
India  44.12 0.82 42.11 44.77  818 397 390 1,759  32.92 11.51 20.82 52.39  36.54 30.20 1.85 113.33 
Indonesia  46.28 4.90 37.68 52.30  2,237 738 1,231 3,828  31.86 14.12 9.68 60.85  19.52 15.60 0.36 43.19 
Italy  34.09 1.66 31.20 37.43  32,504 4,302 24,450 38,237  64.94 16.17 47.09 94.71  26.47 14.82 11.06 61.26 
Japan  28.63 2.41 24.79 32.01  39,321 6,286 25,855 47,163  173.37 24.44 127.21 221.29  70.99 23.04 30.09 127.73 
Malaysia  48.44 2.11 45.96 51.68  6,506 2,267 3,317 10,745  105.79 26.67 49.91 158.51  124.97 55.01 51.88 265.56 
Mexico  48.17 2.97 40.68 52.52  8,383 799 7,123 9,718  19.49 5.79 11.11 31.98  20.31 13.27 0.46 41.84 
South Africa  66.80 5.45 57.19 85.16  6,353 698 5,424 7,583  110.81 33.37 53.97 160.13  153.38 57.89 62.12 256.04 
Spain  34.85 1.30 32.20 37.49  25,362 5,155 17,294 32,460  102.33 37.54 64.25 172.41  48.31 31.66 5.68 108.91 
Thailand  53.42 2.85 48.33 58.77  3,430 1,357 1,404 5,740  99.81 35.19 40.81 166.50  44.88 29.85 1.58 94.77 
Turkey  44.68 2.57 35.95 46.50  8,268 2,457 4,987 13,899  25.72 15.12 13.59 66.83  15.34 10.86 0.93 35.38 
UK  33.87 1.76 29.16 36.13  32,720 6,593 21,689 41,537  111.92 46.25 26.22 194.86  96.30 35.55 6.27 161.60 
USA  39.33 1.81 35.11 41.56  41,136 7,502 28,362 51,933  147.31 37.87 89.13 206.30  92.55 37.52 40.92 146.21 
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Figure A7.1 Scatter Plots of the Relationship between Real GDP per capita and Private 
Credit to GDP (Time-Series Data 1980-2015) 
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Figure A7.2 Scatter Plots of the Relationship between Real GDP per capita and Stock 
Market Capitalisation to GDP (Time-Series Data 1980-2015) 
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Figure A7.3 Scatter Plots of the Relationship between Gini Index and Private Credit to 
GDP (Time-Series Data 1980-2015) 
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Figure A7.4 Scatter Plots of the Relationship between Gini Index and Stock Market 
Capitalisation to GDP (Time-Series Data 1980-2015) 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
8.1 Recapitulation  
This research provides cross-sectional and time-series evidence on the effects of the 
financialisation process on economic growth and income inequality. The cross-sectional 
analysis focuses on the post-global financial crisis period, while the time series analysis is 
based on data going back to 1980, which most scholars suggest as the start of the rise of finance 
globally.  
 
The research broad lines and objectives are stated in Chapter 1. This research has two main 
objectives. The first is to provide a sensitivity analysis—by applying extreme bounds 
analysis—of the relationships between financialisation, on the one hand, and economic growth 
and income inequality, on the other. The sensitivity analysis is extended to examine the 
robustness of the potential determinants of both economic growth and income inequality. The 
second is to provide time series evidence on nonlinearity in the relationships linking 
financialisation to economic growth and income inequality, using annual time series data on a 
sample of developed and developing economies.   
 
In Chapter 2 a theoretical and historical background of the financialisation process was 
presented to synthesise the diverse views expressed throughout the past decades. It reveals that 
excessive financial sector growth and financial deregulation are the most prominent symptoms 
of the financialisation process. Moreover, the rise of finance has indeed exerted negative effects 
on economic growth and income inequality. In addition, the literature shows that there is no 
clear path to the channels whereby financialisation influences income growth and distribution. 
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In Chapter 3 the significant theoretical and empirical contributions to the finance-growth and 
finance-inequality nexus are reviewed critically. Emphasis is placed on the recent contributions 
on the evidence for excessive finance and the consequences of the financialisation process, as 
well as the suggested alternative transmission mechanism. The key conclusion that emerges 
from the empirical literature review is the need to investigate the alternative channels (other 
than saving/investment channel) whereby finance influences the real economy. In addition, the 
limited evidence indicating non-monotonicity of the finance-growth and finance-inequality 
relationships suggests a path for further investigation and motivates the search for the optimal 
size of the financial sector. 
 
The application of  EBA as a form of sensitivity analysis is motivated and explained in Chapter 
4. The use of EBA is of utmost importance to address model uncertainty inherent in 
econometric analysis. In particular, EBA is used to examine the robustness of financialisation 
as a determinant of economic growth (income inequality) when subject to changes in model 
specification. Subsequently, the time series tests used to investigate the nonlinearity hypothesis 
between financialisation, economic growth and income inequality are described. Evidence for 
nonlinearity suggests the need to examine the financial Kuznets curve (FKC), which is a 
counterpart to the widely accepted environmental Kuznets curve. The Phillip-Hansen FMOLS 
and UCM are employed to estimate the growth and inequality FKCs for each country. 
 
The EBA results are presented in Chapter 5. The objective of the chapter is to report estimates 
of coefficients on the financialisation variables across all possible specifications (choice of 
various sets of explanatory variables), using cross-country data for 101 countries. 
Subsequently, the coefficient estimates are used to examine the robustness of the growth effects 
of the financialisation variables. EBA is extended to examine the robustness of the growth 
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effects of other potential determinants of economic growth. The results of Leamer’s EBA show 
that there are no robust predictors of economic growth, which is due to the hard criterion put 
forward by Leamer. The results of the Sala-i-Martin EBA show that financialisation variables 
are not robust determinants of economic growth. However, it reveals that trade openness, 
economic freedom, school years, agriculture sector share of GDP, manufacturing sector share 
of GDP and labour force are robust positive determinants of economic growth. On the other 
hand, unemployment, population growth, urban population growth and government size turn 
out to be robust negative determinants of economic growth. Moreover, these results change 
significantly in sub-sample analysis (for developed and developing countries). 
 
Similarly, EBA is applied in Chapter 6 to examine the robustness of the relationship between 
financialisation and income inequality using cross-country data for 105 countries. The analysis 
is also extended to examine the robustness of other potential determinants of income inequality. 
None of the variables turns out to be robust using Leamer’s EBA. The results of the Sala-i-
Martin EBA suggests that financialisation is a leading driver of income inequality. The positive 
sign of the coefficients on the financialisation variables is in line with the inequality widening 
hypothesis and the recent evidence found in the financialisation literature. The results also 
suggest that a higher level of financialisation boosts the top 10% income share, which is 
consistent with the long-run historical analysis presented by Piketty (2014). Moreover, the 
results show that stock markets have a stronger effect on income inequality than banks. In 
addition, sub-sample analysis shows that the financialisation process is more evident in 
developed countries and that the effects of financialisation are channelled primarily through 
financial markets in developing countries. The results of EBA confirm some of the previous 
findings on the determinants of income inequality. Only one third of the variables examined 
turn out to be robust determinants of income inequality, including law and order, labour union 
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density, population, trade openness (globalisation), remittances, education, and the share of the 
agricultural sector. The robust variables in developed countries are slightly different from those 
in developing samples. 
 
In Chapter 7 the FKC is investigated using annual data for 20 developed and developing 
countries over the period 1980 to 2015. The empirical analysis commences by examining the 
quadratic vs linear functional form using the variable addition test and non-nested model 
selection tests. Subsequently, growth and inequality FKCs are estimated using FMOLS and 
UCM. The empirical results support the inverted U-shaped relationship between 
financialisation and growth, which is a depiction of the growth version of the FKC. However, 
the results provide mixed evidence for the nonlinearity of the relationship between 
financialisation and income inequality, which shows support for the existence of both U-shaped 
and inverted U-shaped curves in more than half of the countries whereas no significant 
evidence is found for the rest. The range of the estimated threshold of the growth and inequality 
financial Kuznets curves are 100% to 130%, depending on the measure of financialisation used.  
 
8.2 Key Findings 
In this section, the key findings of this study are summarised. The empirical analysis 
commences with the use of extreme bounds analysis in chapters 5 and 6 to examine the 
robustness of the growth and inequality effects of the financialisation variables, using cross-
country data for 101 and 105 countries, respectively. For this purpose, two variants of EBA are 
applied—the traditional EBA introduced by Leamer (1983) and its modified variant suggested 
by Sala-i-Martin (1997). The application of EBA required the running of almost 1.1 million 
regressions to generate the results for economic growth determinants, and approximately 
665,260 regressions to generate the results for income inequality determinants. In chapter 7, 
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the nonlinearity of the relationships among financialisation, economic growth and income 
inequality are investigated systematically using a set of time series methodologies based on 
annual time series data for 20 developed and developing countries. The time series analysis is 
intended to estimate the growth- and inequality-FKC for the sample countries, using the 
Phillips and Hansen (1990) fully modified OLS and the UCM developed by Harvey (1989).   
 
The results of Leamer’s EBA presented in chapter 5 show that none of the variables turned out 
as a robust determinant of economic growth, which is consistent with the reputation of the 
traditional EBA as “a hard to pass test”. Therefore, the analysis proceeds with the modified 
variant of EBA suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997), which involves analysis of the entire 
distribution of coefficients rather than just the extreme bounds. The results of Sala-i-Martin 
EBA show that financialisation variables are not robust determinants of economic growth, in 
the post-crisis period. Moreover, the extended analysis reveals that about a quarter of other 
potential determinants examined are robust determinants of economic growth in the all 
countries sample. The results reveal that trade openness, labour force, economic freedom, 
education and the shares of agricultural and manufacturing sectors are robust positive 
determinants of economic growth. On the other hand, the robust negative determinants of 
economic growth are population growth, urban population growth, government size and 
unemployment. The set of robust variables changes significantly across the developed and 
developing countries samples. Nevertheless, trade openness, unemployment and economic 
freedom are common robust determinants of economic growth across. 
 
The fragility of the growth effects of financialisation is in line with the current divergence of 
results found in the finance-growth literature. Moreover, it is considered as further evidence of 
the importance of assuming nonlinearities in the finance-growth nexus, which has been ignored 
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by the early literature even though is more evident in the post-crisis literature. In addition, the 
findings show robust positive effects of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors on economic 
growth, suggesting that further growth of the financial sector at the expense of these sectors 
may hinder economic growth. Hence, this is taken as evidence in support of the crowding-out 
hypothesis. 
 
The results of EBA for the relationship between financialisation and income inequality are 
reported in chapter 6. Again, Leamer’s EBA shows that “nothing is robust” for both measures 
of income inequality. However, the results of the Sala-i-Martin EBA show that financialisation 
variables are robust and positive determinants of both measures of income inequality (the Gini 
index and the top 10% income ratio). The results are in line with the inequality widening 
hypothesis and the overall findings of the financialisation literature whereby excessive finance 
aggravates income inequality. Moreover, financial markets have a larger effect on income 
inequality than the effect of banks and other financial institutions. The positive relationship 
between financialisation and income inequality does not rule out the possibility of nonlinearity 
in the finance-inequality relationship. It could be that the sample countries fall predominantly 
on the rising sector of the curve, with high levels of financialisation. 
 
Investigation of the robustness of other determinants of income inequality shows that only one 
third of the variables examined turn out to be robust determinants of income inequality (the 
Gini index). Particularly, law and order, labour union density, trade openness (globalisation), 
remittances, education, and the share of the agricultural sector are robust and negatively related 
to the Gini index while population growth is robust and positively related to the Gini index. 
The list of robust variables changes slightly across sub-samples (developed and developing 
countries samples), revealing few additional variables as robust determinants of income 
 
 
201 
 
inequality. In developed countries, human development index, average monthly income and 
female participation in the labour force are robust negative determinants of the Gini index, 
while annual investment in telecommunication services to GDP and total natural resources 
rents to GDP are robustly positive determinants of the Gini index. In developing countries, one 
additional variable appears to be robust, which is annual investment in telecommunication 
services to GDP. Sub-samples analysis also shows that financialisation has a stronger effect on 
income inequality in developed countries. Moreover, stock market capitalisation to GDP is the 
only measure of financialisation that is found to be a robust determinant of income inequality 
in developing countries.  
 
The EBA also applied to investigate the robustness of the relationship between financialisation 
and the top 10% income share, where the results show that financialisation boosts the top 10% 
income share, which is interestingly consistent with the famous findings of Piketty (2014). The 
list of robust determinants of the top 10% income share reveals few additional drivers of 
income inequality, including the real interest rate and tariff rate which are robust positive 
drivers of the top 10% income share, which implies that an increase in the interest rate and 
tariff rate boosts the top 10% income share. The top 10% income share gains from the increase 
in interest rates, which suggests that financial gains (income generated through financial 
channels) are more likely to be reaped by those with the top income shares.  
 
A systematic examination of the nonlinearity hypothesis for the finance-growth and finance-
inequality relationships is carried out in chapter 7 to find out whether the financial Kuznets 
curve exists. The initial analysis is based on variable addition tests, supplemented by the Z test 
and non-nested model selection tests, to find out if the quadratic model specification is 
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preferred to the linear model specification. The empirical results are based on annual data for 
20 developed and developing countries.  
 
The results of variable addition tests show support for the nonlinearity hypothesis for finance-
growth and finance-inequality relationships for most of the countries. The results are consistent 
for both measures of financialisation (the ratio of private credit to GDP and the ratio of stock 
market capitalisation to GDP). Nevertheless, the results of the Z test—which is used to examine 
the explanatory power of quadratic (higher-order) model(s) against the linear (quadratic) 
model—lend little support for the findings of the variable addition tests in case of the quadratic 
model. However, the significance of higher-order models, for some countries, suggests the 
existence of multiple turning points (thresholds), which is similar to the case of the 
environmental Kuznets curve. Moreover, non-nested model selection tests results show that 
neither the linear nor quadratic models are correctly specified, suggesting that the correct model 
specification should include both the linear and quadratic terms. 
 
Subsequently, the growth and inequality FKCs are estimated using the Phillips-Hansen 
FMOLS and UCM. The results of the two methodologies are fairly consistent and taken to be 
complementary. The results of the estimation of the growth-FKC support the previous findings 
of the inverted U-shaped curve between financialisation and economic growth, which is a 
representation of the growth version of the financial Kuznets curve. This evidence for the 
growth-FKC lend support to the financialisation hypothesis, which implies that a further 
expansion of the financial sector beyond a certain threshold (the turning point on the growth-
FKC curve) exerts a negative effect on economic growth.  
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Similarly, the results of estimating the inequality-FKC show support for the existence of a U-
shaped curve as well as an inverted U-shaped curve in more than half of the sample countries, 
whereas no significant evidence for nonlinearity is found for the rest. The inverted U-shaped 
curve is a depiction of the inequality-FKC, which is consistent with the nonlinearity hypothesis 
put forward by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) who suggest that income inequality goes up 
at the early stages of financial sector development as a result of credit constraints, which are 
removed once the financial sector develops beyond certain threshold—that is when the benefits 
of the financial sector are transmitted to the poor, leading to a reduction in inequality. The U-
shaped curve is in line with the financialisation literature, which suggests that excessive finance 
beyond a certain threshold aggravates income inequality. The estimated turning points of the 
growth and inequality FKCs range between 100% and 130%, depending on the measure of 
financialisation (financial structure). On average, the estimated turning points are lower when 
stock market capitalisation to GDP is used as a proxy for financialisation, which implies that 
the effects of financialisation are transmitted more rapidly through financial markets.  
 
Overall, finance plays an indispensable role in the functioning of modern economies. However, 
the relationship between finance and the real economy could be exploited through excessive 
finance under which the components of the financial sector degenerate into rent-seeking 
activities as expressed by Zingales (2015). The findings of this research are in line with the 
conclusion reached by Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) that finance contributes to economic 
growth as long as the relationship is not exploited. Besides that, finance could exert adverse 
effect on the real economy—more specifically, finance may hinder economic growth as 
implied by the falling sector of the growth FKC. The same conclusion could be easily 
generalised to income inequality.  
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From a methodological point of view, the application of EBA as a form of sensitivity analysis 
is superior to the use of straight multiple regressions in similar empirical studies. In this sense, 
it is noteworthy that the Sala-i-Martin EBA provides more reliability to the robustness decision 
by analysing the entire distribution of the coefficients rather than just the extreme bounds. The 
Sala-i-Martin EBA provides a more complete picture of the estimated coefficients rather than 
the “zero-one” labelling of traditional EBA. A practical example of the advantages of using 
Sala-i-Martin EBA is provided in sub-section 6.4.1 of chapter 6. Moreover, the supporting 
evidence for the nonlinearity of the finance-growth and finance-inequality relationships 
confirms the importance of investigating nonlinearity. 
 
8.3 Policy Implications  
Slow economic growth and widening income inequality are the defining challenges of the new 
millennium, particularly in the post-crisis era. This research revisits the empirical evidence on 
finance-growth and finance-inequality relationships in light of the recent financialisation 
literature. The findings of this study are of utmost importance for policymakers. 
 
First, it is important to understand the power and contributions of different component of the 
financial sector. Although the positive side of finance promotes economic growth, the dark side 
is that excessive finance leads to the extraction of rents from the real economy and hinders 
economic growth. In other words, an excessively large financial sector drains the resources 
available for the real sectors of the economy. Therefore, policymakers should pursue a balanced 
growth of the financial and real sectors in order re-establish the supportive role of the finance 
to the growth and productivity of the real sectors. Hence, the growth of the financial sector 
should be accommodated by “appropriate policies for financial sector reform and regulation” 
(Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011). 
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Second, the financial sector has a massive redistribution power. The findings of this research 
show that financialisation is a leading driver of income inequality in the post-crisis period. The 
literature suggests that this is a direct result of the shift of management strategy from “retention 
of profit to reinvestment” to “downsize and distribute”, which is a result of the ascendancy of 
the shareholders’ value orientation and changing corporate governance regime (Lazonick and 
O'sullivan, 2000; Lazonick, 2011). Therefore, the findings of this research imply that 
policymakers should call into question the agency theory approach (the corporate governance 
regimes) and its impacts on the physical investment in productive capital and income 
distribution. 
 
Third, the results suggest that policymakers who take the challenge of reducing income 
inequality should consider encouraging a balanced growth between the financial sector and real 
sectors. Moreover, they should focus on boosting the poor and middle classes share of income, 
by fostering labour market institutions such as labour unions. In addition, promoting a better 
education system and higher levels of institutional quality are conducive to an egalitarian 
economy. 
 
8.4 Limitation of Research  
The cross-sectional analysis provided in this study is focused on the post-crisis period using 5-
years average period (2012-2016). However, some of the primary variables used as proxies for 
financialisation and the Gini index tend to be persistent—therefore, it would be more 
appropriate to extend the period of analysis using overlapping (or non-overlapping) 5-years 
average periods over a longer period to establish solid evidence on causality. Another limitation 
is caused by the limited availability of data on the financialisation variables for most of the 
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countries. Hence, more readily available data on financialisation variables would make the 
sample bigger and in turn enhance the robustness of the empirical analysis. 
 
One more caveat pertains to the key sources of model uncertainty. In this research, considerable 
attention is given to the model uncertainty problem arising from the sensitivity of the results to 
the choice of explanatory variables. The present study will not provide the ultimate solution 
for model uncertainty problem, which requires dealing with other key sources of the problem, 
such as the sample period, estimation method, functional form, and variable definition and 
measurement (Moosa, 2018b). A comprehensive study would account all aspects of model 
uncertainty following the works of Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) and Yang et al. (2015). 
 
8.5 Avenues for Future Research  
The empirical analysis carried out in this research provides a list of key research topics to be 
dealt with in future research. First, domestic credit to the private sector was employed as a 
proxy for when it would be more insightful to distinguish between the effects on growth and 
income distribution of household and non-financial corporation credit.  
 
Second, the analysis of the consequences of the financialisation process using data at the firm 
or sectoral levels would provide a clearer picture about the direct effects of financialisation as 
well as the transmission channels whereby the effects are transmitted to the real economy. 
 
Third, few transmission channels for the effects of financialisation to the real economy are 
introduced and discussed in the literature review. It will be worthwhile to investigate these 
channels in different countries (country groups) to explore the specific mechanisms underlying 
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financialisation. This would partially answer how these countries have acquired large financial 
sectors.  
 
Fourth, the literature suggests that the financialisation era experiences a recurrent financial 
crisis and that financialisation has aggravated the instability of the financial sector (Palley, 
2007; Stockhammer, 2012). Future research may investigate the nexus between financialisation 
and financial instability at the microlevel, based on Minsky’s (1992) financial instability 
hypothesis. 
 
Fifth, the evidence for the nonlinearity among financialisation, economic growth and income 
inequality implies the existence of a threshold (or multiple thresholds). The underlying 
conditioning factors of these turning points remain unclear. The literature suggests that the 
turning points are conditioned by the level of economic development (Rioja and Valev, 2004a), 
the level of the countries’ income (Deidda and Fattouh, 2002) and the level of institutional 
quality (Law and Singh, 2014). However, the results of this research show that some developed 
countries have different turning points. For instance, the turning point in the US is reached 
when private credit to GDP ratio is around 287% while in Belgium the turning point is reached 
when private credit to GDP ratio is around 55%. Future research may investigate the factors 
determining the position of turning points for different countries. 
 
 Sixth, reference made to the above-mentioned limitation regarding the sources of model 
uncertainty. Future research may extend this study by considering other sources of model 
uncertainty when investigating the finance-growth and finance-inequality relationships, along 
the lines suggested by Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012) and Yang et al. (2015). 
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8.6 A Concluding Remark 
The results presented in this study will make some contribution to the financialisation literature. 
However, the major contribution of this study is methodological, highlighting the weakness 
and unreliability of empirical results produced by using straight multiple regressions. 
Typically, an empirical study investigating the effect of x on y is a based on a regression of y 
on x with a large number of “control” variables. The estimated coefficient on x would then 
represent a measure of the effect of x on y when other factors are held constant. However, this 
is not physics, which means that it is impossible to identify and control for everything that 
affects y. In this case, it may be a better idea not to control for anything, in which case the 
coeffeicient on x is interpreted as a measure of the effect of x on y when everything else 
changes. This is the principle guiding major works in economics, including the Phillips curve, 
Okun’s law and Wagner’s law. 
 
The use of straight multiple regressions in economics and finance can produce misleading 
results with potentially disastrous policy implications. This is what Goertzel (2002) calls “junk 
science”. Klees (2016) describes multiple regressions estimated in the process of data mining 
as “empirical fishing expeditions”, arguing that these “expiditions” are “frowned upon because 
the result of particular interest (the coefficient on the key independent variable under 
examination) will depend on which covariates are selected as ‘controls’”. Likewise, Young and 
Holsteen (2017) have the following to say about “control” variables: 
When the ‘‘true model’’ is not actually known, control variables can have unpredictable 
consequences. Adding additional control variables to a model is often expected to 
reduce bias and lead to better results. However, this intuition holds only under highly 
stylized circumstances when the true model is completed by the additional control 
variable(s). When the model is wrong—when there are remaining unobserved 
variables—controlling for some but not all variables can increase bias just as well as 
reduce it. 
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There is more where these critical comments came from. In this thesis two way-outs are 
suggested—using EBA with cross sectional data and the UCM with time series data. I am 
hopeful that this thesis will make a small contribution to endeavours aiming to make junk 
science less junky. 
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